In
the course of the conversation the PM asked the SG: ‘What was the major
achievement which the UN could be credited for?’ I said: ‘Its very existence’.
The SG enthusiastically supported this definition of mine and elaborated on it.
The PM reported on his first meeting with
Burns, in which he suggested that Burns would elicit a clear answer from Egypt
whether it is prepared for a cease fire and implementation of all points of the
Armistice Agreement. Burns came back empty handed, having not received any
positive answer to these questions. The question is: does the United Nations
agree to compromise with such a situation?
The
SG reported on his talks with Nasser and Fawzi in which he insisted on the full
implementation of the Armistice Agreement. Nasser said that nobody was more
interested than he was in the implementation of the agreement and of a cease-fire,
however, the trouble was that Egypt and Israel were using different methods of
defence. The Egyptian method was static defense while the Israeli method was a
mobile one. When an Israeli patrol moved along the border and suddenly makes a
90-degree turn towards Egyptian positions, they become nervous and open fire.
The SG replied to Nasser that this was not an answer; the question was: Is
there is an order not to open fire? Nasser argued that there was only one
solution, which was to create a situation whereby no side would see the other
and then, naturally, there would be no cause for opening fire. He actually
returned to his proposal of moving back the units of both sides to a distance
of 500 meters from the line. The SG asked whether this was a proposal or just a
model of a possible solution, and understood [from Nasser’s answer] that it was
just a model and not a specific solution. He told Nasser that Burns had in fact
accepted the principle of separation [of forces], but Burns was authorized to
find out how this principle would be implemented at each part of the line. The SG
had then asked Nasser about the raids [of armed infiltrators] which the principle
of forces separation would not prevent. He said that the separation had to be
accompanied by effective measures for prevention of raids and penetrations, for
otherwise Israel could choose to retaliate. He stressed that the responsibility
for a continuation of the present situation lay with Egypt.
It
was clear that this conversation between the SG and Nasser ended inconclusively.
We stressed the fact that we were again confronted by Nasser’s clear refusal to
issue an order for a cease fire. The SG extricated himself by remarking that
this matter was in any case being dealt with by Burns; he did not see it as his
task to resolve this problem during his present visit.
On
the other hand, he said that in his opinion, since proposals regarding
Nitzana were being advanced in his name [see
WebDoc #65], he should make an effort to put an end to this matter. He
initially thought that this stumbling block should be taken off the road before
he set out his journey, and therefore he had approached the US and Britain and
asked them to influence Egypt in this direction. It turned out that Egypt
preferred to give him a positive answer on this when he came to Cairo, and so
it was.
Regarding the border marking, the Egyptians position is
in fact an acceptance of ours, but in a phrasing which gives them an honorable
way out: The Egyptian Government agrees to the marking of the border of the
demilitarized zone by UN observers “in every place where this marking is
necessary.” It is obvious that Burns will decide where the marking is necessary
and that he would mark only the international frontier. We asked whether this
was clear to the Egyptians, and received a clear positive answer.
Regarding the removal of Egyptian forces from the area
beyond the DMZ, Fawzi claimed that they had already done that, but added that
if it turns out that a force above that which is allowed still remained there,
they would accept Burns’ decision unconditionally. As to the issue of Kibbutz Ketziot
and that of the [Israeli] police force inside the DMZ, they [the Egyptians] did
not see it as concerning them and had nothing to say.
At this point the PM returned to the question of the
cease-fire and asked how we were to understand Nasser’s position. Was a cease-fire
order issued, and Nasser was only trying to justify its violation by pointing
to our method of patrolling? Or was he claiming that as long as we maintained
this method he would not issue this order? The SG’s answer was not clear. He maintained
that Nasser seemed to be confronted by a difficulty to issue a cease-fire order
and was trying to explain it away “by an emergency excuse.” [italicized words in English] The PM took the SG
to the wall map, pointed to the various Israeli settlements [along the Gaza
Strip] and explained the need for our method of patrolling.
When we returned to the table, the PM asked how the SG
would react if we proposed a meeting between us and the Egyptians in accordance
with Article XII of the Armistice Agreement. The SG answered that he would
have, of course, to accept it and convene a meeting, but it was doubtful whether
any good would result. He had an idea - one
that occurred to him during this visit but has not yet ripened - to approach
the four powers and ask them to bring pressure to bear on Cairo to improve the
Armistice Agreement. He thought such a preliminary preparation should take
place before a formal initiative is taken.
The SG presented the statement he would like to issue upon completing his Middle East tour. The Egyptians approved the text and he now asked our approval. He assumed that other Arab governments would also approve it.
