Saturday, November 14, 2015

5 - Excerpts from Sharett’s Knesset Speech, March 8 1954

    I see the contrast between might and right, which was made here [by M. Begin, who accused the Israeli government of ignoring Israel’s basic right to East Jerusalem and to Palestine as a whole, and of basing its claims to hold parts of Israel on occupation by force] as an artificial and empty contrast. We stand for both right and might. But relying on might does not mean pursuing adventurism, and standing for right does not mean totally ignoring of reality. In recent weeks a slogan was advanced around the country, accusing the government of “missing an opportunity.”  It was advanced here too [by M. Begin]. I would like to say with all responsibility and clarity that, if we missed something during the last weeks, it was the opportunity of becoming entangled in an utterly superfluous imbroglio, one whose dire consequences nobody can foresee.
[- - -]
    If we are witnessing all around us countries afflicted by shocks and upheavals, we can boast about our own stable situation. [- - -] We do not relish seeing the regimes around us bathing in havoc. We are not striving to remain the only island of democracy in this sea of upheaval and scheming. [- - -] It is in our interest to live in a peaceful, stable and progressive area, where human dignity and national rights are hallowed principles; where the needs of the masses are preferable to whims of individual rulers. It is against this background that we do not at all regret our past calls for peace, our dozens of initiatives for peace, or at least for bringing it nearer. I daresay that, in our seeking of solutions in this direction, in our willingness to try here and there to extend our hand over and beyond the wall of enmity and alienation – even in our daring act of casting our vote for the independence of Libya [at the UN in 1949], and in our unfulfilled hopes we had in some individual rulers and in certain regimes – there was more responsibility and more Zionism than in the vociferous and vain proclamations about our “foreign policy failures.” [- - -]
    While the decisive consideration in choosing our present political position is the reality of constant Arab warfare against us, when every Arab state gaining independence automatically joins the front of enmity against us, we still should not, in spite the state of war, shut our eyes from looking towards the distant horizon of our future and from the vision of peace to come. This must govern the essence of our actions and of the positions we to take.
[- - -]
    We should be fully aware of the limits of our ability, of where to draw the boundary between wise and effective policy and the area of destructive adventure – even if it’s only in words, such as those proclamations regarding the tearing off parts of a neighboring country [Lebanon], even if not by ourselves but by other [i.e., Maronite] hands. These words were of sheer folly, but, if accepted literally, they could tear down not the in area in question but the fabric of future relations between us and our neighbor with no repair, relations without which it is very difficult to picture life of peace and stability for us and for our future generations. Such raw suggestions are immediately gulped by agile news agencies, then spread over countries near and far as representing the way of thinking of our public as a whole - they are distorting our image and ruin our good name as well as the attitude of respect and admiration towards us as balanced political factor; they are inciting against us and intensify hatred towards us for no reason at all.

SOURCE: Divrei ha-Knesset, vol.15, pp.1084-86.

4 - Excerpts from Sharett’s Knesset Speech, December 7 1953

Let us not exaggerate the value of hasbara [explaining Israeli actions abroad]. Hasbara cannot function and convince [international public opinion] every time and in all cases. There are deep-rooted facts whose impact no hasbara can erase. With the establishment of the state of Israel all DP [displaced persons] camps [of Holocaust survivors], which gave no rest to human conscience, disappeared. But at the same time there arose Arab refugee camps, and no hasbara whatsoever, including myriad speeches and dozens of booklets, shall erase their factual existence. I would like to cite another case, a more recent one. The Qibya action. It is my duty to tell the Knesset – it is incumbent on the  Foreign Ministry to function as a spotter of foreign occurrences and inform people of what it sees there – that the Qibya action was anathema to the Jewish public [abroad]. It shook Jewish masses to the depth of their souls and depressed them to the utmost. It broke, on that day, their pride. [- - -] Perhaps the people who executed that action were right; perhaps there was no other choice. But we must be aware – each and every one of us must be aware – that such [international shockwaves] were the result. Perhaps these [international] results are not decisive –  if the action has improved our security situation, then perhaps this is more important; and, if so, we should put up with the negative reaction. However let us not ignore reality, let us be aware of concrete facts.
    A far-reaching change has occurred in our situation, from which some conclusions can be clearly drawn. For dozens of years we were a political movement, not a political reality. We were a movement facing towards the future. We appealed to the world’s conscience, we tabled before it a moral demand, we professed lofty principles: our historical right, our people’s distress, our striving for freedom, the international justice which dictates the fulfilling of this endeavor. Now we have succeeded in becoming a political fact, a center of interests governed by ourselves, a nucleus of power which is our own. The value of this change is immeasurable. However, we shall not be saved by force alone. We are still a spiritual movement, we are a movement of aliya [immigration] and the founding of new settlements, of the ingathering of exiles. We are still a nation in the process of being built, and thus in need of help. But even when we shall fully be a nation, when the day comes when we will be able to say, “We have reached the goal of fully being a nation and there it is”, because we shall number millions, and even if there will be peace between us and our neighbors – we shall still be here “a people that dwells alone”, a single Jewish republic obviously in this whole area, if not in the whole world, a single Jewish republic that would have to overcome its isolation by maintaining a network of ties with the world at large.
    But there is more to it. We have a past legacy and we have a mission for the future. We had once said something to the world. We made a contribution to its treasures of spiritual life and its mores, and we feel and believe that we can still make a contribution. And hence our problem is how to fuse together the element of temporal might with the spiritual element, the element of the concrete reality with the element of lofty moral endeavor. It is the task of our policy to fully utilize our being a concrete reality while at the same time preserving to the utmost our moral stature in the eyes of the whole world.

