Saturday, April 30, 2016

13 - Excerpts from the Cabinet Meeting of June 20, 1954

Defense Minister Lavon reported: “About three months earlier an appropriate request was made to the US Government to invite the CoS for a visit to instruction installments of the US Army. The State Department responded positively, but an official invitation did not arrive. Later, when the American General Trudeau arrived on a courtesy visit to the CoS, he was carrying an invitation, but instead of handing it over he said: ‘I hear that you are about to visit the USA, this is very good.’ We could not consider this as an appropriate invitation. It seems Trudeau passed through Istanbul when the American Ambassadors in the Middle East convened there, and probably they convinced him that officially inviting the Israeli CoS would be detrimental to American-Arab relations. After all this, our Washington Embassy inquired at the State Department about what had happened. They put the onus on the Pentagon. We again asked that Eban demand an official, respectable invitation. My opinion is that unless an official invitation is received we should give up the CoS's visit.”

Prime Minster Sharett: “When the issue of the visit arose, I found it had both positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, I thought a visit carried out not for a specific military purpose was unnecessary. On the other hand, I thought it was a good idea that, in view of circumstances at the time – this was close to the Qibya affair – the visit would carry some political importance since it would create the impression that there is some cooperation between the two armies. It would have also impressed the Arab states that something is brewing. Meanwhile, the Pentagon informed our military attaché in Washington [Chaim Herzog] that they were expecting the CoS. Apparently they want to meet with him and appraise his personality. Our Embassy people said it would be quite awkward if we insisted on an official invitation after the various announcements that the CoS is a welcomed guest.
“At this juncture I decided to push the matter further, since I consider the visit very desirable, and this morning, during Russell’s visit at my office for another purpose to which I will refer shortly, I told him our people were confused in view of the strange situation created around the visit, since the expected letter of invitation was not handed over. The Israeli CoS cannot beseech the Pentagon. If he is a welcome guest, then he should receive a written invitation. Russell said he would raise the matter with Washington.
“As to Russell’s visit, he came in order to inform me of a tripartite initiative regarding Jordan and Israel with a view to bettering the situation along the borders [the 11-point aide-memoire]. We know that these suggestions were worked out during consultations between the Americans and the British, but out of friendliness and courtesy they asked the French to join in. They decided to first table these suggestion before the Jordanians and explained this procedure by saying that we are people with a healthy, normal psychology while the Jordanians are a bit sick in this respect; if the suggestions were first put before the Israelis, then the Arabs would be sure that they had been concocted in Jerusalem. I did not read the aide-memoire given to me by Russell so that I would not have to respond to its content immediately.”
Defense Minister Lavon, who was asked to give his opinion of the aide-memoire, said it was a harmful document on several accounts. It changes the status of the UN from a mediator into a governing body, into a new High Commissioner [recalling British rule over Palestine during the Mandate period]. Second, it calls for territorial changes, including free passage between Gaza Strip and Jordan, to be executed without an agreement between the two parties concerned.
Next, Sharett reported on recent conversations with Johnston’s aides in view of today’s scheduled meeting with Johnston. It became clear that the Lebanese were adamant on not involving the Litani waters in any regional water plan, both at present and in future. On the other hand, under American pressure, the Arabs have ceased their opposition to the use of the Jordan waters outside the Jordan basin.
Lavon then reported about the Mevo Betar incident. Three members of the settlement were murdered. According to the footprints and blood stains it is clear that the incident took place inside Israeli territory. How and why the three got to the place of murder is now under investigation. Lavon also reported that a UN observer who came to Mevo Betar for the purpose of investigating the murders was attacked physically by one of the “understandably agitated” settlers, who was stopped by an IDF officer. “Our friend Hutchison,” Lavon noted, has “already made a fuss about it”.

12 - Jawaharlal Nehru to Moshe Sharett, June 5, 1954

My dear Mr Sharett,
Thank you for your letter of 21st May which reached me through your Consul in Bombay. Although we have not met, I have endeavoured to follow your activities in Israel, and I was therefore happy to receive your letter.
At the Columbo Conference, the subject of Israel was brought up by the Prime Minister of Pakistan with a view to condemning Israel lock stock and barrel. Some of us were not agreeable and since then much has been said in Pakistan about India not supporting Pakistan in this matter at Columbo.
It was in this connection, a little later, that I had a talk with U Nu, the Prime Minister of Burma. I told him that India recognised Israel about two years ago but that we had not exchanged diplomatic representation. There was no basic objection to this; indeed, normally this follows recognition. But we had felt that we might not be able to serve the cause that we have at heart if at this junction we exchanged diplomatic representation. I am convinced that the problems of Israel and the Arab countries can only be solved by some settlement between them. It is possible that at an appropriate moment, we might be of some service in this matter. But, unfortunately, this whole question is wrapped up in passion and prejudice and it is no easy matter to find a way out. If we established diplomatic relations with Israel at the present juncture, this would not facilitate our task.
This was the general line of our talk. Perhaps, I did not explain myself clearly and U Nu misunderstood me to some extent.
You have quoted in your letter the appropriate and beautiful words of the Song of Songs. Unhappily the world has become much too complicated for these simple and natural approaches.
All good wishes to you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru.

SOURCE: Text of copy of letter courtesy of Dr Yehuda Freundlich, Israel State Archives.

