Thursday, September 8, 2016

134 - C.L. Sulzberger Article on Ben-Gurion, November 14, 1956

In the final paragraphs of his weekly “Foreign Affairs” column, C.L. Sulzberger wrote:

            Ben-Gurion’s government stands alone and isolated. It has no ally. It does not even appear to have a friend. Among the great powers, Soviet Russia is unremittingly working against Israel’s very existence. The United States, appalled by the adventure into Egypt, is cooler to Jerusalem’s cause than at any moment since the Zionist state was founded.
            A Forced Withdrawal
            Now, as the result of gathering world pressures, the jaunty little Israeli army is having to draw back into its crowded borders, yielding the various positions it had – and hoped to hold. In the end, it would appear, it will even have to relinquish the Gaza portion of old Palestine, where Nasser based his guerrilla assaults.
            Boycotts, political strictures and economic constraints are working against Ben-Gurion. Despite the military booty seized by Israel from Egypt, the Arabs will again become stronger and more resolute, impelled by Soviet incitements and equipped with new Soviet weapons. And the presence in the Middle East of Israel’s most implacable great power enemy, the Soviet Union itself, is now a virtual fact.
            From the first moment that Ben-Gurion knew the extent of the Egyptians’ arms purchases from the Communist bloc he determined that some day he would have to “smash them.” ... The attempt has been made. The results are not yet entirely clear, in any long-range ultimate pattern. Ben-Gurion’s great audacious challenge was ventured – and it failed. When next the old scholar turns to the pages of Aeschylus perhaps we will comprehend, in the light of sad experience, what the Athenian meant by writing: “Things are where things are, and, as fate has willed, so shall they be fulfilled.”
             
SOURCE: C.L. Sulzberger, “Fate – as seen by Premier Ben-Gurion and Aeschylus,” NYT, November 14, 1956, p.34.


133 - Sharett, Epilogue to Joel Brand’s book, On a Mission for those Sentenced to Death

In the Margins of the Book

I have willingly responded to the request of Yoel Brand to add to his book my clarifications and assessments. In my official capacity [as head of the Jewish Agency Political Department] in those days I had closely followed the whole saga of his mission, and took part in the efforts aimed at the rescue of Hungarian Jews which were exerted in the wake of that mission. Clearly, I could not do this without providing the reader with my knowledge and my perspective on the events described by Yoel Brand in his book.
            This book is to my mind the story of one man who physically and mentally went through the horrific chapter of the annihilation of Hungarian Jews; a man who became a messenger for a puzzling and imaginary operation which, according to its initiators, was meant, on the face of it, to save them; a man who firmly believed in his innocent heart that that operation, which was far beyond any bounds of practical logic in the circumstances of the time, was workable.
            As someone who experienced the events which are still boiling inside him to this very day, the writer is entitled to tell his story openly. The book presents the deep and agonizing impressions of the author regarding one of the most tragic chapters in the bloody history of European Jewry during World War II. Still, one cannot view this book as the complete story by itself. Naturally, the writer was not able to see, and certainly not at the time of his mission, the background and full scope of the events he was dealing with; nor could he understand and correctly evaluate the basic facts which had shaped international reality during the War years and which had determined the fate of the struggle to rescue multitudes of Jews from the hands of the Nazi hangman. Perhaps one is not allowed to pass judgement, after the events, on a writer who did not uncritically relate the experiences he went through during the days they took place. Yet, at the same time, he cannot expect that his book, which is undoubtedly a shattering human document of Jewish martyrology, would be accepted as well as a factual description, balanced and all-encompassing, of actual events.
            Below an attempt will be made to deal briefly with the factual errors of the story as told here and to correct the perspectives.

            A. The premise which prima facie comes out of this book, that the chapter of the saving of European Jewry began with Yoel Brand’s mission, ignores some basic facts. Already at the 21st Zionist World Congress, which ended in Geneva exactly on the eve of World War II, it was decided by the Labor parties that their emissaries working in Europe would each go back to his post in spite of the dangers involved, and precisely because of the danger looming at that time for all European Jewry. In those days a center was established in Switzerland for organizing the activity of contacts and help throughout the continent. With the outbreak of the war, the Jewish Agency’s and the Hagana’s efforts to move European Jews to Palestine “illegally,” against the White Paper policy, were strengthened in order to get them to safety in time. These efforts bore fruit. Many ships arrived in Palestine carrying refugees from Europe during the war. The Jewish Agency and the Hagana also strove, right from the beginning of the war, by cooperation with the British Army – the only possible vehicle for this purpose – to have teams of volunteers infiltrate into Europe to organize Jews to resist the Nazi enemy and to save themselves. The Jewish Agency fought hard, in some cases not in vain, to use all avenues of legal immigration of Jews from enemy countries. Many rescue efforts were undertaken by the World Jewish Congress and the [American] Joint [Distribution Committee], thanks to which many Jews and whole groups escaped from the hell in time.
            When the first shocking news about the annihilation and its scope reached us, it was not kept secret but was publicized all over the world. The news was summed up in a report published by the World Jewish Congress already in 1942. The news was impressively publicized in a series of public meetings in Palestine, during a session of the British Parliament in December 1942, and in a mass meeting in New York in 1943. Towards the end of 1942 a national “Rescue Committee” was established in Palestine by the Jewish Agency and the Va’ad Hale’umi [National Council], in which all yishuv organizations participated. A “Rescue Campaign” was created which organized a tax collected from the yishuv, a substantial part of its resources were channeled to the rescue of European Jews. A center was established in Istanbul, which strove and succeeded, mostly clandestinely, to gain contacts with several counties under Nazi occupation, transferred money for the financing of local rescue activities and collected information about the evolving situation there. This center organized a team of emissaries and couriers who carried out its missions on dozens of secret and dangerous trips. The center established action committees in the occupied countries for the purpose of renting ships and sailing them [to Palestine]. These committees functioned clandestinely, but sometimes used contacts with local officials of the occupation authorities in order to save Jews.
            The Istanbul center established contact with Budapest as well, and constantly exchanged information and consulted with the committee established there. Without this contact, which was attained thanks to the initiative of the Palestinian emissaries even before the eruption of the Shoah in Hungary, Brand and his comrades would never have arrived at the idea of his flight to Istanbul. The mission of Ira Hirschmann – an American Jew who functioned with special authority for dealing with refugees given him by the American President – came about on the initiative of organized American Jewry, which took much inspiration from the rescue activity in Palestine. Hirschmann arrived in the Middle East before Brand’s arrival, and once he was informed by the Jewish Agency’s representatives of this mission, he immediately set about finding out the possibility of making it successful. The anxiety regarding the fate of Hungarian and Balkan Jewry was worrying to the Jewish Agency and “Rescue Committee” activists ever since the appearance of the danger of their occupation by Hitler. The first news about the annihilation campaign in Hungary reached Palestine and alarmed the yishuv before Brand’s arrival in Istanbul.

            B. The writer has fallen prey to exaggerating the power and authority of the Jewish Agency in those days. Under the fear and solitude and the dark despair which suddenly engulfed Hungarian Jewry, it was only naturally that its activists would imbibe an exaggerated and mistaken conception of the Jewish Agency’s power and that of the Palestinian Jewish public in general to directly act and influence the Allies’ policy as well. But anyone cognizant of the concrete situation in those days, even superficially, would smile bitterly at Brand’s accusations against the emissaries stationed in Istanbul for not being able to immediately provide him with an airplane. For the sake of the reader who is ignorant of the circumstances of the time, let me note that all means of communication between Palestine and the outside world were in the hands of the British military authorities, and each journey and each flight to another country necessitated a permit, the getting of which depended on special efforts which were at times in vain. It so happened that the Head of the JA's Political Department [i.e., Sharett himself] did not receive a Turkish entry visa, and not always was a seat on an airplane made available for a flight out of Jerusalem in time. Generally, the freedom of action of the Istanbul “Rescue Center” was limited and dismal. Its activists had to constantly struggle against serious limitations born out of the existing regime of cooperation with the Allies, a system without which that Rescue Center could not function at all, and out of the constraints exerted by the Turkish authorities which maintained their regular contacts with Germany until the end of the war. Brand’s accusation regarding the lack of bombing of the annihilation centers in Europe and the railways leading to them is also a result of conceptions which had utterly no basis in reality – as if bombers, and long-range ones at that, were at the disposal of the Jewish Agency or the Hagana, or as if the British and American air forces were prepared to act according to Zionist directives. In fact, protracted efforts were made by the Jewish Agency to motivate the British to bomb those targets – precisely at the initiative of Yitzhak Gruenbaum, member of the JAE and head of the Rescue Committee, on whom the writer heaps his boiling wrath.

