(A) Herzog's Reports of the Meeting
Jerusalem,
January 24, 1956
Lawson was summoned tonight to Minister.
Present were Hamilton, Herzog.
The
Minister opened by stating he had urgently summoned Ambassador to tell him a few
things which he hopes would be transmitted to Secretary of State before his
meeting with Eban [on January 25]. These are an addenda to what Eban would say.
After the Ambassador
received from Minister a copy of his letter to Secretary of State [of January
16; see diary entry for that date], the Minister said the issue of arms has now
reached a critical stage. It is now three months since he submitted our request
[for arms] to the Secretary in Paris and Geneva. The answers he has received do
not promise a chance of the United States or other Western powers providing
Israel with the arms which would quantitatively balance the Czech deal, but we
were told that if we handed over a modest list of defensive arms it would be
received with sympathetic consideration. From the Secretary of State’s talk
with journalists in Washington on October 18, 1955 it became clear that if it
was found that [the Czech deal] seriously changed the balance, the United
States together with other signatories would have to take steps to restore the balance. The statement
by the President on October 18, 1955 – the very fact of its publication and its
careful formulation – has also given the impression that there was no intention
of refusing our request or to carry on endlessly delaying it. The Kinneret
operation and the protracted considerations at the Security Council have
delayed the answer. But neither the operation, nor the SC’s censure have
changed the basic situation. For, meanwhile Soviet arms have been pouring into
Egypt and the Egyptians are learning how to use them, in Egypt by Soviet and
British instructors as well as in the Soviet bloc. These arms were purchased
not without a purpose. We would fail by a terrible irresponsibility if we do
not take into account what could Nasser do when he feels that he has reached a
decisive superiority. We cannot rely on outside intervention on our behalf in
case of a crisis since first there is no such obligation, and second even if
there was one it could not prevent the havoc of our cities being bombed from
the air before that obligation is carried out. Nasser is fully aware that we
are not receiving any defensive arms which could by any means be compared to
the destructive arms he is getting. We shall soon have to decide where we stand
and what we are to do. The Minister was convinced that the United States was
considering acting responsibly, but this obliged her to not delay its response.
If the United
States is prepared to positively respond, but for various reasons is afraid of
the publicity of the results of its policy, the Minister is prepared to promise
that this response is kept strictly secret till the United States agrees with its
publication. It is vital that the government [of Israel] or at least number of Ministers
know that the provision of a certain quantity of arms is promised to us soon.
Time is acting against us and soon there would be no possibility of our pilots
training to catch up with [the level] of the Egyptians.
To Lawson's
question whether it was the Minister intention that the proposed announcement
[by the Secretary of State] should be transmitted by formal channels, or would
he be satisfied with a personal transmission [to him], the Minister answered
that he would accept the last alternative, i.e. that Lawson would transmit it
personally, or the Secretary of State transmit it to Eban, and stressed that a
promise in principle without fixing the time of its implementation was not
enough. To Lawson's question whether it was the Minister’s intention that the
response should relate to the list submitted by us, the Minister answered in
the positive and commented that he could see an eventuality in which the US
would say that we would receive a certain type [of weaponry] from France and that
she would supply us with other types. There are here all kinds of
possibilities.
At the end of
the conversation the Minister repeated and stressed that the time for decision arrived [4 words in
English]. We are entitled to know where we stand and what awaits us. The [Israel]
government's situation would be highly serious if, God forbid, it would be
possible to accuse it of being satisfied with a groundless illusion while at
the same time losing precious time. More to come [see below].
*
Jerusalem,
January 25, 1956
During
the conversation the Minister touched upon the following points:
a)
Byroade’s claim, according to US papers, that delivering
arms to Israel would
push Egypt even more into the Soviet bosom means that Israel should abandon
itself since Nasser may ask for more MiGs in addition to the 200 provided him
by the Czech deal. The world is not told that if Israel doesn't receive arms it
would appeal to the Soviet Union. It is assumed that since everybody thinks
that Israel would not approach the Soviet Union, its being responded to in the
negative by the US is all right. This is an immoral and unfair attitude and it
cannot impress Israel. We are still certain of the high responsibility the
United States feels towards small countries which have tied their future to the
west, and that it would assist them when their existence is threatened.
As
to Byroade's claim proper, it is difficult to see how Nasser would be able at
the same time to continue playing with the Russians and still hope to receive
American financial aid for the Aswan dam. And what's more, an increase of
Soviet arms would mean additional mortgaging of Egyptian cotton for arms
purchase. If Byroade's assumption is correct, then it is clear proof of
Nasser's aim to annihilate Israel, for he is certainly aware that the arms we
receive would be defensive only, and that even after we get them a big gap
would still remain to his advantage. The Minister remarked that the US is
delivering arms to different countries without fearing that these countries
would intensify their relations with the Soviets.
b)
According to rumors, Eden will demand that the President make it a condition
that providing arms to Israel would depend on Israel's readiness for large
concessions to attaining a settlement. This means exploiting our serious
security situation in order to shorten the road towards a settlement. The Minister
would like to warn all those who are thinking or might be thinking likewise
that Israel would make no concessions under pressure of a threat to its
security. We will oppose this design with all our might. We are a stiff-necked
people when our very existence and our age-old spiritual vision which sustain
our survival are at stake. Illusions are still directing British policy. The Minister
elaborated on the British failure over the Palestine issue in 1947/48 on
account of their lack of appreciating our political and moral force and alluded
to the British failure in Jordan in recent months [i.e., General Templer's mission to Jordan,
December 1955] as a clear example of British incapacity for realistic
estimation. The Foreign Office people claim to be unique experts on ME problems
while ignoring the fact that their failures refute this pretension. The Minister
appeals to the US to avoid the serious mistake of following British advice.