11 - Winston Churchill to Moshe Sharett, April 23, 1954

Replying to Sharett’s message dated April 13, Winston Churchill wrote:

... I am glad of your assurance that the Government of Israel intend to work for peace, and you know how ardently I have always sought friendship and co-operation between our two countries.
All my information shows that the Jordanian Government are in fact doing their best to curb frontier incidents. We must ourselves be the judges of our obligations to Jordan, but we shall certainly neglect no opportunity to use our influence in the direction of a peaceful settlement of the problems which afflict you and them.
Meanwhile it is obvious that a policy of retaliatory raids and the boycott of United Nations institutions can only intensify Arab Governments’ fears and postpone the day when they will be willing to come to terms with Israel. It is for this reason and in Israel’s own interest that I felt bound to appeal to Your Excellency for moderation and patience. I am reassured by your promise that you and your colleagues will strike to curb passions and to make sane counsels prevail. The fate of countless men, women and children, both Jew and Arab, may hang on the success of your endeavours. So, too, may hang the future of the great experiment in your country which as you know I have always regarded as one of the most hopeful and encouraging adventures of the 20th century.

SOURCE: TNA FO371/111070 VR1072/68.

Friday, April 29, 2016

10 - Excerpts from Sharett's Speech to Mapai Political Committee, April 15, 1954

Inasmuch as American planning is going on, the appeal of the US to the Arab world is being strengthened. This planning doesn’t involve inviting all the Arab states to join the defense pact. They cannot involve Egypt as long as the problem of her relations with Britain is not resolved. It is also doubtful whether Egypt is prepared to join in view of her neutralist tendencies. However the US has not despaired; it would like to do something in order to engage the Egyptians, perhaps by bribing them with arms with no conditions attached. And this would lessen opposition to this step by other Arab states. However at this juncture another opposition [force] appears: Israel is enlisting Jewish and non-Jewish public opinion in America, and thus ensues a confrontation between Israeli and American Jewish public opinion and the policy of the State Department. There was a time during the Truman-Acheson administration when, as a result of State Department influence over Acheson, the President almost approved bribing Egypt with arms worth of several millions, and only the Israeli Embassy’s intervention, with the help of Jewish circles and non-Jewish circles in Congress, [persuaded] Truman to withhold the necessary approval. Acheson then agreed that he had been mistaken, but the State Department almost won the day.
Then there was a time when the State Department suggested $100 million be allotted for military aid to the Middle East. We, who had constantly demanded military aid from America, assessed that we would benefit more if no military aid at all were given than if it were allotted according to the State Department plan, since they meant arming the Arabs only. Our intervention did not succeed 100%, but it did by exactly 70%. Our advance-party – our friends in Congress – opposed pouring money for naught and the grant was lowered from $100 to $30 million. This matter deeply angered the State Department, who knew who had pulled the strings. The $30 million served as a basis for the Turkey-Pakistan pact, and half the sum went to Pakistan.
But it is one thing to enlist Jewish public opinion against arming Egypt, and another to raise the question of posing a direct danger to Israel, and to enter into the sphere of global defense of the American civilization against the danger of Soviet aggression. And obviously American Jews are very sensitive to avoid being accused of damaging their government’s defense plans.
But again, insofar as Iraq is concerned, intensive action has been taken. There is a confrontation here, and they [the State Department] are full of anger and intensively trying to convince us to drop our opposition. True, it may well be that Iraq will receive several millions in spite of our opposition, but it would be much more convenient on their part if they reach a compromise with us on this matter. For it’s one thing if Israeli diplomacy and Israeli dailies oppose American move, but something totally different if this becomes a political issue inside America, when intensive efforts by newspaper articles, radio propaganda, pressure by Congressional delegations are all nourished by Jewish public opinion, and the lever activating Jewish public opinion is Israeli influence. The State Department is opening an operation against this influence. Its efforts are aimed at deterring American Jews from serving Israeli propaganda. It claims it [i.e., arming the Arabs] is necessary for the defense of the West; that it is a paramount American interest and whoever opposes it is not a patriotic American. Jews are asked: Who are you? Are you American citizens, or Israel’s supporters within American society? Do you favor America’s interests or Israel’s, if ever the latter contradicts the former?
This confrontation has taken on other forms, quite concrete and alarming as well.  Our financial machinery in the United States is highly complicated. You all know that the UJA [United Jewish Appeal] functions mainly thanks to the fact that contributions to it are tax deductible. This means that a high proportion of the UJA’s income are indeed contributions by the American Treasury, and this is allowed on condition that the money is spent on charitable matters. But one can prove that part of this money is serving propaganda that is used against the official policy of the United States. Thus there is a background here of far-reaching complications.
If this process has, as is reported, been stopped, then it is precisely because of the general awakening of American Jewry for the defense of Israel and against the arming of the Arab countries by American money – a stand supported by liberal public opinion in America. Moreover, the State Department has counter-productively stopped the grant to Israel. This move caused a real explosion in public opinion and Jews and non-Jews alike mustered great courage on this issue. One could discern here an interesting psychological-social dialectical process, for it came after the terrible impact of the Qibya affair on American Jewry.