            C. Another element ignored by the writer – the most serious one – is the policy followed by the Allies regarding any contact with the enemy and any activity which could be of any help to him, and their attitude towards the problem of saving European Jews through the war years, and generally his ignoring the political background of the Allies’ war against Hitler and their inter-relations as members of a coalition fighting Hitler. The transporting of material help to the enemy, be it for the loftiest aim, was one of the most injurious [pasul] and improper deeds, which was unheard of. In vain would anybody ignore the fact that saving Jews was not among the aims of the Allies’ war against Germany – at most it was to be a by-product of their victory. Needless to say, the Allied powers shunned and even refused to define saving of Jews as a guideline for the operational conduct of the war. Moreover, from time to time the Zionist mission was confronted by unwillingness to accept its proposals for cooperation in the war, which emanated from a fear that the European nations would gain the impression that the war was being fought mainly for the sake of the Jews. Any demand that, while planning wartime operations, the frightening fact of the continuing annihilation of Jews should be taken into consideration, and that laws of war could be overlooked so that Jews might be saved, was met by one single response: the only efficient way to save your people is to guarantee and expedite the collapse of Hitler by concentrating all energies in the fighting itself. The fact that, meanwhile, millions were slaughtered like sheep was not weighed at all towards changing this policy, and for this reason alone the fate of the proposal that the Allies supply Germany, in the midst of the war, with food supplies and means of transport and other vital material was clear. This plan could not but be seen as an insane one, one which wholly contradicted the basic principles of fighting the enemy to the very end. Moreover, once the principle of “unconditional surrender” was fixed as a primary aim of the war, they became highly nervous to carefully refrain from any step which could be taken as possibly leading to some compromise with Hitler, or generally understood as the slightest deviation from the established policy. The mutual suspicion among the Allies in this matter, that is between the western powers and the Soviet Union, as well as the high sensitivity of any member of the partnership regarding his partner lest this or that step would be wrongly understood by him, were then at their apex. Evidently, one could certainly assume that if the question was of the annihilation of millions of Englishmen or Americans, public opinion in these nations would have compelled their governments – if they did not arise by themselves – to break all rules and forego any danger in order to save them, whatever happens. However, the question was that of millions of Jews, and since no such danger loomed over the heads of multitudes of Englishmen or Americans, the moral aspect of the hard position of the Allies was not put to a decisive test.

            D. Most obviously, Brand and his comrades did not, or could not, really grasp the malignant character of Britain’s position under the White Paper policy. Any action of saving Jews assisted by England, which ultimately could have any connection with Jews immigrating to Palestine, stood in contradiction to this negative policy and was seen as threatening the British authorities with an insoluble complication. The shocking tragedy of “Struma”{*}
{*} NOTE: This dilapidated vessel, which sailed from Romania to Palestine with 769 Jews, men women and children who escaped slaughter, was detained in Istanbul and stayed there for a whole month, with the knowledge of all powers. All efforts to prevail on the British authorities to allow the entry of these refugees into Palestine were to no avail. No country whatever proposed to accept them. Ultimately the Turkish authorities forced the vessel to return back while screams of despair and  pain were heard along the Bosporus shores. Upon entering the Black Sea, the vessel hit a mine and sank. Only one of its passengers was saved.

was decisive proof of the shocking situation reigning then. Even in the sphere of utilizing Palestinian Jews for the war effort within the framework of the British Army by enlisting them to the Army, building a fighting force and sending fighters into the enemy’s rear, England found itself shackled by itself on account of the policy she pursued on the eve of the war, maintaining it rigidly throughout the war period. Inasmuch as Zionist and yishuv action attained certain achievements in this sphere, they came very late and only after overcoming the obstacles placed before them by the White Paper. Several important initiatives of military actions failed because of that policy.

            E. And again, one cannot be surprised at the people of the Rescue Committee of Budapest, including Yoel Brand in view of their inability to see the full picture of the circumstances in the world beyond the wall of siege engulfing European Jewry, and as well as the real situation of the Jewish question within the camp of those fighting against Hitler. As people whose lives hung by a thread and who were deep in the darkness of the underground, it was only natural that  they were prone to cling to any spark of hope, be it the most illusory, of saving themselves and their many brethren. It was because of this blindness that they fell prey to believe that “Chaim” was none other than Chaim Weizmann, whose permanent home then was London, while in fact he was Haim Barlas, the Jewish Agency’s representative in Istanbul, who had been active there for a long time, organizing the immigration of refugees to Palestine and whose name was well known throughout the besieged Diaspora centers. The gap between the conceptions prevalent in Budapest and the realities beyond the wall became apparent immediately upon the arrival of Yoel Brand in Turkey, which caused him deep shock. He was astounded when not finding an entry visa to Palestine awaiting him in the Istanbul airport, for evidently he believed that the Turkish authorities used to fulfill any wish of the Jewish Agency’s emissaries. In fact, an entry permit was prepared for him, but matters were bungled up by the appearance with him of a companion, about whose arrival no prior information has been given, and who was known to the Allied authorities as a highly dubious personality.{*}
{*} NOTE: Reference is to Bandi Grosz (Andrei Gyorgy), who operated as a double, and probably a triple, agent. Some accounts treat the Brand mission as a cover for a different one entrusted to Grosz. For details, see Yechiam Weitz, The Man who was Murdered Twice: The Life, Trial and Death of Israel Kasztner. Transl. Chaya Naor (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem Press, 2011), 21, 170-72, and sources cited there.

Whatever happened to Yoel Brand in Istanbul, and later in Aleppo, astounded and frustrated Yoel Brand and struck him as some confusion or terrible misunderstanding or lack of seriousness towards himself, or even as criminal neglect of him. In contrast, it was crystal clear to all who were well versed in the real circumstances then and there, that the sudden appearance in Istanbul, which ostensibly was neutral, but in fact the Allies were quite powerful there, of an emissary from a enemy country, his being a Jew notwithstanding, accompanied by a suspicious fellow believed to be dangerous, was a totally incongruous happening, extremely problematic and one which the Jewish Agency, given its position, could not resolve.

            F. And here is, in short, what happened to Yoel Brand from the day of his arrival in Istanbul onwards, as is known to the people who were involved in the matter. I will first bring forth some evidence regarding their dealings with Yoel Brand by members of the Istanbul Rescue Center. When he appeared before them and related the proposition he was entrusted [by Adolf Eichmann] to carry with him from Budapest – “Blood for Merchandise” – members of the center were astounded upon hearing this for it sounded like something beyond any human logic. Still, they stuck to it. Here is what one member of the team, Menachem Bader, related in his book, A Sad Mission:
                 As if stoned we listened to what Yoel told us – the description of the havoc, the details of the negotiations, the price demanded for the lives of Jews in Hungary, the promise of a respite, or, in Eichmann’s words, “putting the Jews in cold storage for two weeks, since this period would suffice till your international decides whether it is interested in the transaction.”
                 The first reaction – after Yoel finished talking – was a desire to rise up and scream: A lie with a latchet! it’s all a ruse, an outrage! The Germans are clearly assuming that the Allies would oppose this [proposed] agreement, for the Nazis are aware of their not hurrying to help us evacuate the Jews from Bulgaria and Romania, and it is clear that only one intention is hidden in Eichmann’s proposal: to prove to the world at large that Germany’s enemies, too, do not care for the fate of the Jews, and that those harboring sympathy for Jews would not make any sacrifice for saving the Jews who are about to be thrown into the furnaces. But this first reaction was checked within our heart before we cried out. Each of us asked himself how could he answer in the negative and burden his conscience with the rejection of this chance, albeit a most dubious one? Even if such evil intentions are apt to deceive us, there is no alternative. Since the annihilation has been decided upon anyway, perhaps here is something...
               We decided that one of us would immediately go to Palestine and relate the proposal to the national institutions [i.e., the JAE and yishuv leadership], together with our appeal to do even what is beyond human power for carrying it out.
           Immediately upon Yoel Brand’s arrival in Istanbul it became clear that, whatever happened, he would not be able to stay there for long. The Turkish authorities were about to send him back to where he came from, and obtaining a permit for each additional day of his stay in the city was as difficult hard as parting the Red Sea. At the same time it was clear that it was axiomatic that we could not let him go back empty-handed, because his returning with no answer at all would free the hangmen from any “undertaking” and allow them expedite the pace of the annihilation which had begun already.
            In view of this situation, first of all in order to gain time and somewhat restrain the murderers by creating an impression that the Jewish Agency was taking Brand’s mission most seriously, and mainly in order to achieve whatever was possible and impossible in terms of actual rescue, our people in Istanbul suggested that Brand be brought to Jerusalem, and one of them immediately journeyed to Palestine to arrange for this. However, we members of the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem feared that, once Brand crossed the Syrian southern boundary into Palestine, which is governed by the Allies, he would not be permitted to go back to an enemy country, and his not returning there was tantamount to returning empty-handed, and that meant the end of the last remaining hope of saving Hungarian Jews. Thus, under the pressure of these difficulties, an idea was advanced that the meeting with Yoel Brand should take place in Aleppo, the Syrian city close to [Palestine’s] northern boundary. The British in Istanbul agreed with this plan and promised that Brand would be allowed to go back. True, from the beginning there was some fear that the British would not stand by their word, but we concluded that, anyway, we had nothing to lose. Bringing Brand to Aleppo, inasmuch as it involved some danger, was seen by us as the least evil. However, what happened is that the moment Brand’s train arrived at the Aleppo station, accompanied by Ehud Avriel, a member of our Istanbul team, he was arrested – to the extreme frustration of Avriel and myself and the people who accompanied me on my journey from Jerusalem to Aleppo. When I later protested against this action during my meeting with the British High Commissioner of Palestine, saying there was a breach of trust here, he pronounced a sharp answer: we are at war and there is no ground for any questions or arguments. The unflinching adherence to the war policy entailing the avoidance of rescue operations of Jews was evident here in full.
            However, the Jewish Agency did not raise its hands in despair even after Brand’s arrest and his being sent to prison in Egypt. On the basis of the report he gave me in Aleppo in the presence of a British officer, I immediately flew over to London. There the president of the Jewish Agency, Chaim Weizmann, accompanied by me, saw Foreign Minister Anthony Eden and demanded that all regular wartime principles be put aside for the sake of saving multitudes of Jews. We encountered a response ostensibly full of empathy, but a wavering and very reserved one. In fact negative. According to what the British told us, consultations did take place among the Allies. The Russians, they said, expressed totally negative opposition to any dealing with the plan. No positive response came from the Americans. The general attitude towards the plan was to see it as something that there is no point whatsoever in discussing. Nevertheless, talks with the British Foreign Office continued. In one of them the director of the refugee department said to the Jewish Agency’s representative: If indeed it were possible to extricate one million Jews from Europe, what then could we do with them? How could we transport them? Where would we have accommodated them?{*}
{*} NOTE: Sharett flew to London on June 25, 1944. See his report to the ZE, London, dated June 27, 1944. The text of this report was published in Ma'ariv during the Kasztner-Gruenwald trial (see diary entry for June 10, 1954, and notes there), and later in Ha'aretz, June 3, 1961.

