I will start with
the Soviet communiqué. Generally, there is no place for surprises, and if they
do occur it is always due to some negligence or lack of sensitivity.
Nevertheless, surprises do occur in our world and this justifies the existence
of this word. I know, for instance, that MK Namir happened to be talking with a
Soviet representative at the very moment that the communiqué became known, and
he saw how this diplomat’s face expressed sheer shock and confusion.
I have closely
studied this document in its Russian original and I would like to draw your
attention especially to 15 points stressed in it:
1. The main root
of evil is not found in basic contracts between states such as Israel and the
Arab countries, or between India and Pakistan. It is found in the Western policy
of establishing alliances, thus creating mutual pressures.
2. The
deterioration of the Israeli-Arab conflict is the most dangerous factor in the
Middle East.
3. There is a dangerous
trend of exploiting this conflict with the purpose of introducing foreign
armies into the Middle East.
4. An admission
that there is a looming danger of war. But this cannot be permitted, by any
means. It is possible and incumbent [on people] to prevent it.
5. An underlining
of the Soviet Union’s record of supporting independence and of buttressing it.
The communiqué enumerates such states not alphabetically nor chronologically,
and Israel is last on this list. My feeling is that this list was given for the
purpose of including Israel on it, for there is no need to name all these
states – they are long known to be independent.
6. Praise for
England and France for their international position, whereas the United States
is condemned.
7. A number 0f praises
for the Arab states and an expression of preparedness to help them buttress
their independence, while not mentioning Israel.
8. A sentence
which I interpret as a justification of the Czech deal. Arming is presented as
a buttress for independence and as an economic aid.
By the way, I was
recently informed by a very trustworthy source about the first step of the
Czech deal. It turns out that in May or June 1955 [in fact, around June 22],
when Molotov was in San Francisco, he summoned Egypt’s representatives and for
the first time offered them military and economic aid. This was on the occasion
of the tenth anniversary of the United Nations, several months before the deal
was clinched.
9. The Soviet
Union’s policy aims at de-escalation of tension in the Middle East. It is bent on preventing any action which may
cause conflagration of an armed conflict in the region. This is somehow not in
contradiction with the Czech deal.
10. Staunch
support of the United Nations, including Security Council resolutions. I
interpret this as unreserved support of the Secretary-General’s mission.
11. Support of
the Bandung principles. Here one should differentiate between Bandung’s 10
principles, which are all a paragon of virtue, and the series of resolutions
adopted in Bandung which included an anti-Israel resolution.
12. A call for
avoiding any change by force of the existing lines recognized by the Armistice
Agreements signed by the Arab states and Israel.
13. A concern for the refugees. It is necessary to
ease the situation of hundreds of thousands of refugees, assure their
accommodation and means of survival. This with no mention of their return or
re-settlement.
14. A demand for
peace between Israel and the Arabs [based] on the usual principles by both
aides. The wording here is not “accepted” but “usual”. Nothing is said here
about direct negotiations.
15. The Soviet
Union is prepared to aid in the achievement of peace together with other
nations.
Let me now move
to interpretation. Here too I have 15 points in mind:
1. Here, for the
first time, is an admission of the possible eruption of war. Clearly the
Soviets realized that a situation might be created whereby the they would be
seen as responsible for such a war. They are admitting it, but claiming that
it’s possible and incumbent to prevent it.
2. It is clear to
me that they have been impressed by western public opinion’s support for
Israel, especially the circles which they are endeavoring to come to terms
with. There is now a Soviet tendency to develop ties with the western socialist
camp such as the French socialist government, the socialist opposition in
England and the socialist governments of Scandinavia.
3. Certainly the
most serious Soviet fear is of an American military intervention in the Middle
East, which should by all means be blocked. The Soviets are worried lest the
Czech deal has contributed to closing the lines within the western bloc,
especially between Britain and France. Now they are worried that, by their
admission of the possibility of war, they may again cause wedges [to be driven]
between Britain and France, on the one hand, and Britain and the United States,
on the other. In view of this they took some measures, including the two Soviet
leaders’ visit in London and the approaching visit of French leaders in Moscow.
