Sharett
called me to Jerusalem Wednesday ostensibly to express “profound shock and
disillusionment” with “let-down” contained in Secretary’s and Allen’s
conferences with Eban and most urgently to plead for our unequivocal
encouragement to Italy and Canada to release F-86’s to GOI.
Sharett
started conversation, which took form of long uninterrupted statement, of his
reaction to conversations between Secretary and Allen with Eban, as well as
reports of Secretary’s press conference of April 3, by stating, “I must
consider the matter a closed chapter”. )Later I made it amply clear that US
Government does not regard situation now as “closed chapter”; it continues to
reassess its Near East policies as necessitated by trend of events and that
connection is giving consideration to Israel’s application for arms, but it has
not yet completed this reassessment. I then asked him why he considered it a
“closed chapter” after exactly 5 months— why not, for example, after 6 months.
His reply was that US had matter long enough under consideration and that
Israel was no longer to suffer indignity of begging without any firm decision.
He saw no reason to entertain further hope that US would change its mind.(
Sharett
proceeded to read summary of statements by President and Secretary,
conversations held with Eban in Department and a sequence of events which gave
GOI reasons, in his mind, to be hopeful of favorable decision by US. He spoke
for hour and quarter from most elaborate notes he has ever used with me.
Principal points he made follow:
(1) He reviewed all steps in Israel’s negotiations
from time of his first conversation with Secretary in Europe to document his
contention that while US had never made definite promise, there had been
consistent expression willingness to “give sympathetic consideration to
Israel’s arms application”, and US had never given Israel solid reason to
believe final answer would not be favorable. He laid particular stress on
Secretary’s conversation with Eban March 2 before former’s departure for
Karachi and President’s March 14 press conference statement that neither he nor
Secretary had said arms would not be furnished to Israel but US hoped for
better solution. Against such background
Secretary’s position as revealed March 28 had had shattering effect.
(2) After Secretary appeared before Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, GOI had been forced to debate implications his
testimony in Knesset. He had said that if certain of Secretary’s statements in
that testimony finally crystallized as US policy, he could only conclude US was
willing to abandon Israel to its fate. He said he thought that position had
been finally reached and that “we are not [sic.
now] experiencing grave crisis of confidence.”
(3) He questioned US policy of refusing for 5
full months to answer “yes or no”. On those occasions in that period when
Israel attempted to interpret US statements as negative decision on arms, she
was told with “some indignation” that reply was nothing of the sort.
(4) Sharett referred to restrained tone of
Israeli press which he implied might be attributed in part to public statements
of confidence in US policy made here in last few days by Goldmann and Silver.
He said he had no knowledge of source of inspiration from which they spoke. GOI
itself had issued no press statements and had inspired no editorials since
March 28. Prime Minister himself had said development must be most carefully
studied and in meantime GOI should refrain from conjuring up open dispute.
(5) Secretary and Allen had mentioned to Eban
possibility of help from Italy and Canada. He said both countries were very
good friends and Italy in particular for commercial reasons was most anxious to
sell planes. Both would certainly ask what was US itself doing. What moral
force did US feel it could bring to bear on other governments to supply arms to
Israel when US itself was unable to blaze trail.
He
questioned any implied credit for US as initiator of Mystere deal action. GOI,
he said, was grateful to US for delivery of Mysteres but US had nothing
whatsoever to do with generation of “political will” in France to make planes
available. Once that will was generated US assistance was most helpful but
purely secondary. It was a French gift, not one for which US could claim major
credit.
As
to US encouragement of other suppliers of arms, he said planes are actually US
planes and it required only decision in principle by US conveyed to other
governments particularly Italy, to enable GOI to obtain minimum requirements in
supersonic jets.
On
strength of references in Secretary’s conversation, he said he had already
instructed Israel Embassies Ottawa and Rome to make requests to their
government. Ottawa interview had been held this very day (Wednesday) and he
hoped for answer momentarily. If US had in fact told these governments to make
planes available to Israel, he would soon have clear proof in form of
affirmative replies.
He
hinted and an aide later bluntly promised that they would pledge absolute
secrecy and adopt any public attitude we desired on our part in arms
transaction if we would only make sure that Italy and Canada clearly understood
US wanted Israel to have aircraft. Ultimate Israel public position could be one
of censure of US failure to participate or one of praise for opening other
doors to them, as we might desire. Important thing was arms.
Comment: Converse of this could be, I think, that
Israel would make clear by all propaganda instruments at their command that in
their view US Government has categorically and finally denied arms to Israel
despite her desperate straits, thus laying foundation for campaign to bring
whatever moral pressure they may be able to arouse in US and elsewhere to bear
against US. Sharett referred time and again to restraint his government has
exercised in public dealing with arms issue, hinting, I suppose, that there was
little reason to continue this policy in face of US indifference. End
comment.
I
made point that it was quite reasonable to believe US position vis-à-vis Arabs
was different from that of other countries in position to supply Israel with
arms; that we felt we had measure of influence and maneuverability in Arab
countries and did not wish to jeopardize that position; that it seemed more
advisable for other and traditional sources to be relied upon for supply of
arms at this time.
Although
he had not mentioned it, I asked if Department had not explained to Eban the
distinction we drew between arms to Israel from US sources and arms from allies
of the US. Sharett replied Eban had been informed US thought it undesirable to
split area into two pieces, Arabs receiving arms from one side and Israel from
US. He pointed out Iraq is getting arms from US and so is Saudi Arabia. Neither
one of them would boycott US arms if some were simultaneously supplied to
Israel. He referred to tanks to Saudi Arabia, commenting that that was package
in which something for Israel could also have been wrapped. Regarding his
persistent reference to lack of positive action by US to encourage other
countries to supply arms, I said that while it is true Secretary made no commitment
to Eban as to US positive recommendation, he had made it clear that we would
not look with disfavor upon such transactions. Furthermore, as Sharett had
already mentioned to me “Secretary Dulles spoke to Pearson, Foreign Minister
for Canada”. This appeared to me to be very positive step right along lines
that Sharett had suggested. He admitted this to be the case, but thought that
action might be immediately countered by objections in Canadian Parliament on
grounds that US itself had supplied no arms to Israel.
At
this point I emphasized importance of possibility US Government might be able
do more along this line be matter utmost secrecy. In this connection I
suggested that GOI should not attempt interpret purely speculative stories or
even press conference replies to questions as statement of US policy. He agreed
and said GOI prepared to contribute to such secrecy—what it wanted was arms.
SOURCE: FRUS 1955-1957 XV, doc.245
