Jerusalem,
5 May 1955
I appreciate the trouble Mr. Macmillan has taken to
comment on my letter to you and should like in reply to make the
following observations which cover also certain aspects of Sir Anthony Eden’s
recent speech in the House of Commons.
(1) Regarding the effects of the Turco-Iraqi Pact and the adherence
thereto of the United Kingdom, our apprehensions remain unallayed. The view
expressed by Sir Anthony Eden that these arrangements for the first time
directed Iraq's attention away from Israel has unfortunately not yet been borne
out by facts. On the contrary, the Pact has enabled Iraq to extract from Turkey
a public commitment against Israel, of which the first fruit was Turkey’s
identification with the Arab line at the Bandung Conference. Her Majesty’s
Government’s dissociation of the United Kingdom from the exchange of letters
between the Prime Ministers of Iraq and
Turkey was gratifying, but by adhering without reservation to the Pact itself,
the United Kingdom has endorsed the disability for which under its terms Israel
was singled out. The adverse effects on Israel’s position of this exclusion,
and of its endorsement by the United Kingdom, are plain.
(2) The reaffirmation by Sir Anthony Eden of Britain’s readiness to come
to Israel’s assistance in the event of an attack against her is welcomed as an
expression of goodwill and friendly intent, but in present circumstances the
Government of Israel cannot regard it as adequately meeting the issue. This
assurance derives from the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950, which was
designed to benefit the Arab states as much as to protect Israel. It
represented a principle of policy balanced in its application. But if a
balanced structure is superimposed on unbalanced foundation, no equilibrium can
result. This precisely the situation which Israel has to face. The security and
political scales in the Middle East having been heavily titled against her, no
assurance directed in equal measure to both sides can restore the balance.
(3) The basic fact is that Israel is formally excluded, whether as
participant or as beneficiary, from the network of pacts, treaties and
agreements now spread over the Middle East. Such is the case with regard to the
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, the United States-Iraqi
Agreement. In the view of the Government of Israel, the Western Powers which
act as sponsors of, or parties to, those alliances have an inescapable
responsibility for the inevitable adverse effects of their policy on Israel’s
security and intra-regional position.
(4) It is against this background that the refusal must be viewed of Her
Majesty’s Government to formalise its relationship with Israel on a footing of
equality as between two contracting parties – similar to the relationship which
exists between it and at least three of Israel’s avowed enemies. The United
Kingdom has assumed, and is apparently ready to go on assuming, legally binding
obligations based on reciprocity vis-a-vis Arab States. Israel, on the other
hand, is expected to rest content with a purely one-sided verbal declaration
which does not even apply to her alone. Sir Anthony Eden indeed emphasised that
the Tripartite Declaration was not a bilateral one between the United Kingdom
and Israel. It was a declaration, he said, in which the United States and
France were equally engaged. Yet independently of this Declaration Britain is a
party to a series of bilateral treaties with the Arab States. Israel alone does
not seem to be eligible for such relationship. Israel’s repeated attempts to
engage the United Kingdom Government in a clarification of the issues involved
have so far failed. A formal proposal to this effect made in our Note of 22
September 1954 has remained unanswered and was, indeed, ignored in
the British reply of 19 October 1954. It is difficult therefore for
the Government of Israel to resist the disappointing conclusion that her
majesty’s Government is unable to accord to Israel the same measure of friendship
and support which it confers on the Arab States which insist on maintaining a
state of war against Israel.
(5) Sir Anthony Eden’s statement that a British guarantee covering
Israel could not precede but can only follow the settlement of major issues
outstanding between her and the Arab States does not explain, but serves merely
further to emphasize, the discrimination with which we see ourselves
confronted. No such condition has been prescribed in connection with the
treaties thus far signed with certain Arab States, nor are we aware of an
intention to apply it in the event of other Arab States, say Egypt or Syria,
declaring their readiness to conclude defence treaties with the United Kingdom.