            Following several more attempts of beating our heads against the wall, there was nothing left to the Jewish Agency but to deal with the freeing of Yoel Brand himself so that he could come to Palestine.

            G. Even before the Brand episode, on the eve of the Germans’ entry into Hungary,  the Jewish Agency presented the British Middle East Military Command with a detailed plan for sending Jewish armed groups into Hungary and the Balkan countries for the purposes of sabotage operations behind the lines, the enlistment of Jews into the resistance and the carrying out efforts to save Jews. Following the failure of the Brand episode, a chance was seen that this plan would be approved as a kind of compensation. Indeed, approval was given by Churchill after a way to personally reach him was found. Several concrete preparatory steps were carried out. But, at long last, the negationists won over the supporters. Again the reservations emanating from the White Paper decided matters, and this plan was buried as well.

*
            It is evident from all the above that one must accept this book as a trustworthy attempt to present a detailed description of what was going on inside Hungary; as an expression of the inner struggles, the pains, the despairing efforts of one individual who found himself at the centre of the dreadful episode; and as additional evidence of the terrible experiences our European brethren went through at the time, experiences which became an unrelenting nightmare for many of the survivors. At the same time, however, it was beyond the power of the writer to correctly evaluate the concrete possibilities of rescuing Jews on the other side of the front, given the background of the Allies’ position. It is also evident that he had no intention – and he stresses this point more than once – to lay down an accusation against those who, while struggling constantly with difficulties and obstacles, endeavored to do all that was seen as possible, as well as what was definitely impossible, in order to save their brethren from death.
            The whole episode of the rescue efforts during World War II – its endeavors, achievements and failures, its few shining lights and its heavy shadows, the burning devotion of the yishuv leaders invested in it and the impotence in which they were immersed – has not yet been told and aptly summarized. It is still awaiting an objective, fully- and well-informed, penetrating analysis.

SOURCE: Joel Brand, B’shelihut Nidonim Lamavet [On a Mission for those Sentenced to Death], as told by Alex Weissberg, with N. Raban. (Tel Aviv: Ayanot, 1956), 231-38.


132 - Excerpts of letter from Reuven Shiloah to Teddy Kollek, July 6, 1956

                                                                    Embassy of Israel, Washington
                                                                    July 6, 1956

To:     Mr T. Kollek, Prime Minister’s Office, Jerusalem
From: R. Shiloah, Israel Minister, Washington

My Dear Teddy,

I am sorry for not having yet thanked you for your friendly treatment during my last visit to Israel, and for your cables and letters since then. I beg for your forgiveness.

I have postponed writing since I wanted first to examine anew the situation here and update my knowledge and my appraisals, and also because I was waiting for Eban's return from Israel, hoping to learn from him a more accurate evaluation of the situation and the mood prevailing at home, rather than from information gathered from newspapers and private letters.

My opinion regarding the personnel changes at the Foreign Ministry is known to you. For many years now (in fact, ever since 1930 when I went out to Baghdad for the first time on behalf of the [Zionist] movement and perhaps even earlier when as a young member of the “Socialist Youth” in Jerusalem I heard M.S. lecture), I have been connected by deep ties of work, admiration and affection to M.S. I have gone with him a very long way, facing many obstacles, but also filled with achievements and creativity. Under his tutelage and with his help I took my first steps in diplomacy, Arab affairs, security matters and international affairs. I always found in him a loyal friend who gave advice and encouraged and supported me on every idea or initiative that I proposed. Nevertheless, I was always fully aware of his weaknesses. For several years now I have frequently been in disagreement with him over quite serious matters – both personal and political. For years I have watched with great trepidation as his relations with the Prime Minister and the defense establishment deteriorated, and for a number of years now I have held the belief that, for his own good and future and in the best interests of the State, he should remove himself from foreign affairs for a while. On objective grounds, I thought that it was not good that a man who is destined to shoulder central tasks in the State [in the future] should devote himself only to foreign affairs.

I also believed that the deteriorating relations between him and the PM were increasingly undermining the government’s ability to act, [- - -] endangering the government and the State even in normal times and even more so during the current serious year. Still, I had hoped that M.S., with a big effort and the help of friends and other advisers among those who have been working with him in recent years, would perhaps be able to mend fences with the PM and improve the relations of his office with the Ministry of Defense and the Army. But this effort has not been made.

I am convinced that there was no alternative to this tragic amputation, but it hurts me deeply that it is attended by so many complications, so much bitterness and personal animosity on the part of all those involved.

The main problem is certainly how to bring about a speedy healing of the wounds, and how to normalize the necessary social relations that the operation was meant to achieve, to bring about stronger contacts and mutual peaceful relations between the Foreign Ministry and the defense establishment  – the IDF, the PMO and the Defense Ministry, how to enliven and encourage the morale of the foreign service, to drive out the [deadening] routine dominating it and make it once again creative, maintaining its proper standing as befits a state under siege and  facing a state of war.

I do not have many fears regarding the quality of relations between Golda and the PM, but I cannot hide that I am worried about the relations between [the MFA and other] offices, the [IDF] staff, etc.

I did not receive from Eban a clear picture of the [prevailing] political mood at home, nor regarding the plans of creating a more unified leadership for foreign and defense matters. Possibly, during A.E.'s stay in Israel these plans had not yet crystallized. A.E.'s impression is that the aim is to leave things as they are for the time being. I certainly agree that no hasty steps should be taken, and that there is no need for a crisis and upheavals beyond the upheaval of the Golda-M.S. changeover. However, I do think it is incumbent on us to begin the planning and systematic implementation of repairing the structure of the [foreign] office and service, as well as the personnel structure and work methods.

I am not prepared to propose a detailed written personnel and organizational plan (I would not hesitate to do so if asked), but it seems to me that some things cannot be delayed. It is my opinion that unification of dealing with, and the responsible authority regarding, matters of the Armistice Agreements should be speedily given directly to the IDF, with the political direction being given to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This issue has been a bone of contention between M.S. and the PM, and at the time I saw it not as a personal conflict but as an obvious matter of principle. In my opinion the experience learned during the first years of the State has proved the correctness of the contention that the responsibility here should lie in the hands of the Defense Minister and the IDF staff, together with an active participation – at times a decisive one - of the Foreign Ministry. [- - -] I cannot recall a more successful period in Armistice affairs, as well as in other matters, as under CoS Yigael Yadin with Moshe Dayan as the responsible [liaison] officer to the MACs and myself, your obedient servant, as the MFA’s representative for this matter.

I hear from State Department sources that they were informed by their Embassy in Israel that it has already been decided to transfer responsibility for MAC affairs to the IDF, and that Yosef Nevo has already been appointed as the [liaison] officer responsible for this matter. If this is true then I am very happy.

[- - -]

Best wishes,
Yours,
Reuven

SOURCE: ISA FM 130.19/4488/1. Parts of the letter are quoted in Haggai Eshed, Reuven Shiloah: The Man Behind the Mossad: Secret Diplomacy in the Creation of Israel, transl. by David & Leah Zinder, fwds. by Shimon Peres & Haim Herzog, (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 229-30.

