SUBJECT Israel-Arab
Settlement and Israel Request for Arms
PARTICIPANTS
Department Israel Government
Secretary Foreign Minister Sharett
Mr.
Allen Ambassador Eban
Mn
Russell Minister Shiloah
The Israel
Foreign Minister called at his request. He said that the Israel Government had
given careful and searching thought to the aide-mémoire which the Secretary had
handed to him on November 21 and to the remarks which the Secretary had made at
that time. Mr. Sharett said that he had exchanged messages with Prime Minister
Ben Gurion and it could be assumed that the Prime Minister had consulted his
principle colleagues in the Israel Government. He said that the Israel
Government's reactions have been incorporated in an aide-mémoire which Mr.
Sharett handed to the Secretary.
Mr.
Sharett said that he had been deeply impressed by the Secretary's statement in
their last meeting that if there should unfortunately be head-long clashes
requiring a decision on the part of the United States between supporting Israel
and the Arab states, it is a foregone conclusion that the United States would
support Israel. The Secretary commented that Mr. Sharett had over-simplified his
remarks. He said the United States has repeatedly reaffirmed its position under
the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 and, if a clash in the Middle East occurred
through any aggression by Israel, it would be necessary for us to oppose it.
What the Secretary had intended to say in the remarks Mr. Sharett referred to
was that if, despite all of our best efforts, a struggle developed in the
Middle East between a Soviet-supported Arab world and a democratic Israel, our
sympathy, at the very least, would be with Israel.
Mr.
Sharett said that he intended to speak seriously and frankly. He hoped the
Secretary would also regard his remarks as friendly. The most vital and crucial
interests of Israel are at stake. Israel wants to differ as little as possible
from the United States, but it was necessary to state Israel's position
clearly. First, Mr. Sharett said, he had been taken aback by the upsurging of a
wave of optimism at the possibility of an early settlement. He had seen the
wave rising in press reports from Cairo and later from Washington. The previous
day a reporter had quoted Vice President Nixon as being optimistic. Mr. Sharett
said he saw no change of heart in Nasser nor any change in the provocatory [sic.] activities along the borders. The Israel Government has had indirect
contacts with Nasser, in part through American Jews traveling through Egypt,
but none of the reports had been encouraging. In reply to a question from the
Secretary, Mr. Sharett said that none of these contacts had been very recent.
The most significant factor of ail, Mr. Sharett said, was the Egyptian-Czech
arms deal. With all Israel's passionate desire for peace, it was necessary for
the Israelis to exercise prudence in appraising the present situation. It does
more harm to be unduly optimistic than to be healthily skeptical. Apart from an
evaluation of the concrete prospects Israel is faced with, the Israel
Government has noticed a certain departure, indicated in the speeches of the
British Prime Minister at the Guild Hall and in Parliament and also in the
suggestion by the Secretary that it may be inevitable for Israel to make
territorial concessions to Egypt and possibly to others. There seemed to be a
significant chronological sequence and the Israel Government could not help
from believing that there had been cause and effect. It believes the new
departure is the result of the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal. Before the deal,
Israel had sought clarification of passages in the Secretary's August 26 speech
relating to boundaries. What the Israelis were told was reassuring. Macmillan
told Ambassador Elath that "nothing drastic" was contemplated, only
"minor adjustments". Ambassador Eban had gathered the same thing here
in Washington. So Israel is forced to conclude that this insistence upon the
indispensability of concessions is new and stems from the turn of events in
Egypt. If this is so, then it is nothing less than a premium upon doing
business with the Kremlin. The Israel public will regard the reported prospect
of a loan to Egypt for the Aswan Dam as an additional premium. It will appear
that if any country wants a loan or support for concessions the thing to do is
to strike a deal with the Soviet Bloc. The Egyptian junta is getting the best
of both worlds: arms from Russia, loans from the United States and the United
Kingdom, and support for concessions from Israel. These public impressions will
inevitably evoke the ghost of Munich. Nasser is out to gain time and to outwit
both the West and Israel. What he wants would. be at the expense of Israel's
security and ultimate survival. He is creating the impression of willingness to
talk settlement in order to get the Aswan loan and also to gain time to absorb
his new arms and to achieve military confidence. Mr. Sharett said that he
wished the crux of his remarks to be that there is no question of Israel
agreeing to cede territory. It is essential to differentiate between
adjustments which would be reciprocal, mutual, minor, and the result of give
and take on the one hand, and cession of territory on the other. This is not a
difference in degree but a difference in kind. What is now suggested is a
cession of territory and that is not something that Israel can accept. Aside
from a question of statesmanship, there would be no chance of such a cession being
approved by the Israel Parliament or ratified by its electorate.