I said at the time some sharp words on that affair at the Knesset. There were some haverim who were angered by that sharpness. Not only did I not exaggerate, but I refrained from saying all that had to be said on the matter. That was a blow to American Jewry, for it was the first time that this Jewry lost its confidence in the rightfulness of Israel’s action. The slogan “my country, right or wrong” does not generally pertain to American Jews. They love to support Israel out of confidence the they are supporting a just case; that not only is the cause of Israel right in principle, but that what she is doing is right. When they are protesting against the arming of Iraq or Syria, they are convinced they are supporting a just position. Here [in the case of Qibya operation] they lost this confidence, and it became a sore, a terrible burden. For the first time they found themselves unable to feel psychological identification with Israel.
But the very fact that, immediately after this, there occurred the suspension of the grant, gave vent to a response against this move which would have been weaker if not for the Qibya distress. Now they felt free to pronounce fully their protest, fully convinced that the case of Israel was right. This response has brought about concrete results. The Republican Party took notice. Elections to the Congress are forthcoming. The leaders of the State Department too were not oblivious to Jewish public opinion. There is ground to believe that Dulles himself, perhaps Eisenhower too, realized the boys at the State Department went too far and should be restrained. Jewish influence was not correctly assessed. Some local observers believe that this has halted the strong impetus of moving the center of gravity from Israel to the Arab states.
[- - -]
It should be clear that the United States increasingly views the Arab states as participating in its global defense plan. Clearly, then, the Soviet Union must try to disrupt these plans of the West. The Soviets believe that as the Arabs were neutral between Hitler and the democracies in World War II, they may now be neutral between democracy and communism, and thus every effort must be made to encourage them to oppose Western policy. Clearly, this increases American efforts to win the friendship of the Arab countries, and this of course does not improve our situation.
This is the background over which the deterioration of the security situation is taking place. To put it better, this is the background of the struggle between us and the Arab countries over the Armistice Agreements, over their implementation and violation.
To begin with it must be clear the Western states are not interested in this situation. I find it necessary to state this, since here is among us a tendency to always see some foreign power pulling strings and stirring up quarrels. Neither the United States nor Britain are interested in finding themselves pressed to support any side against the other. They have no interest in the conflict. Britain has no interest in activating its mutual defense pact with Jordan. Britain is interested in quiet reigning in our area. But when the situation is not calm, we shouldn’t expect her to be too honest and forthright, since this would mean supporting us against the Arabs and castigating them as aggressors. Given Britain’s general tendency, we shouldn’t expect such behavior and we should realize this in advance. I will not say this in the Knesset, nor in a public speech or in a press conference; but in order to understand our situation we should be aware of this. There are situations in which they find themselves unable not to be critical of the Arab states, such as in the case of free passage thorough the Suez Canal. But whenever they take a pro-Israel stance, they do so under duress.
It should then be clear in advance that, in order to square accounts, they will judge us mercilessly on any transgression of ours. And while the United States and Britain will do their utmost to prevent a conflagration, this is a two-edged sword, for their intervening can be against the Arabs, but also against us. And here it’s not considerations of honesty and justice that reign, but those of which side is easier to check.
This is part of the background, perhaps the main part, against which we should examine our security problem today, indeed during the last weeks and months, even years. Here, at every new phase, the question of our security pops up anew. And the crux of the matter is the question of retaliation.
I believe there can be no disagreement among us regarding whether we should or should not resort to political weapons. It seems that even Herut doesn’t demand that we cease talking with the Powers and engaging public opinion, avoid taking any notice of the UN, and solve all our problems by force alone.
Generally speaking, I accept it as a basic tenet that our struggle should be mixed and balanced, more or less, between the two factors of direct action and diplomacy and propaganda. However, on the question of direct action serious disagreement might certainly arise.
I take it for granted, not only theoretically, that we do not wish for war. This is a serious question. We must ask ourselves: do we want war? I believe in utter certainty that we do not want war, and I think it is not necessary to explain why. But this fact alone doesn’t solve the problem, because our not wanting war doesn’t mean we may not become entangled in war, that we cannot slide into war. Moreover, I am confident and convinced the Arab states do not want war. And this is the current assessment of our soldiers: that the Arab states, at least at present, do not want war. They are all full to the brim with anger and a passion for vengeance, but a passion for vengeance is not tantamount with a well thought-out desire to enter into war. First, they have not forgotten their defeat; second, they are not ready yet; third, Egypt and Syria especially have been enmeshed in internal conflicts for a long time now. And in both countries the army is involved more than any other factor, this resulting in the armies’ inability to rehabilitate themselves. Of course, this doesn’t mean that the Arab states may not slide into war.
These two assumptions do not solve the problem. One could argue that since the possibility of being enmeshed in war exists and, since this eventuality would be unfavorable to us, we should not by any means take too extreme a step which would lead us into it.