4. Here there is
a justification of the Czech deal – a justification of their penetration into
the Middle East in the guise of their buttressing Arab independence. Still,
they sound here like they are defending themselves – they are aware of being
culprits here and thus are in need of justifying themselves. Nevertheless if
one reads their communiqué carefully one is aware that they leave the door open
for continuing the arming of Egypt.
5. Here there is
an aim for balancing their account between us and the Arabs. First of all, they
mention Israel, which they avoided doing on past occasions, as if Israel had
been erased from the world’s map. There was also a mention of their positive
attitude towards Israel’s independence. They avoided [leveling] all kinds of
accusations against Israel, again, contrary to former Soviet announcements in
which Israel was defined as an aggressor, as a western satellite and an
instrument of western domination over the Arabs.
6. There is here
for the first time an approval of the Armistice Agreement lines, and talking
about a peace acceptable to the two sides.
7. There is no
inkling of direct negotiations, but at the same time there is some opening for
not the imposing of a settlement but rather recommending ones. This is seen
also in their talking about a “normal," not an “accepted,”
agreement, and in the support of the United Nations. There is here an opening
for a recommendation, not an imposition, by the United Nations General
Assembly.
8. There is in
the communiqué no trace of the fact that we are prepared to enter into
negotiations and the Arabs are not.
9. The [Arab]
refugees are mentioned without mentioning their return. It is said, however,
that they lost their homes.
10. One cannot
argue that there is in the communiqué any warning to the Arabs, but there is a
statement against war and a mention that they would by no means allow a war to
erupt.
11. The backbone
of the whole communiqué is the demand for recognition of the Soviet Union’s
standing in the Middle East, not only as a world power for which nothing in the
world is without interest, but because it has a say regarding the Middle East,
a region in which it is active and in which it took part in the process of
achieving its independence.
12. An additional
appeal for the abrogation of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950.
13. A staunch
strengthening of the United Nations.
14. Strengthening
the United Nations is at the same time a strengthening of the Security Council
and of the Secretary-General.
15. The arms
problem. Possibly, the intention here is to prevent us from being supplied with
arms. Anyway, this could be the result, for the obvious conclusion would be:
Now that tension is decreased, the danger of war has passed.
The reactions of
the Arab states to the Soviet communiqué were late and reserved. None were
enthusiastic. As to ours, I am going to see Ambassador Abramov tomorrow and
Ambassador Avidar will see Molotov’s aide [in Moscow].
Meanwhile there
is a slowing of the pace of readiness to supply us with arms, persuading us to
first of all try to conclude a deal with Canada. France is unwilling to be our
only supplier.
Regarding the
recent meeting of the World Peace Movement Council in Stockholm, we did some
leg work but have not succeeded in having them condemn the Czech deal from the meeting’s
podium. However, we did get them to demand peace through direct negotiations
without prior conditions or outside intervention.
Generally
speaking, there seem to be signs of a positive change in the climate of Soviet
relations towards us, but the decisive question is: how would this influence
the real weapons balance. Security is a question of balance of power.
Declarations, with all due respect to their importance, do not change the
security situation.
Let
me now move on to Hammarskjöld.
As you well know,
the special authority of the Secretary-General in his present mission emanates
from the Security Council’s resolution of April 4 1956 in which his mission is
defined by two sentences. One says: the Council “requests the Secretary-General
to undertake, as a matter of urgent concern, a survey of the various aspects of
enforcement of and compliance with the four General Armistice Agreements and
the Council's resolutions under reference;” the other states that the Council
“requests the Secretary-General to arrange with the parties for the adoption of
any measures which, after discussion with the parties and with the Chief of
Staff, he considers would reduce existing tensions along the armistice
demarcation lines, including the following points: (a) Withdrawal of their
forces from the armistice demarcation lines; (b) Full freedom of movement for
United Nations observers along the armistice demarcation lines, in the
demilitarized zones and in the defensive areas; (c) Establishment of local
arrangements for the prevention of incidents and the prompt detection of any
violations of the Armistice Agreements.” Then there is a paragraph saying that
the Security Council appeals to the signatories to these agreements to
cooperate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution.
