Dear Mr Hammarskjöld,
I have received your letter of 28 February in which you
express disappointment and concern at our delaying the implementation of the
agreements on Nitzana (El Auja).
I fully understand your position, but I would ask you
carefully to consider our point of view, we being the party whose vital
security interests are liable to be most grievously affected by shifts to our
detriment in the balance of military strength on our southern and south-western
borders.
You will recall that when you originally formulated your
proposals with a view to resolving the Nitzana deadlock on 3 November 1955, you
stated that they were meant for immediate implementation. Because of Egyptian
prevarications the matter was allowed to drag on for months. In the meantime
the physical background of the problem had undergone a far-reaching and, from
our viewpoint, most ominous change.
Even before this change had occurred or come to our
notice, we were gravely concerned by the presence, in violation of the General
Armistice Agreement, of Egyptian military positions in the zone between Nitzana
and the Quseima - Abou-Aougeila line. You will be aware that we constantly
referred to this disturbing feature of the situation and pressed for its
removal. Even though we eventually made our acceptance of your proposals
unconditional, we never desisted from urging the withdrawal of Egyptian forces
from the area delimited as above, to come as a counter-move to our evacuation
of the units of the Defence Army of Israel from the Nitzana zone. In our letter
to General Burns of 11 January 1956, which was subsequent to our unconditional
acceptance of your proposals, we expressly reserved our position as to their
implementation.
But the main difficulty with which we found ourselves
confronted arose from the overall change in the disposition of Egyptian forces,
the full menacing import of which bore in upon us only after you left the
Middle East.
You have to bear in mind that at the root of all our
thoughts on what the near future holds for the security of Israel lies the
conviction that Egypt is bent upon renewed aggression against Israel; or that
at least it is actively engaged in determined efforts to attain as quickly as
possible a level of military preponderance which would enable it to launch an
offensive against us at any moment it might judge convenient.
The nature and quantities of the weapons acquired by
Egypt; the large-scale and intensive programme of training pursued by Egypt
both locally and in countries of Eastern Europe; the virulent campaign of
hatred and revenge against Israel relentlessly carried on by the Egyptian press
and radio; the political machinations of Colonel Nasser aiming at the
encirclement of Israel by a hostile and militant coalition dominated by him;
the insidious devices to which Colonel Nasser has recently resorted in order to
assuage the anxieties of the Western world whilst gaining time for perfecting
his war-preparedness – all point cumulatively and unmistakably to the
conclusion that war for the elimination of Israel is his supreme objective.
It is against this threatening background that we have
had to assess successive reports and observations concerning the state of
affairs on the Egyptian side of the border and beyond, which have reached us in
the last few weeks. The total picture which has emerged from their study is
sombre indeed.
The bulk of the Egyptian standing army – well over the
strength of two divisions and, in addition, several armoured formations – has
been concentrated within Sinai. Efforts are proceeding apace to make this force
logistically independent of the bases west of Suez. The accumulation of
supplies and equipment clearly indicates preparations for a long-range
offensive campaign. Exercises and manoeuvres are conducted on the pattern of an
attack against defined objectives in Israel territory.
This heavy massing of troops and equipment (including
tanks of various descriptions, heavy artillery, etc.) has been carried out in
cynical violation of the General Armistice Agreement. Apart from the
contravention by Egypt of Article VIII (3), the Egyptian infantry forces now
stationed within the Defensive Zone – both along the Sinai border and in the
Gaza Strip – exceed at least threefold what Egypt is permitted to maintain
under the terms of Article VII of the Agreement. An additional violation has
been committed by the introduction into that Zone of heavy armour and other
weapons proscribed by the above Article.
We have lodged an official complaint against this illicit
concentration of forces and expect General Burns to undertake an urgent
examination of the facts. But I would point out that these violations of
Articles VII and VIII of the Armistice Agreement do not exhaust the menace
which Israel is facing. Beyond the infringement of these provisions of the
Armistice Agreement, the accumulation of forces even where it does not clash
with the above Articles is a feature of the situation which might well engage
the attention of United Nations organs as an imminent threat to Israel and to
peace generally.
