At my request Foreign
Minister Sharett received me in Tel Aviv afternoon April 6. I opened
conversation by explaining that I was calling on my own initiative because of
the recent outbreak, in order to stress the critical importance of strict
cease-fire observance and to emphasize US interest in cooperation with General
Burns of both sides. I added that I also wished to obtain information, and
particularly his appraisal of events.
Sharett thanked me for this interest, and proceeded to
review episodes of April 5 and GOI latest contacts with General Burns re
cease-fire.
His rationale followed outline Foreign Ministry statement
included Embtel 1039. He examined bona fides of explanations and proposals of
Nasser on subject of firing on patrols as follows:
1. Nasser’s earlier explanation he could not order no
firing across border by his troops and that firing performed only on IDF
vehicle patrols because of natural fear his forces these patrols were in act of
launching attack was “rabid nonsense.” No soldiers in right mind would initiate
attack across open country openly exposed in vehicles. Furthermore most IDF
patrols were on foot, and Egyptians have now crystallized standard practice of
firing on them. Such fire also not limited to patrols but directed at fixed
observation points from which attack could not be expected. Thus Nasser’s
explanation completely nullified.
2. Nasser’s conclusion this context that forces should be
withdrawn 500 meters from line was based on present disposition Egyptian
forces, since their outposts are situated about 500 meters from border. Nasser
therefore could “implement plan” with no change his system, whereas Israelis
would have make substantial alterations.
After dwelling at some length on lone experience of
almost daily firing on Israeli patrols which fortunately produced no
casualties, and then underscoring April 4 incident which 3 young soldiers
killed by Egyptian mortar and machine gun fire, he gave detailed timetable of
separate incidents April 5. Sharett said Egyptians opened fire on Israel
settlements for first time with mortars at 1500 hours. IDF returned artillery
fire to silence outposts issuing mortar fire. Meantime Egyptians extended front
by firing on other Kibbutzim. Since IDF artillery bombardment Egyptian outposts
failed stop their fire, “at 5 pm, we directed fire at their villages”.
Commenting on April 4 meeting with Burns, Sharett
repeated substantially same account as in Jerusalem 398 to Department but made
several amplifications. He felt it would not break confidence to reveal that in
response to Sharett’s questions concerning large number Israeli complaints
submitted on firing across line, General Burns replied that he felt in general
GOI complaints were justified, although he might have differences on details.
When in past General Burns had proposed “palliative measures” to calm border he
did so with assumption both sides wanted to cooperate. He now no longer assumed
other side was interested.
The Burns-Sharett chat was interrupted by phone call [from] Chairman Egyptian MAC demanding GOI stop fire. General Burns proposed midnight
as cease-fire deadline, Sharett communicated this to Ben Gurion, and “Ben
Gurion had already given orders to stop fire, purpose testing Egyptian
reaction.” Sharett added this was at dusk.
April 6 General Burns made special request to Israelis
temporarily to suspend patrolling, with understanding this would only be
extraordinary temporary measure not to be considered precedential. Ben Gurion
agreed to this as measure cooperative action and in view of Hammarskjöld’s
visit to area and as quid pro quo for the Secretary-General to endeavor obtain
Egyptian consent to issue orders no firing across borders. Sharett commented this
was not easy decision for Ben-Gurion since “it prejudices our position and
gives appearance of yielding under pressure criminal violence”. In reply my
question as to time limitation this agreement he indicated no specific time but
in nature few days trial. Sharett said he had recommended as agenda for
Secretary General in order decreasing importance:
1. He endeavor secure complete cease-fire covering ail
surrounding countries )Sharett especially feared Jordan this respect and cited
March 30 Wadi Ara ambush(.
2. Obtain reduction forces in defensive zones to
conformity with GAA provisions.
3. Obtain complete observance ail details GAA. Sharett
commented Arab States are now expressing negative view they do not wish
anything added to area guarantees beyond GAA. GOI desires that GAA at least be
rigidly observed, whether or not supplemented by additional arrangements.
I expressed gratification at GOI agreement to General
Burns proposal to withdraw patrols and cease-fire, and disposition to work
closely with General Burns these critical times. Sharett said he was grateful
for my call and pleased to discuss situation.
Comment: Sharett appeared relatively relaxed at
interview, and although he mentioned resumption of firing this morning he did
not magnify it into portending further deterioration. He seemed anxious to
underline basic and continuous provocations which took form of Egyptian firing
on foot patrols ultimately resulting Israeli mortalities and especially to
point up fact Egypt first shelled Israeli villages before IDF turned artillery
fire from Egyptian gun positions to Egyptian villages. Although not
specifically gained at interview my impression is that GOI regards reported
heavy loss Arab life as retaliation enough and are not planning any further
specific moves. Attitude now is probably “wait and see” to judge nature and
magnitude Egyptian response, which Israelis believe may be in form Fedayeen.
There also some speculation as to ability or desire Egypt to control highly
excited Gaza refugees.
Although slight mobilization civilian trucks observed
today, there has been no large scale action discernible. Foreign Office informs
me “all quiet” Gaza front as of 1800 hours tonight.
SOURCE: FRUS 1955-1957 XV, doc.253.