Source: Divrei ha-Knesset, vol. 15, p.320. On November 30, 1953 the Knesset debated the UN SC resolution censoring Israel for the Qibya raid. Prime Minister Sharett opened that debate. On December 7 the PM replied to comments made by MKs during that debate.

3 - Excerpts from Sharett’s Speeches, Cabinet Meeting, October 18, 1953

From the opening remarks:

I was let down by misleading information given to me by the people responsible for the [dredging] work [on the northern Jordan waters] regarding the Arab plots. Had I known the facts, I would not have authorized the starting of the work. I would have first found out the facts. I think it was possible not to touch any Arab plots.
    In my argument with Bennike I said it was written, black on white, in the Armistice Agreement that civil life should be returned to normalcy, which means a constant process of change. Moreover, at the time [of the armistice negotiations] we received a letter from [UN mediator Ralph S.] Bunche in which he stated clearly that civilian life includes development. I emphasized that this letter had a decisive influence on the Cabinet’s willingness to sign the Agreement. [- - -] By ordering the stoppage of work the UN becomes a tool in the economic warfare of the Arab League against Israel.
    I received a message from an important [American] Zionist, who related to me a conversation he had with Byroade. Byroade had told him: “They [i.e., the Israelis] are clearly decided to provoke a war; this is their policy. Every move they make must be understood in this context. They are attempting to do this once in the north, once in the south, and now at the center [Qibya], in order to provoke the other side to a response which would ignite a war. And they have the naivete, or hutspa, to come to us and ask for financial aid. I summoned Russell and during our conversation I told him that I knew Byroade well as an honest man, and I could not understand how such filth could enter his clean mind. Russell should be aware that we are decided to foil the Arab intention to paralyze our life. We shall do everything towards the country’s development. It so happens that we had to agree to the existence of demilitarized zones, but we cannot give up the use of them which is vital for the development of the country. Russell did not mention Qibya, and I said: “I have the right to demand that you understand what happened there. This was an outburst which resulted when all had failed.

From the concluding remarks:
    I am aware I am making a last, desperate attempt to convince the Cabinet members [on the issue of the work stoppage on the Jordan canal]. [- - -] As I see it, there is a crying contradiction between our objective, definite, unavoidable dependence on the outside world, a dependence on its assistance, 0n its sympathy, [on the one hand] and our self-seclusion, a psychological seclusion and a complete disconnection from the outside world [on the other]. [- - -] I am doing it not because there is a chance that I will succeed, but because I must make you face a certain reality, a certain was of seeing it, so that the Cabinet decision is not taken on the basis of ignoring reality. [- - -] I didn’t notice here any willingness to be open-eyed. We are all rigid, and the rigidity is extreme. [- - -] I would have liked to see among us an all-encompassing, comprehensive consideration. I didn’t find it. I interpret the very fact that I have not succeeded in convincing the Cabinet members as my personal failure. I think that on an issue such as this one, the Foreign Minister should resign. I am aware of the meaning of such a resignation at this juncture, in view of its repercussions abroad, so in practical terms this move is impossible. But morally this is how feel. I feel that my failure to convince you is a failure that morally obliges me to resign.
    Now, to the second subject [of Qibya]. I was asked here directly by the Minister Shapiro if I had known about the reprisal or not. [- - -]. On Tuesday’s evening I was informed about the killing of the woman and her two children [at Kfar Yehud] and about the reprisal plan. The information did not reach me directly, but this is another question. I did not see any reason to oppose it then. But the next morning, when I was informed of the decision of the IJMAC to reprimand Jordan and to take all steps [against the perpetrators], I approached the Minister of Defense and told him of my opposition. He said he would consider it. In the afternoon I received additional information. Glubb thanked CoS Makleff for letting Jordan use our dogs to follow the murderers inside Jordan and informed him he was doing everything possible to find the murderers and punish them. I then strengthened my opposition, but was told that the operation must be executed since the wheels were already set in motion. [- - -] Had I an inkling of the dimensions of the operation, I would have summoned the Cabinet members from their night beds. Whether we like it or not, we are judged by different moral standards than others are. I am appalled when I hear people say they are shocked especially by the killing of women and children [in Qibya]. As I see it, this incident is different from others not because of the killing of women and children, but because of the scale of the killing, because we appear as a people capable of spilling blood, of executing mass killings. It will take years of effort to live it down, to  overcome this blot, in the same way that we have not yet overcome the hanging of the two [British] sergeants [by the Irgun in July 1947] – and these were soldiers, not civilians. This is the picture [people have of Israel]: that we are capable of spilling much blood.
[- - -] The impression abroad is of our political hooliganism and complete moral blindness. Never mind clashing with the UN on all fronts, raising against us world public opinion. We are doing our job and that’s that; we do not care what others think.