This road would not lead Israel to making concessions but would push her into exasperation [2 words in English]
and the US would thus become most heavily responsible by ignoring Israel's dire
situation.
c)
Regarding the Ambassador's remark that public opinion in Israel seemed more
relaxed recently, the Minister explained that the public was still looking
forward to a positive US response, and is hoping that the worst will not happen [6 words in English]. The public has
read in the press that the US response was delayed owing to the Kinneret
operation [and the ensuing UN SC deliberations]. Once this affair is over, tension
will mount and intensify.
SOURCE: DFPI 11, docs.45, 47.
(B) Lawson's Report of the Meeting
Sharett called me to Jerusalem last night to inform me of
Eban’s appointment with you and, as he put it, to use my “good offices” to send
few personal words in addition to those you will hear from Eban this afternoon:
He showed me copy his January 16 letter [see diary entry for this date], endorsed its
contents, then spoke full hour on following lines:
(1) He reviewed development Israel’s request to United
States for arms and how [garble] which he had led himself to hope would be
favorable “at least to modest extent” had been frustrated or delayed by
Kinneret, leisurely Security Council deliberations, and seasonal holidays.
(2) Meanwhile Egypt’s strength grew apace both in
equipment and skill of its personnel in use of new weapons.
(3) Time for decision had arrived for United States and
Israel. To trust Nasser’s humanitarianism or statesmanship to refrain from
attacking is to “tax quite unduly Israel’s capacity for wishful thinking”, to
trust outside guarantees would be irresponsible. In first place there is none;
if they existed they could not avail against swift blitz attack which could
destroy Tel Aviv and Haifa in matter of hours. Therefore Israel must know where
she is going. United States must decide in manner consistent with its
traditional sense of fair play and its responsibilities to those nations, large
and small, which have chosen to cast lot with west.
(4) He then broached his main point. If it were present
disposition of United States to decide to supply Israel with arms but if in
existing circumstances we were inhibited from announcing it, he would
personally guarantee complete secrecy of any such decision made known to GOI
until it was mutually agreed to disclose it.
Sooner or later, decision would have to be known; first,
because such decisions eventually are known; and second for whatever deterrent
effect it would have on aggressive intent of “other side”. Public knowledge can
be indefinitely delayed but it is most important for government “or possibly
only leading members of government to know”. I asked him what sort of
communication he required. He replied that most informal word from me to him or
from you to Eban to effect that decision in principle had been taken plus
assurances of early discussion of types, quantities and deliveries would be
eminently satisfactory.
Discussion could be on basis of Israel list but there
were many possibilities for flexible adjustment. US might choose to eliminate whole
categories, reduce others. It might choose to encourage existing negotiations
with France (presumably for Mystere IV’s).
But Israel must have assurances as basis for formulation
of policy. “It must know,” he repeated “where it is going.”
(5) Sharett said they had one report British line of
argument in Eisenhower-Eden talks [on January 30] would be that present
critical circumstances Middle East require short-cut to peaceful settlement
between Israel and Egypt, essential element of which would be “far-reaching
concessions” by Israel. This thesis has it that Israel is so desperately
pressed she can be persuaded to make such concessions if permitted to survive.
Hence she must understand she can obtain no arms until she agrees.
“Those who so believe are due for sharp disappointment.
We will not make concessions which threaten our survival. We shall resist”.
He developed extensively theme of British self-delusion
as to their infallibility in Middle East despite record of failure after
failure year after year. He cited Jordan where he said British had “position”
which they had shaken to foundations by failure to foretell consequences of
attempting to obtain Jordanian adherence to Baghdad Pact. “Now status quo ante
is very best they can hope for”.
(6) He challenged theory attributed by press to Byroade
that “if United States gives or sells arms to Israel it will push Arabs,
particularly Egypt, closer to Soviets and only result in Soviets supplying even
greater quantities of arms to Arab States. We are told that Israel must
jeopardize her own security to avoid Egyptian appeal to Soviets for couple
score more MIGs to add to 200 she has already received or has been promised.
If Egyptians demanded additional arms of Soviets as
result of United States decision to supply arms to Israel, it would be clearly
established that Nasser’s intent was annihilation of Israel. “He already has
advantage that we cannot hope or do not want to overtake quantitatively. Why
should he want to increase it if his intent is not offensive? We cannot
entertain such counsel. Time is running against us. Other side has very
considerable start but within limits we can still overtake them, not
quantitatively, which we are not interested in, but qualitatively”.
(7) I asked about public pressures, Sharett replying that
opinion had not yet crystallized because public could still hope in absence of
United States rejection. “If public ever despairs of favorable United States
reply they will be in difficult mood.”
Comment: Sharett
spoke with all exterior manifestations of his usual urbanity, but he was more
serious than I have seen him in months. I believe he was speaking on line
previously agreed by top leadership, including Ben Gurion. He is sincerely
incredulous that we can entertain other than his evaluation of substance items
3, 5, and 6 above. He believes Israel has suffered consequences of its Kinneret
action and having been censured for this transgression, chapter should be
closed.
Meanwhile, public is being conditioned to regard United
States arms decision as key to their security. If disappointed, reaction will
be unpredictable but I am confident it won’t be one of docile resignation to
whatever fate holds.
SOURCE: FRUS 1955-1957 XV, doc.37.