The resolutions
to which the Council refers are those of 30.3.55, 3.9.55, and 19.1.56. These
dates speak for themselves. The first was that adopted by the Security Council
following [IDF’s] Gaza [operation]. The second - following [IDF’s] Khan Yunes
[operation], the third - following
[IDF’s] Kinneret [operation].
In our first
meeting with the SG we found him stressing mainly the second
item of his mission regarding steps aimed at lessening tension along the border
and certain local arrangements referred to in the decision, and not the general
investigation of what has happened to the Armistice Agreements, that is, have
they been carried out or not? what has been carried out and what not? We made
an effort to move the center of gravity to the second item, but tried to find
an equilibrium between the two. I have no idea what was going in his heart and
whether he is happy about this, but he understood that he cannot follow any
definition which would make it possible for us to allow him to make light of this matter. The argument
between us on this question quickly concentrated around one point, that of free
passage [through the Suez Canal]. We said that while free passage was not
specified black on white in the Armistice Agreement, it is obvious that
interfering with it is a violation of the Agreement, and that this interference
is obviously an act of hostility. We argued that the Agreement covers not only
military actions but non-military ones which are hostile, as well.
I have said
already on a certain occasion that if the sailing of an Israeli vessel from one
port to another is not a legitimate act, then I do not know what a legitimate
act is; and if forceful interference with the sailing of an Israeli vessel to
an Israeli port is not a hostile act, I do not know what a hostile act is.
Moreover, the real author of the Armistice Agreements and the architect of the
whole armistice regime, Dr. Ralph Bunche, at a solemn meeting of the Security
Council in August 1949, at which the Council approved all these agreements,
said that it was clear that the Armistice Agreements meant the return to normal
way of life and the eradication of any aggression and interference, and this
obviously includes all limitations on passage to Eilat and all limitations on
free [maritime] passage. I should add in parenthesis that the truth is that at
the time Bunche, when talking about sailing, had in mind sailing in the
Mediterranean, for then there were such cases of interference, and this is
written in the Council’s protocols. He could not then envisage problems of sailing through the Suez Canal and the Red
Sea.
Moreover, a
resolution adopted by the Security Council [on September 1, 1951] stated that
interfering with free passage is contrary to the armistice regime. The Council
could declare that this constitutes a threat to peace; it could say it is
contrary to the Suez Treaty. But it did not make do only with that, and said it
is contrary to the armistice regime. The Secretary General nevertheless argued
that free passage was not included in his terms of reference and relied on the
following: (a) The Security Council’s resolution [on his mission] refers to
past resolutions, but not to the one regarding free passage; (b) It is true that
Eban declared in the Security Council that we include in this resolution the
matter of free passage, and that when he said so no opposition was heard from
either the Council’s president or from Hammarskjöld himself who was present and
listened to Eban. However, we know that behind the scenes the Western [powers]
discussed this matter and decided not to
include this point. Hammarskjöld also argued that in the said resolution
[of 1951] it was stated that it is contrary to the armistice regime but it was
not stated that it is in violation of any articles of the Armistice Agreement.
Hammarskjöld is a
highly learned man and one of the most brilliant minds I have ever met in my
life. He is endowed with a talent for meticulously wording texts. He is extremely
adept at splitting hairs [Heb. pilpul]. But he was faced here with a very staunch position on our side, and as a
result he announced that, in his capacity as UN SG, he was of course bound to
respond to a demand forwarded by a member state of the United Nations, even
more so when the government of this state is relying on a SC resolution,
whether or not this is included in his mission’s terms of reference.
Consequently, he would raise this question in Cairo not on the basis of his
mission’s terms of reference but by virtue of his general authority as United
Nations Secretary-General. He endeavored to convince us that it would be better
if he took this line so as not to allow the Egyptians to argue against our
interpretation. As Secretary-General he would be able to silence them and tell
them to stop talking nonsense.