Mr.
Sharett said he regarded Eden's speech not only as a blunder but as a disaster.
He said he was driven to the conclusion that Eden did it to improve Britain's
position with the Arab world. It was a "disaster" because it was
bound to strengthen Arab intransigence. If Nasser has Britain upholding his
claims, why should he settle for any less? Since Israel will not concede, it
makes the absence of a settlement a certainty. Mr. Sharett said that he
believed the most charitable hypothesis is that Eden is committed to certain
ruts of thought carried over from previous days. The Bernadotte Plan had
carried a "Made in Britain" label. Mr. Sharett commented that Eden's
speeches had not earned him any support in the British press, with the sole
exception of the London Times. Most of the papers had been scathing in their
attacks. The American press had also found the speeches revolting in their
suggestion that Israel, which is so small, should give up land to the Arab
states who already have so much.
Mr.
Sharett said that he wished to be constructive as well as critical and he hoped
the aide-mémoire that he had handed the Secretary would be regarded in that
light. If the Arabs want a settlement they should agree to the Jordan Valley
Plan. It has been worked out on the concept of reciprocity. The Israel
Government prefers to approach the question of a settlement through direct
negotiation but it is not opposed in principle to mediation, as it has indicated
by its cooperation with Ambassador Johnston. But a mediator should not take up
a position on a question such as the Negev in advance. Eden had, therefore,
disqualified himself as a mediator. The question for Israel is whether it can
embark upon negotiations from a position of weakness while Egypt does so from
strength. Does the United States believe it is wise or fair to begin
negotiations at a time when Nasser has planes and tanks in increasing
quantities and when he knows that Israel has no definite prospect of getting
them. Is not Israel's c1aims for a similar number of weapons an irresistible
one? Should Israel trust that nothing untoward will happen? For its part,
Israel cannot put such trust in Nasser.
With
respect to the Secretary's request on November 21 that Israel not force the
issue of the Gulf of Aqaba at the present time, Mr. Sharett said that all
Israel is doing is to use its own port. It is not encroaching on anyone. It is
Egypt that has declared that it is going to use violence to prevent this use.
What the United States is doing is asking Israel to submit to violence, to stay
put, to submit to brutal force. There is, of course, always the question of
political sagacity. If Israel were actually negotiating a settlement, it would
not force the Aqaba issue. But unless and until negotiations begin or appear
practical, Israel cannot renounce its elementary rights. It would be reducing
its strength of negotiation. Israel, by renouncing its right to use its own
port, would merely be giving additional strength to Nasser's position. With
what prospect would Israel be starting negotiations? It is being undermined at
all points. This is not the general theory of the democracies in their efforts
to cope with the Communist threat. The Secretary remarked that he did not
believe the two situations were parallel.
Mr.
Sharett said that, as his last point, he wanted to suggest the advisability of
concentrating on the Johnston mission. This is concrete and tangible and on
this issue Nasser is on trial. He promised Ambassador Johnston that he would
use his efforts to overcome the objections of Syria and other Arab states.
Would it not be advisable to wait a couple of months and see if he carries out
his pledge? Two years have been spent on the negotiations on the Jordan Valley
Plan, which is a US undertaking. If it succeeds, there will be grounds for
encouragement. If it fails, then it will be necessary to strengthen Israel and
wait for a better mood.
In comment
upon Mr. Sharett's protest at the encouraging state of mind he found in certain
quarters about the prospects of a settlement, the Secretary said he had set
forth his position in his press conference that morning. He read the following
from the transcript: "We continue to feel very strongly that there should
be a solution of that problem. I can only go back in these matters to my
comprehensive statement of August 26 on this subject, which was very thoroughly
and carefully prepared, which emphasizes what we believe to be the imperative
need of a solution to prevent, as I then said, the development of an arms race
which would sap the economic strength of these countries. The gains to come out
of a settlement from both sides are immense. We continue to hope that both
sides will see the possibilities of such gains in the situation. I would not
say that there are any concrete developments which could be adduced as proof
that they had been so convinced as yet. But the possibilities in our opinion
still exist."
With
respect to Mr. Sharett's point that the UK and possibly the US had changed its
position with respect to territorial adjustments and with respect to aid on the
Aswan Dam as a result of the Egyptian-Czech arms deal, the Secretary said that
such was not the case. As far as the US is concerned, its views with respect to
possible territorial adjustments had been in formulation for more than a year,
ever since the Secretary had told Eban in the fall of 1954 that he was studying
the question. The views we hold today are the same as those we had six months ago.