After the [March 28 IDF] Nahhalin operation as well, Jordan strongly demanded that Britain consider it a casus belli and come to her support [under the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty]. Britain avoided such a step, but she took care to tell us – and tell us most clearly – that this doesn’t mean she would continue in this vein: “O.K., this time we did not move, but we may next time.” Indeed, one cannot know how much our military operations against Jordan have undermined Britain’s position there. Britain can continue her policy of not acting against us according to the defense pact she has with Jordan, but she can also act if we go too far. Between these two ends we must be swaying constantly.
These are the considerations involved in this problem, but these are not all. We must realize that each serious retaliation operation we mount – and the logic operating here dictates that most of them are serious – I am not talking about Qibya, that was a totally exceptional episode; we have not sat down to investigate the Qibya matter, but its psychological results all over the globe were evident. As far as the world is concerned, this was an indelible stain on Israel, I doubt whether it will ever be erased. It is something which has entered the annals of History. Not everything enters History; this did enter and shall remain there. This doesn’t means that we would not be able to overcome this – such things occur in the history of all nations, and now we have one in ours.
I am not talking about the Qibya incident, but rather about other operations. Generally, when the Arabs act, one or two men infiltrate, usually for the purpose of theft, not in order to kill people. Sometimes, when they are spotted by a watchman, they shoot and kill him. But we [i.e., the IDF] are not crossing the borders in order to steal. Our aim is to carry out some operation.
And when we are mounting an operation, it is not we who publicize it. The initiative for action and the initiative for publication do not go hand in hand. [- - -] The other side publicizes whatever he wishes, and we are not always able to deny or correct it. We can say: who cares, the main thing is the impact of the operation. But this is not so simple, for we are operating also in the sphere of diplomacy and public relations. From this point of view we can only lose.
Moreover, an action taken against us, being a small-scale event, doesn’t evoke much impression in world public opinion. When three people are killed, nobody is impressed. The news is printed somewhere inside the newspaper. It doesn’t make a headline across a page; some newspapers won’t mention it at all. Then, when we retaliate, our action appears not as a second link in a chain or process, but as an unprovoked initiative starting a new chain of violence.
Take the instance of the Nahhalin operation. In [Moshav] Kessalon one settler was killed [on the night of March 26-27]. As far as the world was concerned, this was not devastating news. But when the New York Times correspondent reported about the Nahhalin retaliation, he sent a long dispatch which impressed its readers that a military assault was mounted – according to [Sir John Bagot] Glubb [British Commander of the Jordanian Arab Legion] by 200 soldiers – against a village and that we were repelled; and had we not been repelled, a massacre, a second Qibya, would have taken place and only thanks to the Jordanians defending themselves were only 9 of their men killed.
And when this is the impression people receive, an impression which finds expression also in the Security Council’s deliberations and resolutions, and in communiqués of the big Powers, then all this encourages the other side to continue with infiltration. It doesn’t deter them; it encourages them. And, as far as the international echo is concerned, inasmuch as the aim of the retaliation is deterrence, it achieves the very opposite.
Moreover, retaliations unify the other side. Inasmuch as they hate us, they enhance that hate even more. I am not talking about a certain village which was hit or about its region which include many other panicked villages. I am talking about the whole nation, the whole [Middle East] area. Retaliations inflame the fire of hate, and the fire of hate nourishes, not always immediately, additional sabotage actions. And behind all this looms a risk of an entanglement in war.
Clearly, there are reasons, heavily-weighted reasons, for the mounting of retaliations. [- - -] I am not sure I shall encompass here all these reasons, but let me say this: One reason offered – and I personally don’t take it as proven – is that retaliation prevents further terrorist acts, perhaps immediately, perhaps later, perhaps on the spot, perhaps in other areas. It might well be that it is worthwhile, that an act on the spot [i.e., retaliation against the nearest Jordanian village to the Israeli target hit by infiltrators] affects a stoppage of acts of terror there; perhaps it deters. But this has not been proven to me. I could cite incidents of terrorism which were a direct and almost immediate response to our doing; there were also cases when supposedly there was a lull after our actions, maybe because of our action. Thus I say this remains an open question. I wonder whether it would ever be possible to prove one way or the other.
But there is another rather weighty reason which claims that retaliations awaken the other side’s authorities from their  lethargy, or at least  prompts them in this direction. Any government – I wonder if Israel is included – has an interest in avoiding trouble as much as possible. Suppose Jordan is doing something against infiltration into Israel, but in doing this she facing strong opposition. She does the minimum, not the maximum. How can Jordan be brought to do the maximum? By convincing? By appealing to her sense of justice or human considerations? Logically, it is only if she realizes that avoiding the prevention of infiltration costs her much harsher troubles than if she would chose to prevent it. This is serious reasoning. But, on the other hand, in the meantime people [in Jordan] are provoked to carry out more terrorist actions; in the meantime general hatred of Israel is inflamed; in the meantime Jordan’s government is under heavier duress. This creates an atmosphere in which it again see itself unfettered from the need to use preventive measures, since she can claim she is confronted with Jewish aggression and nothing more. Thus our accounting can fail on this level too.
