At
my suggestion Foreign Minister received me in Tel Aviv Monday for my oral
presentation [- - -] which I thought would convince him we are taking active
steps within circumstances to encourage other countries to supply arms and to
clarify any misunderstanding regarding US position. I made it clear my approach
limited entirely these objectives and furthermore not to be construed as formal
message.
He
said he “greatly welcomed” two points; a. US intent to bring influence to bear
on governments to persuade them to sell arms to Israel and, b. US statement on
undesirability of perpetual imbalance in arms. However, he was afraid both
points were nullified by other elements in US position.
(1) He was convinced that US influence on other
countries would prove uneffective [sic] in absence some US sales to Israel. He
could report that GOI’s “intimate” contact with Canadians had now persuaded him
there was little prospect obtaining planes from them without US sales. Nor was
he hopeful of further Mystere sales from France; French Foreign Minister had
advised Israeli Chargé he not willing that France bear entire responsibility
arms supply. However, if US supplied some arms, French were prepared to supply
perhaps 75 percent Israel’s needs but not 100 percent.
He
appreciated US initiative in making clear to France it would have no objection
to interruption OSP Assembly [sic] to
supply additional dozen Mysteres to Israel. But this was not sufficient to
persuade France. It appeared that Israel would be left with nothing but 12
Mysteres which it now had “more or less in hand”. This was “dismal and alarming
prospect.” (He put Italy in different category, saying he was not persuaded US
as of now wanted Israel to obtain F-86’s from that source. If you have agreed
we should have them from Italy, please say so. He said Eban had been told by
Department that US representations in Rome would “help with other items”. This
they did not need. Italy was prepared to make everything available—”in
reasonable quantities” which was under its exclusive control.
(2) He argued that for US simultaneously to
postulate distaste for arms imbalance and fear of contributing to arms race
constituted contradiction in terms. US must make up its mind. If it did not
wish imbalance perpetuated there was chance of correcting situation by US sales
to Israel. This might set off arms race. He doubted it, but risk must be taken.
There was no chance correcting imbalance if US arms were not sold to Israel.
(3) Our reiteration that US policy did not
preclude US sales to Israel had long ceased to be any comfort. After months of
no sales, statement could be just as logically construed to mean no sales were
contemplated. (I argued that our statement that US sales to Israel “were not
precluded” might bring little comfort when addressed to Israel, in this
instance we were declaring it as policy to other governments which was a
different thing. It represented a positive statement of policy and it
eliminated any possibility of misunderstanding regarding US position. I felt it
a helpful and encouraging action on our part. Sharett remained unconvinced this
would influence other governments to positive action.) As to US dislike to [sic]
“unlimited sales” [- - -] he said none was desired by Israel for economic
reasons if no other.
(4) If US really wanted to give practical
constructive assistance it was Israel’s very earnest and urgent plea that a few
items which were “manageable” from US standpoint should be picked from Israel’s
list and delivered to her. He cited F-84’s as example, stating they were for
reconnaissance which was purely defensive assignment. If US prepared to do
this, it would encourage Canadians to sell F-86’s. It would also have marked
effect on France and gordion [sic] knot would at last be cut.
(5) Developing this theme on basis my remark that
US was not traditional supplier [of] major arms to Israel, he said if US wanted
to avoid appearance having embarked on new policy as result of Czech deal, it
could supply anti-tank and AA weapons which it had supplied in past, thus only
continuing established routine policy towards Israel but enabling Israel to persuade
other countries to sell items he needed which US could or would not furnish.
Comment: As noted, I prefaced my remarks
by explaining Department had addressed the primarily potential sources of arms
and no reply was necessary unless he cared to comment. He seized opportunity to
restate GOI position with usual alacrity, but it was obvious that he was
rehearsing very familiar story in most details. Of most interest to me were his
positive suggestions reported under 4 and 5 above. From Herzog we had already
received information that Eban is preparing abbreviated list of arms which, I
take it, fits into Sharett’s suggested program. When Israelis renew their
presentation to us as they inevitably will in face of uniformly negative
response they are receiving in other capitals, it probably will be on this
line.
SOURCE: FRUS 1955-1957 XV, doc.286.