131 - Nahum Goldmann Appreciation of Moshe Sharett

            In this struggle [for a privileged position of the World Zionist Organization in relation to Israel and for legally establishing its right to work in Israel] I acquired the vital support of Moshe Sharett. Apart, perhaps, from Chaim Weizmann in the later years of our relationship, Sharett was my closest friend among all the Zionist leaders. Our friendship went far beyond our practical work together. I cannot call to mind any serious conflict with him, although we had occasional differences of opinion over tactical matters. His career is well known. It included all the positions of honor that Zionism and Israel had to bestow. After being in charge of the political section of the Zionist Executive for years, he became Israel’s first foreign minister and, later, its prime min­ister. Ben-Gurion finally forced him out of the government in a most brusque and ruthless manner. Sharett was an extraordinarily gifted man, especially remarkable for his phenomenal memory and talent for languages. He knew a number of languages perfectly, and was a brilliant creator of new terms in modern Hebrew.
            Sharett’s political talent was chiefly analytical. He never overlooked a single aspect of a problem and backed every demand he made with logical, meticulous argumentation. He was not so much the intuitive politician, exemplified by Chaim Weizmann, as a man who depended on systematic analytical reflection. At times he carried the principle of minutely substantiating every-thing to the point of exaggeration. I remember Weizmann saying to him: “When you’re asking something of the Colonial Office or the Foreign Office, limit yourself to two or three telling arguments and leave out the minor ones. Otherwise you run the risk that when you get through the man you’re talking to will forget the important arguments and remember only the minor ones.” But this was impossible for Sharett. He was afflicted with the vice of perfectionism, if I may put it that way. Everything had to be just right. Every document he drafted, every letter he wrote, was revised and polished to make sure that every word was in its right position and sparkling with just the right luster. He wasted too much time and energy on minute details, but his esthetic sense and desire for perfection required this often excessive expenditure of effort.
            As the first foreign minister of Israel, Sharett created the new Israeli diplomacy. It took courage as well as knowledge of human nature to train the young diplomats to think like statesmen. For centuries the Jews had expressed their reactions purely in the form of protest and criticism. Since the Diaspora never allowed them to create a political reality of their own, they had to content themselves with reacting passively or seeking escape in dreams, illusions, and wishful thinking. This explains their tendency to extremism bitter accusations, radical demands, and hypersensitivity, not to say persecution complexes, all of which are typical of powerless, oppressed peoples. With the establishment of a country of their own, all this has had to be fundamentally changed. The Jewish people had to be trained in realism, in accepting compromise (which in practical politics is often more important than theoretical demands), and in making the best of what cannot be helped.
            The first man to recognize that this takes more strength than is required for persistently trying to do the impossible was Chaim Weizmann; as a result, he was attacked for decades as a compromiser, a weakling, and even a traitor. Sharett, like me, was a pupil of Weizmann, and he too was often criticized for the same failings. It was also one of the reasons for the clash with Ben-Gurion that led to his sudden resignation. In most conflicts between Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, Sharett had taken Weizmann’s side and Ben-Gurion knew it. Sharett also rejected Ben-Gurion’s ideas on many points of foreign policy, although here he did not go as far as I did. Above all, he resisted the retaliation policy that Ben-Gurion pursued for years. It was easy for Ben-Gurion to override my opposition in these matters because I was not a member of the government, but he had to pay some attention to Sharett as foreign minister and leader of a group within the Israeli government. No doubt the decision to get rid of him before the Sinai campaign is explained by this opposition. It took Sharett a long time to get over this ruthless dismissal.
            In character Sharett was one of the most distinguished figures in Zionism and Israeli politics, a true aristocrat who owed his splendid career almost entirely to his own positive qualities – an extremely rare occurrence, Of course, like everybody else, he had to pay a price for his virtues. They prevented him from being a real fighter and from using the necessary ruthlessness to enforce his ideas. Goethe’s saying that the man of action has no conscience did not apply to Sharett. His scrupulousness merely diminished his effectiveness from time to time. To fight a political battle with irreproachable tactics is almost impossible, and Sharett was not a man to pound the table, to mobilize his supporters for defense and attack, or to consider his choice of means justified by his ends. On the other hand, these shortcomings lent him a moral position all his own. He became, especially in the last years of his life, Israel’s great ethical authority, and while he was not feared and held in awe like other leaders, he was revered and loved more than any.

            His attitude toward the Zionist organization and toward rela­tions between Israel and the Diaspora was similar to mine. He supported these ideas as long as he was an influential figure in the Israeli government, and after he resigned I tried to get him to return to a leading role in Zionism. Having become president of the WZO in 1956, I suggested more than once that he become my co-president. This he refused, but I did finally manage to persuade him to become chairman of the Zionist Executive, a position that gave him the opportunity to perform important services. His presence increased the prestige and authority of the organization, especially in Israel. Since he was also a tireless worker and took care of all the routine details in which I was not much interested, he was a much better chairman than I would ever have been and gave the Zionist movement new impetus. I had always hoped he would succeed me as president, and his unexpected death was an irreparable personal loss and a severe blow to the Zionist organization. He played a decisive part in whatever limited success was achieved in rebuilding the WZO after the founding of Israel.

SOURCE: The Autobiography of Nahum Goldmann (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1969), 319-22

130 - Ben-Gurion Letter to Mapai Party Haverim, June 28, 1956

To the haverim,
            I have been aware of the mood of the haverim at the Central Committee’s meeting and of the mood of many citizens of Israel (as well as that of some friends abroad), who were confused by the personnel change that took place in the Foreign Ministry, and by the departure of M.S. from the Cabinet – which occurred without an adequate explanation, or even without any explanation at all. I well knew that this matter, both in Party discussions and at the Knesset, might indeed cause me some harm. Had I been motivated, first and foremost, by the stature of the PM in the eyes of the public, then I would have had no reason to hide anything from it. On the contrary, I would have had much interest in divulging the reasons and the motives to the public’s attention.
           The restrictions I have put on myself resulted from my maintaining respect of haverim with whom I have collaborated over many years. It is with a clean conscience that I can leave my responsibility for the personnel changes in the Foreign Ministry to the judgement of the people in days to come. No fault will be found with me for not making this change beforehand. It is possible that I took into consideration too much the feelings of friendship and comradely collaboration in state matters.
           Since 1933 I have been responsible for the outlining of the political course of the Zionist movement and the yishuv as head of the Zionist Executive.
           From May 24, 1948 I was responsible for the fixing of the political course of independent Israel – until I left the Government for personal reasons sometime at the end of 1953.
           M.S. was my chief aide in all political matters. And in the establishment of the Jewish battalions in World War II and in the attainment of the Jewish Brigade he had taken the biggest part, and I regard this important project first and foremost as his achievement.
           M.S. was not always in agreement with the course I took, but even though he had hesitated at some junctions of fateful decisions, he always collaborated with me in a friendly manner.
           Our first [contentious] episode came in the days of the Provisional Government, when he disagreed with me on a vital matter and overrode me by his own vote.*

* NOTE: Reference is to the vote taken on September 26, 1948, on BG’s proposal that the IDF occupy the southern part of the West Bank, including Bethlehem and Hebron. According to the protocol, the proposal was defeated by a vote of 7:5 (!) but there are other versions showing a 6:5 vote. This episode was defined by BG as an occasion for the “weeping of generations to come”  (b'chiya ledorot). The essence and many contradictions of the phrase and its users are examined in an Annex to Moshe Sharett, Davar Davur [Speaking Out: The Collected Speeches of Israel’s First Foreign Minister, 1948], eds. Yaakov and Rina Sharett (Tel Aviv: Moshe Sharett Heritage Society, 2013), 619-43.

I am not at all sure he is happy with and proud of the position he took then, but it is my opinion that by it he caused a tremendous, immeasurable national failure: the loss of Old Jerusalem, of the Samaria areas and of the northern Dead Sea.
           There was no collective responsibility in the Provisional Government, and I could not afford a governmental crisis in view of the serious political and military campaigns [then underway].
           It is with satisfaction that I note that M.S. did not repeat his mistake when I proposed later the expulsion of the Egyptians from southern Judea and finally from the Negev, too.
           Since then and up to my departure from the Government there did not occur even one instance of a vital political decision taken against me under the influence of M.S. He tried to make use of his influence when he was away at the UN General Assembly in order to prevent the moving of the Government to Jerusalem, according to my proposal, but his opinion was not accepted by the Party and by the Cabinet, and – in spite of his and his counselors’ opinion – Jerusalem has become the capital of Israel both in theory and in practice.
           M.S. tendered me his resignation at the time, but I did not accept it. I even did not divulge this to the haverim; I only informed M.S. of it in a letter to him in New York, saying that [such] disagreements are not enough of a reason for leaving [the Government].*

*NOTE: See exchange of correspondence in DFPI 4 (1949), docs.490 and 498.