There is a third reasoning, one which it seems no one can refute, and this is the settlers’ morale. We all know the situation on our borders. We know how the settlers there are burdened by the quota of night-duty each of them must spend guarding his village, by the stealing of his property, by the feeling his village is a target of attacks. If in view of this background the settlers are aware that they are left to their fate because no reprisals are being carried out, then this situation might enhance the deterioration of the settlers’ morale, which is already low. It may well be that we must mount reprisals only in order to buttress their spirits and demonstrate that the State stands behind them and is not indifferent. There is a battle going on; they are part of the front line; and they too must take part in it. This consideration is binding.
I must mention one more consideration, which is the general feeling reigning in the country. It is a consideration that a democracy cannot always ignore. There is no doubt that, after the Ma’aleh Akrabim incident which was not responded to by a reprisal, there was a heavy felling of distress in the country. And obviously this feeling has not vanished, when the papers report Ambassador Elath’s meeting with Eden and Ambassador Eban’s meeting with Dulles, or my speech in the Knesset or other speeches on this matter. All these gave a certain vent to the hard feelings, but the general distress passed away when the Nahhalin reprisal was publicized. But I must add here that I suspect whether any of those whose distress dissipated thanks to that reprisal had foreseen in advance its consequences.
Well, these are the considerations. But there something else too. It is the fact that the other side doesn’t suffer, or suffer less, from untruth. He is less sensitive, his society is less sensitive to untruth. But he is also less in need to say untruths, for were I the Jordanian Government, I could most calmly say that I did not send off all the bands into Israel – anyway, not in all cases. It is clear that inside Jordan’s government and inside the Jordanian Army there are elements who assist these acts, but obviously no one can say these acts are perpetrated by the Jordanian Army. One can count on less than five fingers the cases in which Arab soldiers of any the Arab state crossed our border and mounted military operations since the end of hostilities in 1949.
However, when we mounting any operation, it doesn’t matter what we say and what we don’t say – sometimes we say this, sometimes that, sometimes we say nothing – it is clear to any thinking and well-oriented person that this action was not initiated by some unknown private individual but by the State, pure and simple. They all know what kind of a country Israel is, what kind of an army we have. So when they approach Jordan they at best say: “Listen, you must do something and curb infiltration.” But when we are approached they say to our government: “You are responsible. We demand that you cease doing this.” And I must confess here, within these four walls, that an unpleasant feeling is born, because you cannot say all the truth that is in your heart. You cannot. I don’t know whether I should come to conclusions [and resign?].  But it should be clear that retaliation cannot be a panacea for every single incident. Consideration is needed in each individual case. In general, retaliation is something which is better to minimize than maximize, something which is better to do in intervals than constantly. And it is something which must be accompanied by an explanatory [hasbara] effort within the Israeli public.
For instance, if we castigate the deterioration of the armistice regime, it should not lead to a conclusion that we want to completely do away with this machinery, because its abolition means war. We should make it clear that we are interested in its continued functioning as long as we have no better alternative. We should always remember that, in spite of the situation being bad, that it might be worse. This must be explained to our public. And it is needed in the Army.
It must be clear that while the function of force and weapons on this front is important – without the Army and its ability to respond and make war we would have been lost – it is impossible to mount our campaign only by this single instrument. Our campaign must be mounted by political means as well, and thus the question always arises: how much is this instrument helping the political battle and how much is it damaging it? At times it is impossible to avoid damaging the political battle by concrete action [of the IDF], but ignoring it is something unthinkable. And this not-ignoring is necessary not only at the level of the decision-makers, but also at the levels of the public and the Army.
There is also here another factor which is certainly not decisive but it too cannot be ignored. And this is the relationship between us and diaspora Jews. We have witnessed a crafty scheme to insert a wedge between us and Jews abroad as was evident in a certain passage of Byroade’s speech, which was a continuation of State Department policy. This is a very grave matter, and we expect a response first and foremost from American Jews. It would be sad if the response is manifested only in the Israeli press and in pronunciations by the Embassy of Israel [in Washington]. We cannot, if we aim at the strengthening of the ties of diaspora Jews with us and instilling courage in their hearts to maintain these ties, to rightfully speak up on our behalf, we cannot ignore – take notice, haverim, I am not saying this is a decisive consideration; I am saying we cannot allow ourselves to ignore – their direct internal, psychological responses to our actions. We cannot demand their solidarity and rely on their assistance while at the same time behave as if they do not exist.
There are of course matters which depend on effective explaining; there are matters which are difficult to explain; and there are matters which are unexplainable. We can also take actions which cannot be explained. But we should be aware of this problem. We simply cannot allow ourselves to forget it. And this too must be a part of educating our public and the Army.
[- - -]