The PM went over the text and said that, were he in the SG's place, he would not have signed it because it did not present the reality; however, he did not oppose its publication. I said that I had two questions regarding para.3, one regarding the past and the other regarding the future. The past concerns the Egyptians’ approval and the future - Jordan’s approval. Was it clear to the Egyptian leaders when they expressed their agreement with this para that it was binding them to stop opening fire, to put an end to the [economic] boycott that they are maintaining contrary to the UN Charter, as well as to the Armistice Agreement and the Security Council’s [1951] resolution [WebDoc #2] to stop interfering with Israeli shipping? And in the same vain, would it be clear to Jordan when it gives her approval of this para. that this binds her to activate Article VIII of the Armistice Agreement, i.e., to participate in the meetings of the Special Committee set up to settle our freedom access to the Mount of Olives, to Mount Scopus, to the holy places, to Latrun, etc.?
The SG presented the statement he would like to issue upon completing his Middle East tour. The Egyptians approved the text and he now asked our approval. He assumed that other Arab governments would also approve it.
The PM went over the text and said that, were he in the SG's place, he would not have signed it because it did not present the reality; however, he did not oppose its publication. I said that I had two questions regarding para.3, one regarding the past and the other regarding the future. The past concerns the Egyptians’ approval and the future - Jordan’s approval. Was it clear to the Egyptian leaders when they expressed their agreement with this para that it was binding them to stop opening fire, to put an end to the [economic] boycott that they are maintaining contrary to the UN Charter, as well as to the Armistice Agreement and the Security Council’s [1951] resolution [WebDoc #2] to stop interfering with Israeli shipping? And in the same vain, would it be clear to Jordan when it gives her approval of this para. that this binds her to activate Article VIII of the Armistice Agreement, i.e., to participate in the meetings of the Special Committee set up to settle our freedom access to the Mount of Olives, to Mount Scopus, to the holy places, to Latrun, etc.?
I said that the matter of implementing Article XII could
be raised in this context. On the basis of the SG’s statement we would be able
to declare – without any hint of suspicion regarding the truthfulness of the
Arab governments’ agreement to its contents – that we were very happy that they
are willing to return to faithfully respecting the Armistice Agreements, and
therefore we proposed to convene meetings in accordance with Article XII for
the purpose of discussing the way of implementing the Agreement’s obligations
which have not been executed to this day.
That SG agreed that, if this was what we wanted, we would
be able to rely on his declaration in the future as binding the Arab
governments to a certain extent, but it would be better if we do not do this in
the very near future lest the Arabs accuse him of having tricked them [orig. in English].
At the end of this part of the meeting, I asked: Is my
assumption that the three obligations included in para. 3 of the [SG’s]
statement – to avoid aggressive actions, to respect the territorial integrity
of the other side, and to settle any conflict by peaceful means – are to be implemented
integrally? [(integral implementation) added in English] The SG answered that this was so.
In parting, the SG again expressed his great satisfaction
with his visit and his deep impression of what he saw in our country.
The PM concluded the meeting by congratulating the SG as
a member of the Swedish people, to whom we are deeply indebted for saving
thousands of our brothers during the Holocaust in Europe.
The meeting
lasted about an hour and a half and was conducted in a fresh and tension-free
atmosphere, as if the sky became purified after the storm which erupted between
us last night.
-----
Next morning, when I accompanied the SG to Lod Airport,
he took out the draft of his statement from his pocket and said that he was
still thinking about the serious questions I had raised him regarding its para.
3, and concluded that it would be better to revise it. Instead of saying that all
the parties involved have “reaffirmed their adherence to their obligations in
accordance with the Charter and the Armistice Agreement, and stressed their
determination to abstain from any aggressive action,” it would be said “reaffirmed their adherence in accordance with the Charter and the Armistice Agreement, and
stressed their determination to abstain from any aggressive action, etc.” I said that the meaning of the paragraph was
thus diminished, for the confirming of the obligations demanded by the Charter
and the Armistice Agreement was dropped out. On the other hand, I said, there was
in the new draft a greater measure of honesty and harmony with reality. The SG
agreed with this definition of mine and said he was very much impressed by the
questions I had posed to him and, to be truthful, he had tried to draw the
statement closer to reality. It was obvious that he was overcome by a fear lest
he fail in attaining Jordan’s agreement to para.3 of his first draft, and
therefore decided to make this easier for them. He certainly also wanted to avoid
being accused of [issuing] a statement that tried to cover up the Arabs’ crimes
by flowery language.
At the time of writing this report I am unaware of the fate
of the final text of the revised statement.
M.S.
27.1.56
SOURCE: DFPI 11, doc.56.
SOURCE: DFPI 11, doc.56.