Indeed, the postponement of a guarantee to a time after the Arab-Israel
conflict has been resolved borders on the paradoxical. It is precisely because
the Arab States maintain an implacable hostility towards Israel, and despite
that hostility are considered eligible for participation in the Western defence
system, that Israel is in need of, and feels herself entitled to seek, a
special guarantee for her security. In the absence of a settlement, a guarantee
becomes essential. It may even prove useful as conducing to a settlement. Its
importance dwindles if it is envisaged merely as a post factum imprimatur
on a settlement already achieved.
(6) I have given a good deal of thought to the implications of Mr.
Macmillan’s statement that the process of drawing the Arab States into a
defence association with the United Kingdom was an essential step towards inducing
in them sufficient confidence both in themselves and in the West to enable them
to contemplate putting their relations with Israel on a better footing. The
implication seem obvious: no defence association with Israel is possible before
a settlement between her and the Arab States has been reached; no such
settlement is possible before all, or nearly all, Arab states have been drawn
into the orbit of a Western defence system; hence Israel must be relegated to
the tail of the queue both in point of time and in order of precedence.
(7) From a practical aspect the conditioning of any guarantee to Israel
on a prior settlement of the major outstanding issues appears bound to retard
rather than hasten the advent of a settlement, for the simple reason that the
Arab states are entirely uninterested in seeing Israel's integrity guaranteed.
Moreover, if an initiative is taken by the United Kingdom, or by any other
third Power, to outline specific proposals on which a settlement might be
based, further serious complications are bound to ensue. The nature of the
Arab-Israel conflict is such as always to expose Israel to the danger that she
will be confronted with demands for unilateral concessions. Israel claims no
Arab territory. The Arab States claim territory from Israel. Israel does not
ask that Jews who fled to her from Arab lands be repatriated. The Arab States
insist on the repatriation of Arab refugees. In these circumstances, what the
Arab states can be called upon to concede is merely a claim to something which
they in any case do not possess; whereas Israel may be faced with the demand to
give up what she has. Should the proposed settlement be based on such an
approach Israel will have no choice but to reject it, nor will a Power
sponsoring the proposal be free in the eyes of our people from a charge of
partisanship. The Arabs, on the other hand, would hail the concessions demanded
of Israel as a triumph of their intransigence and, far from becoming amenable
to a compromise, feel encouraged to persevere in the their tactics and press
for even more far-reaching concessions. To avoid any possible misapprehension,
I take this opportunity of reiterating Israel’s categorical misapprehension; I
take this opportunity of reiterating Israel’s categorical refusal to cede any
part of her territory or to readmit Arab refugees. Minor and mutual adjustments
of the frontier fall into a different category and can always be considered
when the time comes for demarcating the line as a result of a peace settlement;
there will also be a continued application of the principles governing the
grant of entry permits under the Reunion of Families’ Scheme.
(8) I appreciated the proposal that Her Majesty’s Government should use
its good offices with the Prime minister of Egypt in exploring the possibility
of a settlement. We should welcome such initiative if it were directed towards
inducing the Egyptian Government or respond to Israel’s repeated offers of
contact and negotiation but not if it were used as an occasion for proposing
specific terms liable to prejudge the issue and possibly wreck the chances of
an eventual understanding. The responsibility for such an untoward outcome of a
well-meant intervention would be very grave. As things stand, Egypt still owes
a reply to the United Nations’ proposal, which Israel has accepted, for a high
level meeting to deal with problems of border security along the Gaza Strip.
Her Majesty’s Government will also be aware of Israel’s readiness to proceed to
the gradual payment of compensation for abandoned Arab lands – which may
necessitate a special loan – provided the Suez-Canal blockade against Israel
shipping and threats and reprisals by Arab States against foreign firms having
connections with Israel are discontinued. These proposals offer scope for
progress without being fraught with the danger of irreparable harm, such as is
liable to be caused by the raising of issues which directly and fundamentally affect
Israel’s sovereignty in terms of territory and population.
(9) I deeply regret that my first communication intended for transmission
to Mr. Macmillan should be somewhat sombre in tone but I believe that, in view
of the serious issues at stake, a candid expression of our views and feeling at
this stage will serve the best interests of Anglo-Israel friendship which I am
sure Mr. Macmillan no less than I has much at heart.
SOURCE: DFPI 10, doc.208.