SOURCE: Israel Labor Party Archives.

9 - Summary of Remarks by the Foreign Minister during a Consultation at the MFA, April 12 1954

The views heard here represent my thinking which I have expressed not once in internal debates, but they were limited to a one-sided consideration of dealing with the situation from an international point of view rather than from a national one. I am not talking about hot-heads and people thirsty for blood, who demand retaliations, but about those who are very much restrained, but are not willing to give up retaliation as one among several weapons used in this battlefield. For inasmuch there are decisive considerations against retaliating, there also exist practical considerations for it.
What are the main considerations?
1. If we desist from retaliation operations, does this repair the situation? Does this stop infiltrations and thefts?
2. If not retaliations, what are we suggesting instead?
One cannot ignore morale. I differentiate between two: The Army’s morale and the morale of the settlers [in border areas vulnerable to attack]. I think we should ignore the element of the Army's morale; it is unacceptable to let the Army carry out operations just for the sake of lifting its spirits. The Army must be disciplined so as not to lose awareness of its importance even when it is not carrying out actions.
However, I cannot ignore the element of morale among the settlers. An Army is controlled by the government of the state, but there is no power in the world that can control the settlers’ spirit. If we take into account what is said in London, Washington and New York, we must first take into account what is said by this or that settler of a village he was sent to by us. As far as these people are concerned, it is a fact that night after night infiltrators come in, steal and murder. The next day it becomes necessary to add two more guardsmen, while the number of settlers is not growing. If such incidents continue with no response, then the settlers feel that the Army and the government are indifferent, and this undermines their morale, while if the see that the Army is fighting, their morale is boosted.
Let us assume there are 100 settlers in a village, and 20 of them leave. The burden of guarding during the nights becomes heavier. There is also a danger in houses being empty, for sometimes an infiltrating gang can hide in an empty house in daytime and attack again on the second night. In some cases the number of settlers leaving a border village grows to a point that threatens a break up of the village.
You are taking into account the mode of thinking of New York Jews and of the Western Powers. You must take into account the morale of Israel's population. There is a wave of public opinion here that just cannot be overcome, and a government cannot ignore it if it wishes to govern and not lose the ground under its feet. After the Ma’aleh Akrabim incident there was no retaliation, and its absence created a strong anti-government sentiment in the country.
There is also a second element of frustration because of no retaliation, one which should be denigrated. It is a fact that when the retaliation operation after the Nahhalin incident became known, a wave of satisfaction and release of pent-up tension spread throughout the whole country. People breathed freely.
It is incumbent on us to lessen and restrain retaliation operations, to maintain lulls in between retaliations, and to avoid retaliations whenever it is possible. But there is no chance that we would stop retaliations altogether. There are enough reasons to believe that retaliation operations prompt both the Arabs and the Powers to seek a general solution to the situation along the borders. Without retaliations, it would be easier for them both to do nothing. At the same time it is clear to us that a retaliation which goes beyond a direct hit at the nest of the attackers (as in the Qibya case) is counterproductive. We must be careful to avoid such operations. This whole matter is complicated and demands pursuing a delicate balance, but it is impossible to only obstruct, prevent or forbid retaliations altogether.

Source: ISA, FM 130.02 file 2448/15.

8 - Summary of D. Ben-Gurion, “Our Security and the UN,” Davar, March 21, 1954

Published in Davar, March 21, 1954

Writing from his Sde Boker retreat, Ben-Gurion raised the question: “Is it possible to rely on the UN to protect the lives of Israeli citizens from murderous attacks, wholesale or isolated, by the neighboring Arab states which are declaring, from dawn to dusk, that their determined policy towards Israel is to wipe it off the map[?]” He warned against the danger of mistaking the current UN body as being capable of enforcing a world order against the persistence of individual state sovereignty. While the organization embodied the human desire for peace and the rule of international law, its sorry record included its inability to (a) deter the Arab states’ 1948 military defiance of the 1947 partition plan, (b) enforce compliance when Jordan ignored rulings about access to Mount Scopus, and (c) enforce Egyptian compliance with its obligations to allow Israeli ships free passage through the Suez Canal.
“There is no point and no use," he concluded, “in our expressing our moral outrage against the double standard in the Security Council or in the UN General Assembly. [- - -] No doubt the majority of the member-states of the UN have no interest in the murder of Israeli citizens, and the majority of the free peoples look negatively on the machinations of the Arab states in their economic boycott of Israel and in their violations of the Armistice Agreements and Security Council resolutions. But only political children will imagine that the great powers will spoil their relations with countries of the Arab League for the sake of protecting the lives of citizens of Israel. That task falls on the State of Israel itself, and only on it.
“Even a big power is not capable of protecting in every case the lives of its citizens. But we must wean ourselves off the foolish illusion, lacking the slightest basis in reality, that there exists in the world outside of Israel the power and the will to protect the lives of our citizens. Our ability to defend ourselves is our sole security.”