           In November 1953 I left the Government for personal reasons, since there was a necessity for a respite “for a year, two years or more” from the psychological tension bearing on me incessantly for more than twenty years, as I explained in my letter to the President.
           In accordance with my suggestion, P. Lavon was then nominated Minister of Defense. M.S. was nominated Prime Minister – not in accordance with my opinion, but without my objections. I appreciated Moshe’s abilities, knowledge and diligence, but I did not think him capable of performing a leading and decisive role since he was devoid of boldness, foresight and understanding of complicated political situations. But I felt I had no right to intervene actively at a time when I myself had given up responsibility.
           After what happened in Egypt to our people (and to this very day it is not clear to me who was responsible for it), P.L. left the Ministry of Defense. I proposed nominating Shaul [Avigur in his place], but he refused.
           In mid-February a delegation (Golda and Namir) came to me in the name of haverim and in the name of M.S., asking me to return to the Ministry of Defense. I had personal and other reasons for continuing my work in Sde Boker, but the fear of moral deterioration inside the IDF tilted the scales. I informed the two emissaries of my readiness to return to the Ministry of Defense.
           Without my approval this was immediately announced on Kol-Israel. On Sunday [February 20, 1955] M.S came to me at Sde Boker and we conversed about the security situation and about the Ministry of Defense. I told Moshe that I disagreed with the change he made during my absence – the transfer of negotiations with the UN Observers from the Ministry of Defense to the Foreign Ministry. M.S. tried to convince me that this arrangement was justified and desirable. In the meantime evening set in and I did not want him to drive back in darkness. We thus parted in disagreement over this matter.
           Next day I came to Jerusalem, since on that day M.S. had to table at the Knesset the Cabinet’s decision to co-opt me into the Government as Minister of Defense. On that same day I wrote a letter to Moshe, informing him that, if he insisted on his opinion concerning negotiations with the UN Observers being carried on by the Foreign Ministry, he would have to look for another Minister of Defense.
           I did not receive an answer, but in the afternoon, at the Knesset, I was proposed by M.S. as nominee for Minster of Defense and after a debate this was approved.
           I was quite astonished by this procedure, but Moshe explained to me later that he had not managed to read my letter to him before coming to the Knesset since he had been busy composing the speech he was about to make at the Knesset.
           During the six months of my service as Defense Minister, two vital matters were decided upon against my opinion – by a Cabinet majority composed by [ministers of] the General Zionists, Hapo’el Hamizrahi, M.S, Rosen, and one or two of our Party’s ministers:
(a)   Leaving the Gaza Strip in the hands of Nasser, in spite his violations of the Armistice Agreements and the turning of the Gaza Strip into a base for anti-Israeli terror, this at a time during which he was enmeshed in a serious crisis with Britain and we would have been able to expel him overnight without a cock’s crowing in the international arena;
(b)   The rejection of my second proposal of announcing that the violation of the Armistice Agreement by Egypt would release us from the obligations this agreement imposed on us.
          On one occasion, I informed our haverim in the Cabinet that after the [November 1955] elections I would not be a participant in a government which pursued such a security policy and would not support it.
          And since I knew the days of this government were numbered in any event, I avoided creating a crisis, even though I had enough reasons to do so, but I resolved to adopt self-restraint. I also resolved to accept M.S.’s decisions as Prime Minister without objection, whether or not I happened to agree or disagree with him, and I also told him so.
          During the election campaign I spoke in my speech in Be’ersheva about the importance of the south and of Eilat, and I announced that, if I were asked to form a government after the elections, I would not accept the blockade which was in contradiction with the UN Charter and with the Security Council’s decisions, and that we would put an end to this blockade by IDF force unless the UN was powerful enough to do this.
          I was happy and surprised to read in the next morning’s papers that, on the same previous evening, M.S. had spoken too on this subject and had pronounced (although in different terminology, of course) the same position regarding the breaking of the blockade in the Red Sea.
          I felt happy about it, because I saw the breaking of the blockade as a vital need for the state. I discussed this subject with Rosen, who was always among those opposing my “daring” proposals, even though he admitted in one of the Cabinet meetings that, in all the disagreements between us, he realized later that I had been right and he had been wrong.
          To my astonishment, Rosen was in full agreement with the plan of breaking the blockade.
          As is well known, constituting the Cabinet took a long time, and the basic principles [of the coalition government] agreed upon were not relevant to the new situation created by the Czechoslovak arms deal and the great Egyptian danger. I drafted a speech that I would give in the Knesset, and I brought it to the knowledge of the ministers-to-be. They all approved the text. M.S. was out of the country at then time, and I sent him the draft of my speech by special air courier. He proposed some minor linguistic corrections, but he too approved its contents.
          One of the disagreements between me and Moshe was over my principle never to make public or inform representatives of foreign governments about moves we do not intend to make. M.S. was of the opinion that in certain instances we should do so in order to “plant fear”, in order to extort concessions, even if he had not planned to put into action what he said to other governments for the sake of “frightening” them. For instance, he informed the French Minister (and possibly to others), without my knowledge, that we were going to renew work in the Jordan channel on March 1 [1956]. I don’t agree with this method. I shall not say something which I am not going to implement. And therefore I had no doubt that the haverim agreed with what I said in the Knesset on November 2, both in theory and in practice. But, to my dismay, I became aware that I was mistaken. When I proposed – after satisfactory preparations on the General Staff – a plan for breaking the blockade, I encountered an opposition by a majority of the Cabinet ministers, headed by M.S.
          Had there not been no such serious danger of Egypt’s waging war on us, I would not have hesitated for one moment to tend my resignation from the Government immediately. But I was apprehensive of the resulting impact on the morale of the people and the IDF, and I chose self-restraint.
          After I had warned Burns that Egypt had to cease fire and implement the Armistice Agreement, and after Burns tried influencing the Egyptian Government but was unsuccessful – I proposed the establishment of a new settlement in Be’erotayim, in the Nitzana area. Mapam, Hapo’el Hamizrahi. Rosen, and one or two of our haverim under the leadership of M.S. vetoed this. I claimed that this was not prohibited by the Armistice Agreement, nor by the UN or by the Security Council, and in my conversation with Burns I had announced that not only was the establishment of one kibbutz not prohibited, but even the establishment of ten kibbutzim – if only we found them necessary, since we had agreed on demilitarization of the area, not to its barrenness. But the majority opposed [my proposal] for fear of UN censure.
          Again I opted for self-restraint, but I realized I was confronted by a united majority in the Cabinet – Mapam, Rosen, Hapo’el Hamizrahi, M.S. and one or two of our haverim against the majority of our haverim, a majority which I felt did not reflect the opinion of most of the people. And I notified the haverim that if I ever saw moral grounds for leaving the government, I would do so; and not only that, but that I would fight against this policy which to my mind was not in accordance with the vital interests of the state.
          I have reached, with much sorrow, a second conclusion: after my departure from the government M.S.’s haughtiness grew and as a result he was shouldering responsibilities for which he lacked the necessary inner strength.*

*NOTE: BG uses a Hebrew phrase here which cannot be translated literally. In Hebrew:Hu lokea’kh al akhrayuto d’varim b’li samkhut maspika”. By “samkhut maspika” BG means MS is not of sufficient stature, or with a strong enough personality, to allow him to make fateful decisions relying only on himself – like he, BG, presumably could.

          “The straw which broke up the camel’s back” happened on a marginal matter. At the meeting of the Party’s Committee of Nine, when the nominating of an authoritative candidate for the post of Party General Secretary was discussed, somebody proposed Golda for the post, and somebody else proposed Eshkol. M.S. suggested himself for it.
          The matter was not decided at that meeting, and I discussed this with several haverim. I discussed it, of course, with M.S. too. I was astonished upon hearing from him that he did not intend at all to become General Secretary, and that he had suggested himself for this post only in order to make it easier for Golda to accept it....
          I have never valued M.S.’s decision-making ability when facing complicated and fateful political questions, but I had no doubts about his moral integrity. His words regarding his disingenuous suggestion shocked me.
          I felt I could not go on anymore in the existing setup. I said this to the haverim. M.S. had demanded a decision by the [Party’s] Political Committee, since all our haverim in the Cabinet were also approved by a central organ [of the Party]. His demand was accepted. I called up Moshe and in the presence of Shaul I told him I did not want to explain to the Political Committee why I insist on his leaving the Foreign Ministry (a) because I did not want to disqualify him in front of the haverim; (b) because I was pretty certain that everything I would say would appear in the evening papers and in other papers, perhaps with additional distortions.
          I did not vote against him in the Political Committee. Rather, I suggested to him that I would leave the government, Golda would be Foreign Minister, Shaul or Moshe Dayan or somebody of their caliber would be Defense Minister and M.S. would be Prime Minister, since I would be able to support him as Party General Secretary only if there was a government in which foreign and security policies were managed by two people who would implement the policy I had outlined in my speech at the Knesset on November 2, 1955, courageously and with conviction.
          M.S. announced that he was not going to be a member of such a Cabinet. On the next day I decided to convene our Cabinet haverim and tell them I was not going to take part in the Political Committee’s meeting and that there was no need for this, since I was leaving the government.
          A few of the haverim possibly understood why I was convening our Cabinet haverim. And by noon Ziama and Pinhas Sapir came to me and informed me that M.S. had waived his demand for the Political Committee meeting and that he was leaving the government.
          In the meantime false news appeared in the papers, especially abroad, that I had proposed M.S. for the post of Party General Secretary in order to oust him from the government.
          I was surprised that M.S. did not deny this fabrication.
          On Monday, 18/6/1956, I convened the Cabinet and at that meeting M.S. announced his resignation. On the same day the Cabinet decided to nominate Golda as Foreign Minister and to have Namir join the Cabinet. On the same evening I announced these changes in the Knesset.
          Before coming to the Knesset I sent Moshe the draft of my speech (a very short “speech”); he suggested a few additions regarding his [past] activity, which I accepted, and then I said what I said in the Knesset.
          Moshe spoke immediately after me. And again I was surprised that had not felt it necessary to deny the fabrication concerning my proposal that he become Party General Secretary, although he did deny some [other] fabrications which appeared in the papers.
          Next day I decided to speak again in the Knesset, to clear up some obscurities and to deny the fabrication concerning my proposal that he become Party General Secretary. I telephoned Moshe and informed him that I was going to say that he was the first to table that proposal (of becoming Party General Secretary). He suggested that I say that I had heard from him for the first time about the “possibility’ (of his becoming Party General Secretary). I was somewhat surprised at this inexact wording, but I accepted it and used the terminology he suggested to me.
          All the rest is known.
          To one of the haverim who wrote me a letter on this matter, I summed up my opinion in a few sentences [see WebDoc #128]:

You are as much aware of Moshe’s many talents and qualities as I am. And I have no doubt at all that in a country like Denmark, which primarily deals with courteous trade relations with her neighbors, he could be an excellent Foreign Minister. Israel, to my deep regret, is not Denmark. From time to time she faces serious political conflicts and fateful decisions which demand a great deal of foresight, courage and a deep understanding of concrete factors and circumstances, not symbols and rhetoric, in order to steer the storm-bound ship to safe harbor through the treacherous seas that beset it.