In the face of all these facts and considerations, I
would ask you to place yourself in the position of the Government of Israel and
ponder whether and to what extent it would be acting in accordance with its
responsibility for the defence of its territory and the safety of its
population if all it did in this critical situation was to lay bare Israel’s
front by withdrawal of its units now at Nitzana. Permit me to say that judging
by all standards of common sense and practical expediency it would thereby be
committing an act of folly.
It is in view of this crushing responsibility and the
gravest risks involved in our failure to discharge it that we have been driven
to the conclusion that we must insist not only on the removal of the
unauthorized Egyptian positions from the area facing Nitzana in accordance with
Article VIII (3), but also on the reduction of Egyptian forces in all parts of
the Defensive Zone to the maximum laid down in Article VII, both these measures
to be carried out simultaneously with the withdrawal of our military forces
from Nitzana.
We have informed General Burns, and I take the
opportunity of confirming to you, that the acceptance of your proposals
regarding Nitzana stands; that we continue to regard your success in securing
the consent of both parties to these proposals as a significant achievement;
that in our view, however, the implementation of these proposals must in the
given circumstances be deferred pending examination of the issues bearing on
the size and nature of forces located in the Defensive Zone; and that once that
examination was completed, its findings should be implemented concurrently with
the Nitzana settlement.
In accordance with this position, I now propose to answer
the series of questions addressed to me on your behalf by General Burns in our
interview of 12 March and recorded in his Aide-Memoire of the same date. In so
doing I shall merely be repeating in writing what I have already told General
Burns orally.
Your first question is whether the Government of Israel,
while maintaining that is still unconditionally accepts the 3 November proposals,
makes their implementation conditional upon the implementation by Egypt of
Article VIII (3).
My answer is that the Government of Israel differentiates
between acceptance and implementation. While its acceptance stands, it believes
that the implementation of the 3 November proposals should be in conjunction
with that of both Article VIII (3) and Article VII.
Your second question is whether the Government of Israel
realizes that with equal right, Egypt could make the full application of
Articles VII and VIII a condition for the implementation of the (3 November) proposals.
My answer is in the affirmative. We concede Egypt’s right
to make the same stipulation.
Your third question is whether the Government of Israel
realizes that its conditions as to simultaneous implementation robs its
previous acceptance of the proposals of all substance, since a direct approach
to the second step, which is the full application of Articles VII and VIII,
nullifies the acceptance of the proposals concerning the first step, which is
the Nitzana issue alone.
My answer is that here the Government of Israel must
differ from you. It does not accept the negative conclusion set forth in your
question as to the status and fate of your own proposals concerning Nitzana.
Our assumption is that the Nitzana issue was definitely and conclusively
resolved when both parties accepted the Secretary General’s proposals as
formulated on 3 November. Hence in the examination of complaints concerning
Articles VII and VIII, the Nitzana issue need not and, in our view, should not
be reopened. The examination need not and should not extend over the ground
already covered by the Nitzana settlement, but should concern itself with
issues relating to other points or aspects of the border situation. In other
words, the fact that action upon the 3 November proposals, which have been
accepted by both parties, is to be deferred pending an agreement on other
outstanding issues, by no means entails the nullification of those proposals.
In international and other negotiations it is customary not to conduct the
discussion of all the items on the agenda en
bloc but to tackle them seriatim,
i.e. having reached an agreement on the first, pass to the second and so on, on
the understanding that when all items have thus been disposed of, action on all
of them will follow simultaneously. While discussion and decision can be
successive, implementation can be simultaneous, and there is absolutely no
contradiction between the two procedures.
I hope I have succeeded by this letter, for the length of
which I must apologize, in dispelling any possible misunderstanding and in
explaining our point of view both on the concrete merits of the issue and on
its procedural aspect. I shall be happy to learn that our approach has commended
itself to you and that we can, along the lines I have attempted to trace,
envisage progress towards our common goal of the reduction of tension and the
strengthening of peace through a faithful observance of the Armistice
Agreement.
Yours
sincerely
M. Sharett
SOURCE: DFPI 11, doc.157. Sharett was replying to Hammarskjöld to Sharett, February 28, 1956, ISA FM
130.02/3/5936/34; and UNA S-0163-0002-01.