6 - D. Ben-Gurion to M. Sharett, February 27, 1954

Sde-Boker, February 27, 1954
Moshe,

Upon my withdrawal from the government I decided in my heart to desist from intervening and expressing my opinion on current political affairs, since it seemed to me that I should not do anything which might in any way or aspect burden the government. And if you hadn't called on me, the three of you, yourself, Lavon and Dayan, I would not have gone anywhere in order to express an opinion on what is being done or what ought to be done. But as you called me, I deemed it my duty to comply with your wishes, and especially with your own wish as Prime Minister. Therefore, I permit myself to go back to one issue which you did not approve of and discuss it again. And this is the issue of Lebanon.
Apart from any connection with current events (meanwhile Neguib was again nominated President; and this is an extremely clever step taken by Nasser of his group), it is clear that Lebanon is the weakest link in the Arab League. The other minorities in the Arab states are all Muslim, except for the Copts. But Egypt is the most compact and well-established of the Arab states and the decisive majority there consists of one solid block, of one race, religion and language, and the Christian minority does not seriously affect their political and national unity.
Not so the Christians in Lebanon. They are a majority in historical Lebanon and this majority has a tradition and a culture different from those of the other components of the League. Also within the wider borders (this was the worst mistake made by France when she extended the borders of Lebanon), the Muslims are not free to do as they wish, even if they are a majority there (and I don't know if they are, indeed, a majority) in view of the division among the Christians. The creation of a Christian state here is therefore a natural act; it has historical roots and it will find support in wide circles in the Christian world, both Catholic and Protestant. In normal times this would be almost impossible, first and foremost because of the lack of initiative and courage of the Christians. But in times of confusion and turmoil, or revolution or civil war, things take a different turn, and even the weak declares himself to be a hero.
Perhaps (there is never any certainty in politics) now is the opportune moment to bring about the establishment of a Christian state in our neighborhood. Without our initiative and our vigorous aid this will not be done. And it seems to me that this is the central task [underlined by BG] – or at least one [underlined by BG] of the central tasks – of our foreign policy. And this means that the means, time, and energy ought to be invested, and action be taken in all avenues which could bring about a fundamental change in Lebanon. [Eliahu] Sasson and our other Arabists must be mobilized. If money is necessary, no amount of dollars should be spared, even though the money may be spent in vain. We must concentrate all our efforts on this issue. It may well be that Reuven [Shiloah] should be immediately brought here. This is a historical opportunity, the missing of which will be unpardonable. There is no challenge against the world powers in this. Generally we should not act according to others’ initiative. But everything should be done, in my opinion, rapidly and at full steam.
The goal will not be reached of course, without a chopping of Lebanon's borders, but if men in Lebanon and exiles from it are found who will be ready to mobilize for the establishment of a Maronite state, extended borders and a large Muslim population will be of no use to them and this [i.e., giving up Greater Lebanon] will not constitute a disturbing factor.
I don't know if we have people in Lebanon, but there are various ways in which the proposed attempt can be carried out.
Yours,
D. Ben-Gurion

7 - Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Sharett on the Ma'aleh Akrabim Incident, March 24, 1954