The Secretary said that he had asked Francis Russell to work with him in seeing
what the US could do to help in making a settlement possible. He hoped that
some day it would be possible for him to tell Mr. Sharett or some of his
colleagues more in detail what our views were. We have been studying the
possibility of assisting in the construction of the Aswan Dam for over two
years. Our attitude on what constitutes a fair agreement with respect to
territorial adjustments and our attitude on economic development in the area
has not altered as a result of the Soviet arms deal.
On the
question of "cession" of territory in the Negev, the Secretary said
that the Israel-Egyptian Armistice Agreement provides that the armistice lines
were to be without prejudice to the question of ultimate boundary decisions.
Israel's present title to territory in that area is provisional, not final. The
Secretary said that Mr. Sharett had mentioned a lot of evil things that would
flow from a willingness on the part of Israel to regard the Negev boundaries as
negotiable: loss of access to Elat [sic, for Eilat], loss of valuable mineral
products, loss of population, and dismemberment of Israel. The Secretary said
that he believes there are ways of avoiding this chamber of horrors and still
provide land communication between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. Mr.
Sharett remarked that Israel had offered to provide a right of transit. The
Secretary commented that that was not enough, in his best judgment, to obtain a
settlement.
The
Secretary said that, in his opinion, any possibility of a settlement must be
carried forward by the mediation approach. He said we are not offering
ourselves in that role but we are exploring simultaneously on both sides what
the attitudes toward a settlement are. The Secretary said that he believes the
time for a special effort at settlement is right here now. Today and for some
months, the position of Israel will be one of military superiority. It will
take time for Egypt to assimilate any arms it acquires. Egypt has always taken
the position that it could not negotiate from weakness but it may feel that the
prospect of an increase in its actual armed strength will suffice to enable it
to contemplate a settlement. It is not probable that we shall ever find a time
of perfect equilibrium. Mr. Sharett said he must deny that Israel has military
superiority. The Secretary said that all he could do was to take the advice of
this Government's military experts who believe that Israel has current military
superiority. Mr. Sharett said that if Israel has superiority, it is the result
of factors unrelated to equipment. The Secretary said it was quite true that
this superiority may be less decisive in the future than it is now. The present
is, therefore, a good opportunity to make a serious effort at a settlement.
Mr.
Sharett said that the mood in Israel now is one of tense calm in the face of a
grave danger. He pointed to the fact that there had been no recent reactions to
border provocations because the public knows that the Government is attempting
to deal with the larger danger. The Secretary said that he thought it doubtful
that efforts by both sides to increase armaments would produce a better
situation.
The
Secretary said he had only had an opportunity to read very hastily the
aide-mémoire which Mr. Sharett had just handed to him but it was his impression
that it was not adequately responsive to the Secretary's requests of November
21. Nevertheless, it does indicate a certain willingness to negotiate. Mr. Sharett
interpolated, "provided the cession of territory is not made the starting
point." The Secretary said that he had not suggested it as a starting
point. The Secretary said that whatever merit there may be in Israel's attitude
toward the question of the use of the Gulf of Aqaba, it was necessary to bear
in mind the practical fact which Mr. Sharett had mentioned, namely, that a [inserted in JFD's handwriting: "forcible"] raising of the issue at
this time would be most unfortunate with respect to the prospect of a
settlement. The Secretary referred to Mr. Sharett's suggestion that
negotiations be delayed for a couple of months to see whether there might be
agreement at the end of that time on the Jordan Valley Plan. The Secretary said
that those two months are too valuable to spend in waiting. That may be the
very time when a rough military equilibrium will best provide an opportunity
for moving toward a settlement. Mr. Sharett asked whether the impression his
colleagues had obtained at the time of the Secretary's speech last August that
territorial adjustments would be mutual and not drastic was accurate. The
Secretary said that Francis Russell had studied the problem intensively last
spring and that, from a review of the situation with him, the Secretary's impression
had been that Israel would have less in terms of square miles but that it would
not involve areas that were heavily populated or had great strategic value.
With respect to Mr. Sharett's comment that it was one thing to negotiate and
another thing to have a prejudged plan, the Secretary said that he was not sure
which category he would put our present thinking into. We have tried to satisfy
ourselves that there is a solution that would not involve real loss to Israel
but out of which would come some very real gains. The Secretary said that he
believed there is a possibility of an equitable settlement and he hopes that
Israel will not foreclose it.
Mr.
Sharett said that he expected to be leaving the United States in a week and
that it would be most important for him to have some indication of the United
States' answer to Israel's request for arms. The Secretary said that the
Department expected to receive from Defense by the end of this week a report
with respect to availability and cost. Mr. Sharett said that what he would be
most interested in would be not the details but a general understanding with
respect to availability and especially the possibility of acquiring jet
aircraft.
Source: FRUS
1955-1957, XIV, doc.437.