In view of all
this, both on account of the SG’s initiative first and foremost
raising the subject of Article II (2) – arguing that first of all, before any
negotiations regarding other issues, let there be a cease-fire and stoppage of
border crossing – and also on account of our raising such a difficult question
[of free passage] for which it seems he was not fully prepared when starting
his mission. Even if Eban had said what he said, he was not prepared for us to raise it in such a clear manner and with such pressure.
It is because of this that a differentiation was made between Article II (2)
and all the rest, and thus it seemed as if we were discussing two Armistice
Agreements with each of the Arab states – that we had not three agreements but
four: one that forbids shooting and border crossing and one including all kinds
of other issues such as avoiding making threats and any hostile acts. We
claimed that these included interfering with free passage as well.
Our position was
that Article II (2) means an absolute and unconditional commitment; it is
conditioned only by mutuality. We are allowed to cross the border if they cross
it. By this kind of conditioning we do not mean that if they interfere with our
free passage we would be allowed to shoot. Hammarskjöld differed. He said that
if we are shot at, we should table a complaint.
Regarding other
articles, our position is that they constitute one whole entity. If they
violate any article, then we are not committed to all the others. [- - -] Besides Article II (2) there is a limitation on the size of forces
allowed inside the defense zones – these are the areas close to the [armistice
demarcation] line. We argue that the Egyptians have surpassed this limit and
are maintaining much bigger forces both in the Gaza Strip and close to the
Sinai border. The Egyptians claim that we have exceeded this limit and thus the
problem is how to go back the size permitted. Meanwhile we have postponed
discussion of this problem until it becomes clear that the Egyptians are
prepared to implement other articles.
Then there is the
problem of the demilitarized zones. Regarding Egypt, there is such a zone in
Nitzana. We are at present there [in force], while admitting that by this we
are violating the Armistice Agreement. Our justification for this situation is
that they too are unlawfully holding defense positions on the their side of the
border. We argue that if they vacate their area we shall do the same in ours.
On the other
hand, Hammarskjöld has brought up Burns’, the Security Council’s and his own
proposals aimed at strengthening the implementation of avoiding opening fire
and border crossing in connection with Article II (2). Here we responded to
Hammarskjöld by claiming that it was the Egyptians who first opened fire. In
view of this, it has been proposed by the United Nations that they establish
observation posts. The very fact of the existence of such posts, they argued,
would act as a deterrent, since the observers would be able to detect who shot
first.
I would like to
remark in parenthesis that, generally, one of perturbing questions arising in
such tense situations is the clear determination of the identity of the
aggressor, hence the natural tendency of the Security Council to build an
instrument for that purpose. In Korea this proved to be of decisive importance
in the Council’s resolution that the North was the aggressor.
In short, the
following plan, consisting of five articles, was proposed to us: (a)
observation posts would be established along both sides of the Gaza Strip line,
to be freely approached anytime by UN personnel; (b) UN observers would be
allowed to patrol anytime along the Gaza Strip line; (c) UN observers would
move freely inside the defense zones for investigating whether the size of the
forces there is within what is allowed; (d) The UN observers would be allotted
roads of approach to these posts and zones; (e) UN observers would be allowed
to move freely anywhere inside an area within five km. of both sides of the
border.
Our response was
as follows: we absolutely rejected the fifth point, and it was removed for the
time being. Regarding point (d) we clarified that inasmuch as we allotted UN
observers approach roads, we would specify them. The discussion of point (c)
was postponed pending clarification of the question of defense zones. As to the
remaining two points – observation posts and patrols – we said we accepted them
in principle but with certain reservations. But before dealing with these an
introduction is necessary.
There is between
us and the United Nations a theoretical dispute as old as the Armistice
Agreements signed in 1949, which continues to this very day, regarding the
source of the UNTSO’s authority in our country. It first started with the cease
fire decided upon by the Security Council, and then the late count Bernadotte
was appointed mediator. He was followed by Bunche and later we moved from the
truce regime into the Armistice regime. We were of the opinion, well propped by
our legal experts, that the truce regime was totally superseded by the
Armistice Agreements regime, while the United Nations argued – and it had quite
a strong basis for their position, and our experts admit behind closed doors
the validity of this position – that the truce regime was not superseded by the
next regime but was only added to it.
