At
his request White was received by the Minister in order to congratulate him on
his return [to Israel]. Herzog was present.
The Minister opened by saying that since the
Ambassador was about to return [home] he would like to congratulate him in view
of what he has heard about his diligence and wisdom in executing his task as
chargé d'affaires. White thanked him but added that unfortunately he had failed
in his reporting to the State Department. It was his impression several weeks
ago from what the DG said that we were not considering retaliation for the
incidents along the Jordanian border, and since the arms issue has been
occupying a central place in the expectations of both the government and the
public, he had assumed in his report that Israel would remain quiet during
these weeks. But then came the Kinneret incident and proved him wrong. He has
learned his lesson and will not prophesy any more. The Minister answered that
in view of the constant provocations on the part of the Syrians for many years
now, our patience could not but come to an end.
The Minister said that
the publication of our peace plan [of December 6; see WebDoc #69] was
criticized by different elements in the country, claiming it could be seen as a
starting point only, thus inviting further concessions. This claim might be bolstered
by the deduction of the press, via certain quarters in the State Department, to
the effect that “the peace plan shows a constructive attitude hinting at the
possibility of Israeli concessions.” If the State Department doesn't want to weaken
those circles in Israel which are calling for peace and avoid adding
superfluous complications to a situation which is already complicated anyway,
it would be best if it ceased spreading such misleading and damaging hints.
To White's question regarding the atmosphere in
the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the Minister answered by stressing
that the fate of our appeal for arms is at the center of our interests.
White recalled the
impressions of Nasser which Streibert conveyed to Ben-Gurion after his
conversation with him, and said that the State Department assumed that possibly
a positive change has taken place in Nasser's position regarding the question
of a settlement with Israel. The Minister retorted that one should doubt this
evaluation for it may be that Nasser is only maneuvering to repair negative
impressions of him in the West following his Czech [arms] deal in order to
strengthen his appeal for a loan for building the Aswan Dam and to buy time
till the Czech weapons are absorbed into his army. The Minister was not
entirely convinced that Nasser would soon go to war against Israel, but he
doesn't want to be at the mercy of his
statesmanship [in English] and to say that from the standpoint of his
military power Nasser would feel free to decide. He recalled that in his closed
meeting with the NYT editors he
analyzed the considerations which may influence Nasser's position if the
balance of power would heavily tilt to the benefit of Egypt. Nasser, without
becoming entangled in war by normal evolution, would be able to try in a matter
of a few hours to bomb Israel by his air force and create havoc, on the
assumption that he would complete his move before the powers get together for
consultation. Moreover, he may think that in view of the ties established
between him and the Soviet Union, the powers would think twice before
intervening for fear of global conflagration. He (the Minister) was not saying
that this consideration would determine the powers' position, but it must be
taken into account that Nasser would act according to it. Consequently, if we do
not receive appropriate defensive weapons, a very serious danger would be
looming over Israel.
As to rumors that the
United States are about to grant a loan for the building of the Aswan Dam, the
Minister said that in principle we have always welcomed economic development in
the Arab countries, but a question arises whether it is possible that the
greatest state in the world, which is calling for civilized relations between nations,
would extensively assist a state which is behaving like a brigand toward her
neighbor. The Egyptian revolutionary junta had two aims upon reaching power,
one political – to evict the British from the Canal, the other economic - to
build the Aswan Dam. US assistance was decisive in implementing the first aim,
and now she is about to assist the implementation of the second. In both cases
the United States has not made it a condition that its assistance would be given
if the Egyptian stopped blockading Israel. The fears of the US that without her
assistance the Aswan project would be executed by the Soviet Union were groundless.
According to the Minister, the Soviet Union is not capable of implementing her plan
of vastly enlarging her industry without harming the standard of living for its
citizens while granting extensive assistance to foreign countries.
White retorted that the
United States' evaluation was not the same as the Israeli one. The execution of
the Aswan project would take years and the Soviet Union would not find it
difficult to channel materials and machines out of its huge industrial
production in a piecemeal way. The Soviets were attracted by the possibility of
introducing thousand experts into Egypt.
As to the Minister's argument
regarding the Egyptian blockade, White said that Eilat is not an economic
necessity for the time being, and at present Egypt-Israel relations are not
being discussed narrowly but with an aim of trying to reach a solution down to
the core. The Minister retorted that Nasser was not showing any concrete
willingness to reach a settlement. The Johnston plan was a clear-cut test,
since Nasser promised him to get Arabs consent within three months, and, as he
may recall, the Minister had told him that we are prepared to wait even four
months till the end of February. In his meeting in Washington with Johnston the
Minister found him for the first time deeply doubtful as to his plan's chances
of execution.
White asked how the
Secretary of State had evaluated Nasser's preparedness for a settlement [during
his talks with Sharett], and noted that the Johnston plan was not essential for
the situation. The Minister replied and said that until very recently the US
had seen in the Johnston plan as a key to the reduction of tension. White
retorted that since something big has happened in the region – the Czech deal –
we were compelling to abandon the line of gradual
approach [in English] and instead follow a general approach going to the
roots of the problem. The Minister noted that things had been turned upside
down and expressed deep doubts regarding the correctness of this assumption and
its efficacy.
SOURCE:
DFPI 10, doc.535.