          An ability for literate expression and for explaining matters is not enough, and the abilities necessary for standing at the helm have, to my dismay, never been at the command of M.S. Negative avoidance by “sitting put” and doing nothing is not enough. The preference for not doing is at times fraught with much more dangerous future results than any daring and fateful deeds.
          Three instances of “sitting put” – decided upon in the days of the Provisional Government and in the last two Cabinets against my opinion by M.S.’s inspiration and leadership – shall cost our people very dearly. In my view the end of the tether has been reached, and no wise man could have expected that I would – in the long run – be a party to a failing policy.

SOURCE: Ben-Gurion Archives, Yad Ben-Gurion, Sde-Boker. The document bears no signature. The original Hebrew text is reproduced in Shoher Shalom, 89-95. Some quotations and paraphrasing of the above indictment appear in Moshe Dayan, Avnei Derekh, 208-09. 

129 - Meeting of the Mapai Ideological Circle, June 28, 1956

Chairman:   We have invited haver Moshe Sharett to address the gathering. Moshe Sharett has the floor.
M. Sharett:    [- - -] Our economic and political problems are inextricably linked. Our enemies are conducting their campaign against us not only on the defense front, and they hope that their victory over us will not be a solely military one. They are doing everything in their power to hold back our development in order to undermine our economy and thus cause our collapse from within. [- - -]
       [- - - Egypt] has, to a great extent and thanks to the Czech arms deal and Nasser’s preparations for war, achieved some major successes in this direction. If we add the almost total standstill in tourism, dwindling investment capital, diminishing confidence in the State of Israel on the part of the banks, to the vital need to divert vast funds for arms procurement, thereby harming our development, immigration and other efforts, then Nasser does not really need to go to war. All he needs to do is to continue rearming and drag us after him into an arms race which would bring us to the brink of total economic collapse.
       But there are also factors which are dependent on ourselves: how we organize our lives, how we prepare ourselves, how we all grab from the state (actually from one another), how we fight with one another for all kinds of delusionary benefits. All this contributes to the devaluation of our currency, the drop in our purchasing power, the reduction of productivity due to strikes; it teaches the people to believe in the most dangerous illusions which will bring us to the brink of economic suicide. From a political standpoint, and if the situation I have described aggravates even further, it means handing a great victory to our enemies. Even if we were concerned solely with the political front, we would still be faced with all of the efforts and changes of direction that are incumbent upon us to make as a result of our economic situation and the dangers inherent in that situation.
       Yet another political question arises. I do not wish to go into the depth of this matter as it is extremely complex, but the question is: can we hold out in a long-term arms race? We are diverting huge sums to arms procurement. These are not one-time payments. Arms procurement does not stop after one payment. This means an ever-increasing burden on the budget, current expenditure on unlimited training, spare parts, replacing weapons and maintenance. The question of whether we can continue in this manner for an unlimited period of time must be asked. [- - -]
       I want my words to be precise. We are speaking about two dangers which do not bear comparison, dangers to our security and dangers to our economy. If there is a danger to our security, it is the danger of destruction, total annihilation. Economic danger spells, in the worst case, shortages, hunger, riots, and a lowering of our stature in the eyes of the world, but that does not mean that the State of Israel will be wiped off the face of the earth.
       Therefore, if the choice is between strengthening our defense capability or doing something else, then defense clearly comes first. No one is sure that there will be a war. There are serious fears that there might be. It involves a high percentage of risk. But on the other hand, any observer of our deteriorating economic situation must be aware of the high risk of economic collapse. I would go so far as to say that the second danger outweighs the first simply because the danger of economic collapse is not less than the danger of a serious military conflagration. That does not mean that we should not purchase arms, but somewhere along the line there must be a balance between our military and economic thinking.
       [- - -]
       If a disagreement has occurred between BG and myself, it is not simply because “A” stopped liking “B” or vice versa, but because they came to differ on a series of matters and subjects and then one of them reached whatever conclusions he did. At another time, the other reached the same conclusions. The question is: should these differences of opinion be discussed and clarified just between the two of them?
       By our accepted norms, this concept is probably somewhat outdated and should be re-discussed in the party. But what kind of a discussion are we talking about? Someone said earlier that it is impossible to discuss economic problems at a conference with 1,100 delegates. I agree. And I add, by the same token, it is immeasurably more impossible to discuss matters of policy at a conference of that size.
       Let us assume that someone proposes that we should break the blockade on Eilat. Someone else will then stand up and explain what such an operation entails so that the haverim will have all the facts at their fingertips in order to make up their minds. Would anyone say such things in public? [- - -] Could the question of our military response be discussed with the eyes of the world, not to mention the eyes of the Arab states, upon us? In other words, any debate conducted at our Party Convention would mean doing just that! Does that make it impossible to discuss matters of policy? [- - -] From the moment that the membership of the party Political Committee ballooned in size to 40, it became impossible to discuss certain matters there. [- - -] It seems to me that the party has no choice but to establish a smaller body, not composed by proportion according to party institutions, groups, or factions. It should, in my view, be established on a personal basis and comprise five members whose distinction lies in the fact that the general party membership trust their credibility and – as a rule – their judgement. If not, there will be no discussion and clarification, or if there is, it will be conducted between two people, or at best between three or four, probably our representatives in the Cabinet. [- - -]
       [- - -] My remarks will not be so orderly. Also, I am incapable of being simplistic and unequivocal, or expressing myself in a wholesale manner as some of those who spoke earlier. I do not possess their confidence. I also think that the confidence expressed, which stated that matters would have to take this course and not another, has no scientific foundations. This is soothsaying, but politics is not a matter of prophetic vision. Politics has to do with looking soberly at the facts, and each fact is liable to develop in various directions.
       I am not a Marxist. That does not mean that I think that everything that Marx ever said is nonsense. As far as I am concerned, Marx was a man who lived in the middle of the 19th century and who wrote an important book, possibly a few important books; and just like other books, they too contain certain truths. I make no pledge to live according to the dictates of The Bible. But one of Marx’s most important attributes was his analytical style and his concept of dialectics. That is to say, that every regime carries within itself the seed of opposition, and every tendency towards one extreme causes a reaction towards the other; this leads to a struggle from which springs something new, and this in its turn leads towards one specific direction and creates an antithesis. This is usually what happens in historical process.
       I feel [- - -] that we possibly have not yet fully exhausted all the possibilities of rearmament, and that Nasser, too, has not yet fully realized all of his military potential and that he may yet go from strength to strength; that is to say, that he will receive further arms and exercise additional influence on his neighboring countries. It is possible. But even then I am unable to say that I am convinced that such a situation will be permanent, while on the other hand I can see a possibility of this being only a short-term situation. And I can already see the beginnings of the antithesis. We know that Egypt’s economy is in distress; we know that there is widespread dissatisfaction in Egypt; there is a deep sense of disappointment, we know that this gang [Nasser’s junta] is sorely in need of strong means of control, and we have read of how they elected their president and what kind of authority he was given – the right to hand down a sentence of ten years’ imprisonment without the benefit of a trial. And Egypt has its own diaspora which is not entirely passive. True, while the Great Powers compete for Nasser’s favors, he will continue to gain power and any possible opposition will lose confidence in its own abilities. Yet the positions of the Great Powers can change and there are already some signs of this happening, both inside and outside Egypt.
       We know that in a country like Syria, instability is endemic, and we know that Nasser’s efforts to extend his control over the Arab world have caused some anxiety, even among those who see no choice but to accept that control. There are, however, active opposition forces inside Syria and also opposition factions active outside the country. We still do not know what turns events will take there.
       We are even witnessing a struggle inside a weak country like Jordan, which on the face of things, should have fallen into Nasser’s jaws like a ripe apple from a tree. [- - -]
       [- - -] Baghdad is not putting itself into Nasser’s pocket just yet, and while such a fate is entirely possible, things could turn out differently. I am not at all sure that we cannot play a certain role here and I am not at all sure that we are even trying to play it, but I am, of course, uncertain about the possible consequences. I would therefore steer clear of sweeping generalizations.
       This also applies to any arbitrary statement which says that military conflict is unavoidable. I do not subscribe to this view, neither can it be proven. An unavoidable military conflict is not an incontrovertible fact. I also see no practical purpose in subscribing to this assumption. In any case, whatever my part was in making demands for arms and in its procurement, I never felt that my efforts were diminished because I did not hold this view. My efforts were possibly not fully exhausted, but it was not due to this. What is clear is that in the given situation, a military conflict is possible. What is clear is that in the given situation there are factors in play which bring the possibility of armed conflict closer, and those that push it farther. We do not know what will happen. To say that it is unavoidable at the outset? I would advise caution in the face of such dogmatism in our policies.
       It could well be that Nasser’s aspirations are such that he would like to extend his hegemony from Gibraltar to the Persian Gulf. Morocco has gained independence and could, in the very near future, join the Arab League, but I am not at all sure that she would easily accept Nasser’s hegemony. She has her own aspirations and self-esteem to think of as well as her particular assessment of Egypt’s role and destiny. Enlarging the Arab League does not necessarily mean either its unification and internal reinforcement or the advancement of Arab unity.