Therefore the
UNTSO staff’s authority stems from two sources, not from just one: that is,
from the Armistice Agreements which were agreed upon by the signatories but
also from the earlier source emanating from the Security Council decisions of
the truce period which are not dependent on the agreement of the two sides. Up
to the present, whenever faced with this problem, we succeeded in extricating
ourselves from it by some practical arrangement within the framework of the
Armistice regime. We have not faced up to now a case regarding which we had to
agree with the exercising of the authority which the United Nations claims it
has. Now, when the Secretary-General forwarded his proposals with the intention
of implementing them, he relied in fact on the first source. We, on the other
hand, said that, inasmuch as we would have to agree to any proposal, it would only be
on the basis of the second source, and therefore we made it a condition that
anything agreed upon had to be based on a decision taken within the framework
of the mixed armistice commission. In other words, the validity of what is
agreed upon would emanate from its being accepted by both sides at the MAC.
This would be an agreement between the two sides, valid only if accepted by
these two. It would not be something decided upon by the United Nations. This,
then, a general reservation regarding the legal standing of the source of UNTSO's
authority. In addition,
this whole arrangement is for six months, after which we would be free.
In addition to this general reservation there are also practical reservations regarding observation posts: (a) Their placing would be established with our consent; (b) Their number would be the same on both sides of the border; (c) It should be clear that the observers would come to these posts and stay in them only if accompanied by our people, unless we deemed this unnecessary; (d) The observers manning these posts would be reporting only on violations of Article II (2) such as opening fire , border crossing, mine laying and reaping; (e) These reports would be discussed in the MAC on the basis of complaints [by the sides].
In addition to this general reservation there are also practical reservations regarding observation posts: (a) Their placing would be established with our consent; (b) Their number would be the same on both sides of the border; (c) It should be clear that the observers would come to these posts and stay in them only if accompanied by our people, unless we deemed this unnecessary; (d) The observers manning these posts would be reporting only on violations of Article II (2) such as opening fire , border crossing, mine laying and reaping; (e) These reports would be discussed in the MAC on the basis of complaints [by the sides].
As regards
observers’ patrols, each must take place accompanied by our people, and patrolling observers would report only on
violations of Article II (2). The patrols would move only between observation
posts, not simply freely along the line.
I will now move
to agreements with Jordan and Syria.
Regarding Jordan
we concentrated in our talks with Hammarskjöld on two points: (a) The issue of
Article VIII which clearly states our rights in Latrun, the holy places in
Jerusalem and Mount Scopus. He took it upon himself to seriously raise these
questions on his visit to Amman. (b) The situation along the border and the
recent incidents. Here we have pointed out to the possibility that, if indeed
the situation along the Gaza Strip calms down, Nasser would be able to shift
his anti-Israeli activity to the arena of the Jordan border. Moreover, Jordan
itself may serve as a base and as a source for terrorist gangs operating from
its territory.
We
based our contention regarding the [dredging of the] Jordan channel on the
Armistice Agreement and argued that according to it life inside the
demilitarized zone must return to normalcy, and normalcy means development. We relied on the precedent of Lake
Huleh, where we continued our drainage works, which had also taken place inside
the demilitarized zone, and which we have completed without interruption in
spite of Syrian interference. This fact is indisputable.
We strongly
demanded that Hammarskjöld agree and inform the Syrians that any forceful
attempt by them to interfere with our work would be seen as a violation of the
Armistice Agreement. Moreover, a threat of using force, which has been made
already, is by itself such a violation.
Hammarskjöld
accepted our condition but found it necessary to add: “Whether your activity is
legal or not, they are not allowed to disturb it or threaten to disturb it.
Such actions would be considered as a violation of the Armistice Agreement.”
As to the
question of our freedom to resume work [on the Jordan channel], he thought that
it needed clarification. He himself was not convinced of our freedom to do
that. There is a possibility of yes or no here. If the Syrians ask him what the
situation is according to the Security Council resolution, he would answer them
that he was not authorized to interpret the Council resolution. Only the
Council can interpret its resolutions.