The entire nation was shocked a week ago at the news of the terrible outrage which occurred at noon that day at Ma'ale Akrabim in the Negev.
      An omnibus of the Egged company proceeding from Eilat to Beersheba was ambushed and attacked at that spot by an armed Arab band. The first volley of shots killed the driver and hit several passengers. The immobilized vehicle was subjected to a hail of bullets from all sides. The murderers broke in, killing off the survivors. Altogether, 11 men and women were put to death. Four escaped, of whom two were seriously wounded.
      It was soon evident that the attack bore the unmistakable character of a military operation, properly planned and methodically executed. The killers came from afar, making for a fixed destination. There was no looting. They were bent on death. Nothing had occurred in that neighborhood which could have served as the slightest provocation for the massacre. A vital artery of internal communications deep within Israel territory was the target. This was the gravest and the most brazen act of violence perpetrated within the country since the termination of hostilities in the War of Liberation. It was a warlike act in nature and planning.
      Footprints clearly indicated the Jordanian origin of the gang. Two sets of tracks were found - one leading towards the ambush from the direction of the Jordan frontier and another back towards it. United Nations Observers took an active part in following the footprints, an operation carried out with the help of expert trackers and police dogs.
      In this work, and in the investigation of the circumstances of the crime on the scene, they faithfully carried out their duty under most difficult circumstances. The footprints were not traced right up to the frontier because of the rocky nature of the terrain around, but from the point at which the track ended there was only one narrow gorge leading to the Jordan frontier with impassable rocky ground on both sides.
      The Government of Israel received information from most reliable sources that the gang had, prior to the crime, crossed the Jordan border westwards at a certain spot. It also obtained the names of three of its members. Even without taking these data into account, the tracks and the general picture of the outrage bore evidence that its perpetrators had come from Jordan. This is the patent truth and no amount of pedantic routine and formalistic quibbling can cover it up.
      Yet, as the House is aware, this was not the finding of the Mixed Armistice Commission. The complaint lodged with the Commission by the Israel Delegation laid the responsibility for the crime at the door of the Jordan Government, "for, under the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, each government is responsible for crimes committed by people from its territory entering a neighbouring state."
      The Jordan Delegation, on the other hand, did not hesitate to put the blame on the Israel Government. It asserted that it was Israelis who committed the murders at Ma'ale Akrabim - Israelis who were "Arabs by race and Jews by religion," according to the Jordan representative, who thought the occasion appropriate for linguistic experiments.
      This insolent and preposterous invention, which added insult to injury and which should have served as further proof of Jordan's guilt, was presented as an alternative version in the proceedings, equal in weight with the Israel indictment.
      In the deadlock that arose the Chairman was called upon to make the decision. As a representative of the UN it was for him to give expression, on this crucial occasion, to the conscience and authority of the international organisation charged with supervising the implementation of the Armistice Agreements, and he was in duty bound to uphold the injured party and condemn the aggressor.
      But the Chairman chose not to exercise his authority. He neither repudiated the Jordan fabrication, nor gave support to the Israel draft resolution. The deadlock was complete and no decision was pronounced by the Commission regarding the outrage which shocked world opinion.
      Yet this is not a matter of a personal indictment. The crux of the problem is the fate of the armistice regime as reflected in the outcome of the examination of the Ma'ale Akrabim outrage. How has the UN Armistice supervision machinery, as an international body, stood the test of efficacy in this exceptionally grave incident?
      The armistice regime has proved incapable of preventing this bloodshed, carried out swiftly and with fiendish ferocity. In truth, the UN Observers are not military commanders charged with the defense of the frontier, nor are they look-outs, doing guard duty. Nobody wants them to perform such tasks, which are the exclusive prerogative and responsibility of a sovereign state.
      But they have been invested with the authority and charged with the duty of identifying and condemning whatever party is guilty of violation of the Armistice Agreements by acts of lawlessness and aggression. This authority entails the exposure of the aggression to international opprobrium so that the urge to commit further crimes may be curbed and a deterrent created.
      The authority to take this step was especially significant in connection with as revolting a crime as the bloodbath at Ma'ale Akrabim. Tile measure of the grave responsibility in this case is also the measure of the Commission's total failure. To leave the question of guilt undecided on this occasion is to proclaim the complete moral bankruptcy of the entire implementation machinery of the Armistice Agreements and their supervision. Such an end to the investigation spells a complete breakdown of authority and an invitation to every mail to do as he pleases.
      The prestige of the UN concerns us no less than anyone else; we must deeply regret this disturbing paralysis. But the point is not one merely of international ethics.
      This demonstration of the impotence of the Mixed Armistice Commission, which is capable of examining a massacre without reaching any conclusion, is liable to open the way for violence and remove all brakes from the lust for slaughter. The Armistice Commission's record in the Ma'ale Akrabim incident must serve as evidence that one may transgress without risking condemnation, and commit murder with impunity.
      The Government of a country bordering Israel, responsible for preserving its Armistice with Lis, cannot but learn from this experience that it need make no effort to stem the tide of lawlessness, and that it call afford to disregard any outrage committed beyond its borders by its own nationals.
      As to ourselves, this experience must lead to far-reaching conclusions as to our own orientation – as to how we should organize our defenses and forestall attacks, and first of all, how to safeguard and defend our traffic arteries.
      As to the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission, which has failed to carry out its responsibilities and betrayed our confidence, we have come to the conclusion that there is no sense in our continued participation. Accordingly, the Israel Delegation announced yesterday at the meeting of the Commission that it will no longer participate in its work.
      In making this decision Israel does not repudiate its responsibility under its Armistice Agreement with the Kingdom of Jordan. We have no intention of embarking on aggression or provocation. We cannot, however, continue to be a party to farce, by taking part in an institution which has betrayed its primary duty of denouncing breaches of the Armistice, identifying those responsible for them and setting a barrier against their repetition.
      At the same time the Government of Israel has also turned to the Western Powers with an urgent request that they call for an immediate session of the Security Council in order to discuss the Ma'ale Akrabim outrage.
      In doing so we are not asking the Powers to shoulder an unfamiliar burden, for they themselves were quick to initiate a discussion in the Security Council following a border incident last October. It is difficult to imagine that the innocent lives cut down at Ma'ale Akrabim can be regarded by the Powers as less deserving of sympathy than the lives of innocent people lost at another place, and concerning whose death the Government of Israel at the time expressed its deepest and unreserved regret.
      The Ambassadors of Israel in tile capitals of the U.S., Great Britain and France are now addressing this request to the governments to which they are accredited. What happened last week at Ma'ale Akrabirn is so grave in itself and so dangerous in its implications that we believe it to be suitable for urgent and most serious consideration in the Security Council.
      The chain of bloody events, of increasing Jordanian provocation and attacks against a background of constant incitement against Israel, both official and unofficial, reached a new peak at Ma'ale Akrabim. If it is allowed to continue unchecked it can lead to incalculable results; and anyone who shows indifference in the face of this development when lie is in a position to oppose it assumes a heavy responsibility.
      The Government of Israel has tried in various ways to stem this tide. Its latest effort was to call Jordan through the UN Secretary General, in accordance with Article XII of the Armistice Agreement, to a special conference for comprehensive discussion of ways and means of implementing the agreement. Despite Jordan's clear duty, imposed on it by the Armistice Agreement, it has to this day not responded to the call of the Secretary General, now thrice repeated.
      Notwithstanding the importance we attach to UN responsibility for the security of Israel, and to our own responsibility towards the international organization of which Israel is a member, we must not forget, even for a moment, that in the final analysis the bulwark of our security is our own strength, which we must continue to reinforce in every way, with the help of whoever may be ready to assist us -and first and foremost with the help of the Jewish people all over the world.
      We must be mindful of our special position as regards security - both the security of the State as a whole and the security of life within its borders. Ours is a State consisting for the most part of frontier zones, surrounded by hostile forces who seek to acquire more arms and who conspire constantly against us. The unceasing outcries to which the world has beer treated by our neighbors regarding the concentration of the Israel Defense Army on their borders, regardless of the actual facts (and that at a time when one of the neighboring countries is massing troops on the border); their threats of joint reaction to acts of aggression that have never taken place - show clearly in what direction our neighbors are headed.
      We must meet the future with fortitude, with open eyes and preparedness. As long as there is no peace we demand arms for Israel, which seeks peace and is forced to defend itself; we demand that they should not go to the Arab States, which plan and carry out aggression.
      From the UN and the great Powers we shall expect the fulfilment of their obligations and their international responsibilities for peace, security and equality between nations. In this we shall stand firm until the end, and at the same time we shall fortify our position of strength with our own hands - build it up and use it in the hour of need with courage and with wisdom.

SOURCES: Medzini, Israel’s Foreign Relations, Selected Documents 1947-1974, I:318-21 [doc.17]; http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/17+Statement+to+the+Knesset+by+Prime+Minister+Shar.htm