“I
do not know of many cases in our public life in which there is such sincere and
fruitful collegial cooperation than the ‘ideological,’ moral, and public
cooperation existing between Moshe Sharett and David Ben-Gurion, although they
are not obliged to think the same on each and every question.”
Thus
wrote David Ben-Gurion less than a year ago, when he was asked to form a government
after the elections to the Third Knesset. In the same article he vigorously
denied reports that he intended to take foreign affairs out of Moshe Sharett’s
hands. In an interview given to the London Times
and in an article published in Davar,
Ben-Gurion emphasized again that “between two independent personages there
obviously were, and probably would be, disagreements and differing views,” but
that he had no intention of dissolving the cooperation between Moshe Sharett
and himself, which had lasted for 22 years.
At
yesterday’s Cabinet meeting, one of the ministers indirectly raised the
question of the rumors about Mr. Sharett’s resignation as Foreign Minister. A
clear reply was not given. But today the question will still reverberate
through the Knesset corridors and in interparty discussions. Although the
Cabinet reshuffle has been postponed for a few weeks, the postponement cannot
heal the wound which was opened by the proposal to make changes at the head of
the Foreign Ministry.
Ben-Gurion
did not want to hurt Moshe Sharett. He did not want to “throw him out,” as many
thought. His comradely feelings towards Sharett are as ever. The recent
contention between the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Defense is more
between their respective advisers.
When
a “line” of policy changes, B.G. knows how to sacrifice people on its altar. He
knows how to dismiss and replace advisers as need be. Sharett, in contrast,
less resolute than B.G., is more loyal to his advisers. He always tries to
cover up their errors and is not inclined to replace them.
Sharett
is more hesitant. B.G. makes decisions very quickly. The differences in their
temperaments have borne differing approaches to security matters which are the
focal point of our foreign policy. Yet it is difficult to draw a precise
boundary between Ben-Gurion’s activism and Sharett’s non-activism.
It
is a matter of record that it was during Sharett’s tenure as Prime Minister or
Deputy Prime Minister that the IDF’s most daring reprisals, at Gaza, Khan Yunis,
and other places, were undertaken. Yet Sharett’s advisers tried to label him a
moderate. They described him thus abroad, and this definition was apparently to
Sharett’s liking. This is the main cause of the existing tension. As
“moderation” had been linked to Sharett’s personality, and as conciliation was
the cause of the débâcle in the Security Council, Ben-Gurion sought a way of
expressing his dissatisfaction to the Great Powers who had counseled
moderation.
B.G.
could have called for military action to express this dissatisfaction, but
because of Sharett’s arguments and the pressure exerted by the Great Powers, he
preferred diplomatic action. He came to feel that Sharett’s resignation from
the Foreign Ministry would influence the Great Powers just as much as a
military operation. It would serve as a warning that Israel would not sit idly
by in the face of the menacing rearmament of the Arab states.
Be
that as it may, he did not wish to cause Sharett personal anguish and tried to
execute the surgery painlessly by giving him another distinguished post, that
of General Secretary of Mapai.
Sharett
would have been able to influence foreign policy from this post just as he does
today. He was even disposed to accept the post and might even have agreed to the
political rationale behind the reshuffle.
But
Sharett’s aides and advisers thought otherwise. They knew that in any reshuffle
of this kind they would bear the main brunt, so they embarked upon a struggle
to overturn the “verdict.”
The
first intimation of this came in a New
York Times article on the political damage that Sharett’s resignation would
cause.{*}
Then
rumors began to spread. It was as though Sharett’s departure from the Foreign
Ministry would be likely to harm the chances of obtaining jet aircraft from a
certain country, which would only agree to supply the aircraft if it were sure
that Israel would display moderation and not start a war.
In
fact, Ben-Gurion too does not intend to go to war. He does not want war. Not
out of a fear of the response of the Great Powers, but out of purely national
considerations. But he knows that without pressure the Western countries will
not agree to supply the weapons that Israel needs, the supply of which alone is
likely to prevent a war.
The
advice given to him by his advisers caused Sharett second thoughts about
accepting the post of General Secretary of Mapai. Although he had already given
his assent, he later argued that the decision regarding the reshuffle should be
made by the Party Central Committee, and not by the Secretariat or the Party
Political Committee.
Those
who advised Sharett to use this strategy granted him a temporary victory. The
reshuffle has been postponed. But the advisers did not do Sharett a personal
favor, for as a result of their advice, relations with B.G. have been aggravated – something that Sharett does not relish. They have also obviated
the exploitation of the reshuffle abroad. Sharett’s strategy has succeeded so
far, but the government has not been saved from the shocks that await it.
{*} In the New York Times of
May 31, 1956, Jerusalem correspondent Homer Bigart had written, inter alia: “It
will be difficult to convince the world that Moshe Sharett’s resignation from
the government in order to take up the post of General Secretary of Mapai did
not stem from fundamental differences of opinion with Prime Minister David
Ben-Gurion. [- - -] [I]t will be difficult to avoid the impression that
Ben-Gurion’s prime motive was his desire to get rid of Sharett [- - -] [A]lthough
Ben-Gurion now admits that there is a great deal of wisdom in Sharett’s
moderation, some worldwide fears are likely regarding Ben-Gurion’s actions when
Sharett is no longer at his side. [- - -] Moshe Sharett faces a crucial
decision in his public career.”