       Haverim! There is no denying the fact that it is not a very good thing that there is only one state of Israel while there are many Arab states. There is also no disagreement on this point. It is also not very fortuitous that we are stuck here, right in the middle of the Arab world. So, where do we go from here? Start looking for another country?
       [- - -] It seems to me that when we view any development taking place in the world, our thinking is afflicted by simplification and an artificial and arbitrary isolation of the problem. This also applies to our thinking regarding our own problems. We have not yet achieved a sufficient and essential level of political thinking to realistically comprehend that there is a balance between depending upon our own strength and understanding our dependence on international factors from which we are unable to escape. These may not be part of our consciousness but they are certainly a part of our reality. And there are always crises. Just as crises occur in anyone’s personal life, so it is with a people, a country and a party – when this balance is not achieved, when suddenly it becomes apparent that there was not even an awareness of the existence of this dependence.
       I would like to give you a small example. Let’s take the subject of the possibilities of obtaining arms. There are some people who think that we should approach the USSR. I would not like to discuss the question at present, but the reasons behind the approach trigger my interest. I do not think that all the people who made such a proposal did so because they assumed that the USSR would reject our request and we could thus fulfill our political obligations towards Mapam. I do believe that there are those among us who genuinely think that it is possible to obtain arms from Russia. They do not think that Russia will supply us for free. Even Egypt did not receive Russian weapons for free, but supplied cotton in return. We have no cotton. If you say “we shall pay with citrus fruit,” what, then, shall we use to pay for our oil? Even after the discovery of oil at Heletz [in the northern Negev], we still have to purchase a large amount of oil which is paid for in both citrus fruit and dollars.
       Those supporters of approaching Russia assume that we will be able to find the necessary dollars but they do not grasp the fact that those dollars come from America, through the United Jewish Appeal and the [State of Israel] Bonds. Even when the American treasury gives us a grant, we use the money to buy arms and the Americans are fully aware of that fact. It is one thing to use American dollars to buy French arms, for France is our current European supplier, but a completely different thing if America knows that her dollars are finding their way to Russia.
       Without going into details, my words in the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee to the effect that the UJA or the Development Loan would not be able to exist for a single day without the goodwill of the American administration – in other words, the State Department – might come as a surprise. That is not to say that the State Department goes out of its way in its efforts to help the UJA and the Loan, but it tolerates these organizations with all their idiosyncrasies. But the moment they, or their idiosyncrasies, become intolerable, the State Department can stifle them. This kind of dependency is part of reality, but it is not part of the [Israeli] public’s consciousness. People bring up ideas without any awareness of the possible consequences. And then, when someone tries to apprize them of those consequences, he is told that he is “not dynamic.” What has dynamism got to do with it? The only thing that has to with it is total and criminal ignorance. It is criminal because it takes its revenge on us.
       When we say that Egypt’s aggressive initiative is unavoidable, we are assuming that she is making her plans without taking her international dependence into account and without realizing that she could find herself facing some opposition. I believe that the USSR is currently exerting her influence against war, but that does not mean that she guarantees us that war will not break out. I am talking against rigid thinking. Heaven protect us against any rigidity of thought! I am not saying that the USSR is a protective wall around us and will prevent war, but I do say this: her influence is being exerted in that direction. But to think that Nasser views himself as a completely free agent is not, in my opinion, realistic.
       I said that I am convinced that Russian influence is being exerted in that direction. I will say something about which I am not completely certain, but I can see the possibility of talks between us and the USSR in this sphere, especially in the wake of Shepilov’s tour of the Middle East. I do not know whether or not the Foreign Ministry will do it, but it seems to me that putting out feelers in that direction would be worthwhile.
       We are faced, my friends, with a very simple choice: if we believe that we are facing the Arab world and can only rely upon our own strength, then this brings us to one conclusion: we must respond to each and every [terrorist] incident, for not reacting would be interpreted by the Arab world as weakness and we would then be done for. That means that there is only a two-way accounting between us and the Arabs and nothing else. So what do you envisage as a future? How many millions will we be here? Russian Jewry is currently locked up. American Jewry does not want to emigrate here. Moroccan Jewry is also possibly not allowed free emigration to Israel and public meetings will not open it. Do we embark upon a plan for illegal immigration from Morocco? We certainly will, if there is no alternative. We will have to wait and see, the situation is still unclear. But assuming that we manage to bring the whole of Moroccan Jewry to Israel, how many will we be then? We live in the belief that we have returned to this land for the third time not to be uprooted again and not for history to repeat itself again. And we are surrounded by an Arab world of tens of millions.
M.Avizohar:    We have stood up to them.
M. Sharett:    But we are saying that they are rearming and that their hatred of us is increasing. We defeated them in a particular situation, but we know what has happened since then. We know that they have tremendous potential, and I am talking about the more distant future, not five years’ time, but ten, twenty, and thirty years from now.
       If that is the situation, once we have exhausted all the possibilities of strengthening our forces and explored every avenue in our policies – and for the moment I accept that responding to each and every incident is an unbreakable and sacred commandment – we will still be blind if we do not explore every possibility of reliance upon allies all over the world.
       What do I mean by allies? If reliance upon world powers is an asset, then nurturing that asset is mandatory; nurturing, not hampering. Upon what does that depend? First of all, on world attitudes towards the State of Israel, how the world views Israel. Does it view us as a negative or a positive force, as a moral or immoral factor? Does it view us as a place which generates creative endeavors or as just another mini-state whose existence is irrelevant, whose existence will leave no mark on history? This must be the permanent, unwavering objective of Israel’s foreign policy. That is not to say that every decision made should be made in its light, but it should never be completely ignored.
       I would like to stress that I am convinced that Nasser, with his intelligence, his course, his cunning and stratagems, does not forget that he is part of the world and that there are all kinds of factors in this world, some of which might have restraining effect [on him]. This must weaken our prophetic one-mindedness when we try to forecast future events. Nasser’s forging of relations with Nehru and Tito are also a deterrent to his lust for adventure [Italicized sentence was added to the protocol in Sharett’s handwriting].
       [- - -] We must fortify ourselves with patience. We have no other choice, and this can lead us to conclusions which will not be easy. The Jordan [diversion] channel and [free passage to] Eilat, for example. There is no comparison between the two, just as there is, in my view, no comparison between [digging] the Jordan channel and draining Lake Hula, not because there was some opposition in one case and none in the other, but because in one case there was UN intervention and in the other there was none. It could be that had [former UNTSO Chief William] Riley and not [Gen. Vagn] Bennike dealt with the matter, the channel issue might have turned out differently. I am not prepared to say so categorically, because I made the Hula arrangement with Riley and I did not make the channel arrangement with Bennike. In the meantime, things have changed. While Russia did not cast a veto at the time of the Hula project, she has done so regarding the [Jordan] channel project, thus intensifying the sensitivity of the Great Powers.
       My opinion on the matter of Eilat can either be accepted or rejected. In my view, breaking the Egyptian blockade on the Gulf of Eilat means war. That is not just a possibility; this Eilat [operation] will be a war initiated by us. True, I once said that we have every right to break the blockade, but I qualified my remarks with “after we have exhausted all other possibilities.” The London Times, which compared this statement of mine with another made on the same day, stressed those words. I said, “after we have exhausted all other possibilities,” but I did not determine a time-frame or enumerate the possibilities. I have never said that we must restart work on the channel, but rather that we were within our rights to do so.
       When I said what I said about Eilat, I assumed that breaking the blockade would be an air operation, no more. That assumption has since been rejected by the other school, the decision-makers, not by me. The issue is currently based upon other assumptions which mean war. So the debate on breaking the blockade of Eilat is not just a question in itself, but a question of war or no war. If we decide to go to war, we can decide that our best opening move would be breaking [the blockade on] Eilat.
       Regarding the Jordan channel, I accept that it [i.e., resuming work] is only a possibility. But we would be doing ourselves a disservice by closing our eyes and putting our backs to the wall. In the matter of the channel, our eyes should remain open, and if there is a wall, then we should do our utmost to topple it. Restarting work on the channel would immediately arouse the Security Council against us, and then the question would be whether we could withstand such an onslaught. Maybe or maybe not, but questions would still have to be answered. For example, under the threat of restarting work, would we be able to obtain massive assistance for such an ambitious development project at present? What if it were possible to funnel funds to Israel for the project, but the situation, from a technical point of view, was not urgent? I am convinced that a dictatorship would take this route as it would not have to concern itself with public opinion. The question is: should we commit unrewarding acts, from which we might even incur losses, simply because we fear adverse [domestic] public opinion? A further question is: does a democracy have to act foolishly, or can it not explain its actions wisely, making an effort to have it understood? I am unable to go into this matter any further.
       [- - -] One comment on Meir’s remarks: you said that there is an ongoing offensive which supports a preemptive strike. True, but the people are against war, of that I am certain. The people are against war. The people want peace. That is not to say that the people will not go to war and give their all if war breaks out. But the people, the masses, are against war. They want peace and are possibly too much against war and too much in favor of peace. That, perhaps, complicates matters a little. Perhaps we should cool their enthusiasm for peace, for it is not always attainable.