NOTE: Other excerpts from Sharett's speeches at this Cabinet meeting are given in Moshe Sharett: Rosh Hamemshala Hasheni: Mivhar Te'udot Meperkei Hayyav (Hebrew - Moshe Sharett: The Second Prime Minister - Selected Documents) eds. Yemima Rosenthal & Louise Fischer (Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 2007), doc.125.

2 - UN Security Council Resolution 95 (1951), September 1 1951

The Security Council,
1    Recalling that in its resolution 73 (1949) of 11 August 1949 relating to the conclusion of Armistice Agreements between Israel and the neighbouring Arab States it drew attention to the pledges in these Agreements "against any further acts of hostility between the parties",
2    Recalling further that in its resolution 89 (1950) of 17 November 1950 it reminded the States concerned that the Armistice Agreements to which they were parties contemplated "the return of permanent peace in Palestine", and, therefore, urged them and the other States in the area to take all such steps as would lead to the settlement of the issues between them,
3    Noting the report of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine to the Security Council of 12 July 1951,
4    Further noting that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization recalled the statement of the senior Egyptian delegate in Rhodes on 13 January 1949, to the effect that his delegation was "inspired with every spirit of co-operation, conciliation and a sincere desire to restore peace in Palestine", and that the Egyptian Government has not complied with the earnest plea of the Chief of Staff made to the Egyptian delegate on 12 June 1951, that it desist from the present practice of interfering with the passage through the Suez Canal of goods destined for Israel,
5    Considering that since the armistice regime, which has been in existence for nearly two and a half years, is of a permanent character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or requires to exercise the right of visit, search and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defence,
6    Finds that the maintenance of the practice mentioned in the fourth paragraph of the present resolution is inconsistent with the objectives of a peaceful settlement between the parties and the establishment of a permanent peace in Palestine set forth in the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel;
7    Finds further that such practice is an abuse of the exercise of the right of visit, search and seizure;
8    Further finds that that practice cannot in the prevailing circumstances be justified on the ground that it is necessary for self-defence;
9    And further noting that the restrictions on the passage of goods through the Suez Canal to Israel ports are denying to nations at no time connected with the conflict in Palestine valuable supplies required for their economic reconstruction, and that these restrictions together with sanctions applied by Egypt to certain ships which have visited Israel ports represent unjustified interference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas and to trade freely with one another, including the Arab States and Israel,
10    Calls upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal wherever bound and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and to the observance of the international conventions in force.

1 - The Tripartite Declaration, May 25 1950

    The Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, having had occasion during the recent Foreign Ministers meeting in London to review certain questions affecting the peace and stability of the Arab states and of Israel, and particularly that of the supply of arms and war material to these states, have resolved to make the following statements:
        1. The three Governments recognize that the Arabs states and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole. All applications for arms or war material for these countries will be considered in the light of these principles. In this connection the three Governments wish to recall and reaffirm the terms of the statements made by their representatives on the Security Council on August 4, 1949, in which they declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab states and Israel.
        2. The three Governments declare that assurances have been received from all the states in question, to which they permit arms to be supplied from their countries, that the purchasing state does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other state to which they permit arms to be supplied in the future.
        3. The three Governments tale this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in the area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistent with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.