M.Avizohar:    There have been times when a preemptive war was very much justified.
M. Sharett:    No. There were some young men who grasped at that idea, not the people. The people did not. Deep down, the people know in what kind of a war their strength lies, and they do not want to lose their moral underpinning. The ethos of the nation guards us against that.
       Now to the question of reprisal. I would like to present two or three hypotheses. There is no earthly reason for us to adopt the principle of a reprisal for every single incident without examining the incident, without studying the current world situation, and without examining our other objectives. It has no foundation. Take, for example, the most recent shelling of Gaza. In my opinion, that was a criminal act, and once the man responsible became aware of what was happening, he stopped it immediately. The first thing it caused was the cancellation of French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau’s visit. Our “non-dynamic” foreign policy had brought the visit about, everything had been prepared, and the shelling of Gaza canceled it. We had things to discuss with Pineau, and they did not concern French art or cultural cooperation. Though that, too, is of importance. One talk with Prime Minister Edgar Faure [in October 1955] upgraded our air force from the Mystère-II to the Mystère-IV; one single talk. France is prepared to sell us the Mystère-II at present, and we were hesitating about buying. France does not mind selling them since they are outdated; but the move from the Mystère-II to the Mystère-IV was revolutionary. It was a political decision of the highest order.
       That does not mean that there were no problems later, and we had to bring all our contacts into play, including some sterling work by the Ministry of Defense people in order to clinch the deal. But the cornerstone of the effort was a specific decision made by the French Prime Minister. That is an undeniable fact. He said “yes,” and today we have 24 Mystères. On what basis could we know whether an in-depth talk here, between the FM, the PM and the CoS, would not have produced results? We can estimate what opportunities we missed, maybe we did not miss any, but we might have missed a great deal. From a political standpoint too. I listen to the radio. It has become somewhat discomfiting. Leaders visit their opposite numbers and vice versa. No one comes to visit us. Once we did enjoy a visit by [Burmese president] U Nu. For how long can we live off that visit? Pineau could have come here for a visit, but because we killed 50 men, women, and children in Gaza, he cancelled his visit. What good did that do us?
       Another thing. The French decision to supply us with Mystères did not automatically ensure their actual delivery at the time they were sent. If it had not been for another operation – a purely political one – not a single Mystère would have been sent. Yet today we have twenty-four of them. There is a vast difference between 24 and none at all, especially when, in the hands of our men, the aircraft in question are superlative defensive weapons and not for the conquest of Egypt. This increases their value immeasurably. Had we not received a single aircraft, France could not have been accused of going back on her word, because we had to release her from her commitment to the United States. Her production capability is limited. She can produce a certain number of Mystères a month and she was committed to first supply a certain number to NATO, in other words, to the US. She had to be released from that commitment. That was an operation in which the State Department, Dulles there and Lawson here, were all involved, and it resulted in the release of first 12 aircraft, and later an additional 12. Without that operation, not a single Mystère would have moved.
       There is a difference of opinion which has resulted in a draw, and I would not like to express my opinion on it. What would have happened, from the standpoint of arms supply, if Operation Kinneret had not taken place? The result is a draw. I shall say no more. In private conversation I’ll have plenty to say. But from a completely objective point of view, I am prepared to compromise on the result of the tie. I would like to tell you from the depth of my conviction and with all my power of persuasion that had Operation Kinneret been undertaken at the time we sweated blood to secure the early release of the Mystères by a few months, it would have been a lost case for that time.
       Is consideration of such a matter vital or not? Is it possible to act blindly according to rigid principles? This is a political decision, not a standing order. I shall not go into the question of who has the power of decision. Let us assume the existence of a hierarchy. But should the man who has to make the decision be allowed to fit blinkers to his eyes and see only the decision and ignore the whole picture? Or should he see it all? I say this: blindness is unthinkable and so, by the same token, is adherence to a rigid principle. Dreadful things may occur, but at the same time we must be in the midst of a much more serious campaign.
       I am not sitting in judgement. I only point out what considerations should guide our thinking. And so I say: a reprisal for each and every event is out of the question. I am not sure, and I am taking a great risk in saying so, but there was a time when there were a few rays of hope in our contacts with Nasser, hints of possibilities. I do not know, it might have been a deception from the outset, or not. Anything is possible. But it is a fact that we did see those rays of hope and they were extinguished after the attack on Gaza. They would still be flickering had only 10 people been killed; they were extinguished because more than 40 died. You said that “there was no reprisal against the fedayeen.” [There was no reprisal] because the fedayeen attacks were a response to IDF operations, not just because of Hammarskjöld[’s visit]. That, too, was a consideration, but not the only one.
       Your line of thinking regarding the necessity of military reprisals truly astonishes me. When we are hit by a terrorist act and blood is spilt, there is at first a very strong emotional shock. Then there is a political consideration arguing that we cannot sit still and not respond, lest this be interpreted as a sign of weakness. And there is of course also a military consideration demanding an eye for an eye. But at the same time we seem to be forgetting completely that there are men and women living on the other side of the border, and they are, too, endowed with brains, and they too react to our raids in a similar way. I really cannot fathom the way some of us, Israelis, grasp the situation. It seems I cannot expect all of you here to have had the same experience I had when I lived surrounded by Arabs in an all-Arab village in order to become aware that Arabs are human beings, that they have brains, rational thinking, self-esteem and human emotions, and are capable of feelings of outrage just like us.
        I do not wish to go into the chain of events which led up to the shelling of Gaza, although I have volumes to say on the subject. The shelling of Gaza took place. And in Gaza, like a bolt from the blue, 50 people were killed and a further 50, among them women and old people, were wounded. The [Egyptian] man responsible for Gaza has to show that he has killed people. He does not do so in a military manner but in a way that is alien to us. He thinks that it is more effective. That is his way. He is, as they say in English, “taking off” [i.e., subtracting] from an account he has to settle. His account stands at 50. Today, five Jews are killed – he subtracts 5 and has 45 to go. Tomorrow three Jews are killed – 42 are left. He is prepared to go on until the end. Hammarskjöld’s visit possibly stopped it. I am sure it did, for I know what transpired between him and Hammarskjöld before the latter came for his visit to Cairo. I know that Hammarskjöld said that he would not come to Cairo unless certain obligations were undertaken, and he received them.
       Here I reach a second conclusion. I have never proposed the principle of “no reprisals under any circumstances.” That amounts to the same absurd rigid thinking I mentioned earlier. I say this: consideration of each event in the light of the circumstances, and I say further that the considerations must also be applied to the scope of the reprisal. In the history of the Hagana and the Palmach, and even in the War of Independence, there were some magnificent instances of operations which, from a theoretical military standpoint, were guerrilla-like actions. Today, suddenly, we seem to have only one option, direct military action, which means aggression. This in turn means many casualties, and if we are going to hit them, then we must hit them hard. There are, perhaps, cases where force is necessary, but I totally reject its use in each and every case, with no exceptions. I am not a military man, and the fact that I once was makes no difference at all. However, my intelligence does not allow me to compromise with the view that there is no alternative. I have heard recently that such a possibility might exist. Perhaps I am mistaken. I hope that I am not.
       The scope of the operations is most important. If you had been in New York and had seen the headlines about Operation Kinneret, you could not be but exasperated. It is not just a question of my having weak nerves, that I become horrified all too quickly, that I should have nerves of steel and not lose my equanimity. This is a political issue. Are we dependent upon the United States or not? Are we dependent upon American Jewry or not? Perhaps one of the most serious things that occurred was when the trust of American Jewry in the good judgment of the Government of Israel was shaken, for they were incapable of understanding why the operation had been undertaken on the very day that a meeting had been planned, a meeting on which high hopes had been pinned. As far as they were concerned, nothing out of the ordinary had happened: shots had been fired in the Kinneret area, we had suffered no casualties, and then out of the blue came this operation, with dozens of people killed. And the headline, “Israeli Offensive Against Syria,” at a time that we were involved in a world-wide effort to explain our position, to prove that we were a country under siege; a country with its back to the wall, whose enemies were planning its annihilation – and then came [Operation] Kinneret. The words said one thing, the facts another.
       I say that we must consider when to retaliate and when not to. The retaliation and its scope must be considered, and the impact that it leaves cannot be ignored, for the impact left is a political fact, with all of the concomitant consequences. In the case of [Operation] Kinneret, the consequences were the Security Council resolution which censured us as the aggressor. In another case [i.e., Gaza], it was the cancellation of Pineau’s visit. In yet another, the cancellation of arms supplies or the justification of the cancellation. All that has happened and damage was caused. I do not say that we should always make our decisions in light [of outside factors], but they cannot be ignored. And the Army must not be allowed to ignore them. To say nothing of the fact that reprisals ignite a sea of hatred, flames of animosity all around us, and result in contributions of military assistance being channeled from one Arab state to another.
       What Ben-Gurion said in the Knesset about Hammarskjöld’s claims being refuted is quite true. He was proven that there are situations in which restraint is impossible. But another thing is also true. When he [Hammarskjöld] countered by saying: “Yes, but the facts prove that this does not solve the problem,” I received the impression that it had been our claims which had been refuted. In any event, he was not given a rebuttal.