Now, what was the
Security Council resolution? In fact, there should have been two resolutions.
One [Resolution 100 (1953) of October 27, 1953] says that the Security Council notes with satisfaction Israel’s
preparedness to stop work for the duration of the Council’s urgent discussion,
and we contend that the urgent discussion has long been terminated – it started
in December 1953 and ended inconclusively] in January 1954. Another resolution was about to be
adopted but fell because of a Soviet veto, and therefore we claimed that the
Syrian complaint fell as well. The Council did nothing further, and Hammarskjöld said that there
could be different opinions regarding this issue. He will tell the Syrians that
he himself cannot decide, while they are not allowed to interfere. It was clear
that he, from the view point of political wisdom, was of the opinion that we
should not renew work on the channel, but he would not take it upon himself to
decide.
As for the
Kinneret, I would first of all like to bring to your attention that the legal
situation regarding the Kinneret is that a resolution was adopted by the
Security Council [i.e., Resolution 111 (1956) of 19 January 1956; WebDoc #85], and
it referred to that decision in its instructions to the Secretary General when
asking him to take on his mission, in which it was said that the two sides
should cooperate with General Burns in implementing his proposals. Following
that session of the Security Council, General Burns approached the two sides
with five proposals: (a) The Syrians are forbidden to fish in the Kinneret; (b)
The Syrians are forbidden to open fire on Israeli fishermen in the Kinneret;
(c) Israeli forces are forbidden to open fire on the Syrians; (d) Israel would
allow, out of a free agreement, that her police boats would not go closer than
250 meters from the Kinneret shores – no limitation was made regarding Israeli
fishing boats; (e) The Syrians are allowed to drink from the Kinneret’s waters
and water their herds.
We completely
accepted the first three proposals. As to the fourth, we said that generally a
police boat should maintain some distance from a fisherman’s boat in order to
be able to protect her, but it should be clear that this doesn’t invalidate our
right to get close to the shore when protection of our boats necessitates.
Hammarskjöld was satisfied with this position. As to the proposal regarding
drinking water we said we were not going to be strict aboout drinking and
watering herds, but it should be clear that we shall by no means agree to the
Syrians setting up water pumping machinery.
On this ended our
talks regarding the five proposals. It remains to be seen what would the Syrian
reaction would be.
On this occasion
I would like to complete the picture regarding Gaza. We told Hammarskjöld that
we have no interest in getting closer to the border line there; however, it
should be clear that whenever security needs call for our military to move up
to the line, they would do so, and this is how we operate there.
A few words
regarding our conception of Hammarskjöld’s mission. We regarded it with special
interest in terms of our stature in the United Nations as well as in the eyes
of world public opinion. It is we who are directly involved here; the chisel is
felt in our own flesh. We are aware of what important issues are at stake and
of the possibility of falling into an attitude of contempt or cynicism
regarding the United Nations or its Secretary-General. I think such an attitude
is by and large unjustified. This is an extremely unrealistic attitude, which
time and again has harmed us. True, I do understand its psychological
background. However, inasmuch as we are part of this world and, in view of the
various aspects of our dependence on the outside world, it would be extremely
serious if we ignored the huge moral and political importance which the world
attaches to the UN and to the high and revered stature of the SG who epitomizes
this institution and its authority.
While we are not
accusing other governments of having too much international idealism, we should
bear in mind and take into consideration their ability to exploit international
emotions against us, so that we should not be faced with totally unnecessary
surprises when we can in fact envisage them in time.
Moreover, we
[ourselves] are the very factor which has been focusing the world’s attention
on our security problem, on the problem of peace and stability in the ME. If
complaints arise among us – why is the world paying so much attention to us,
with such intensity? – then we should be aware that we are to blame for this,
for we have caused this. We have achieved this by making the Czech arms deal
the terrible and dangerous threat which it is. It was we who cried out that our
security is endangered. It was we who raised the slogan of “arms for Israel!”
And the world, in quite large measure, has responded to it by becoming alarmed
and calling for help for us. Throughout all this, at times explicitly, at times
by implication, a tone of censure has been heard against the UN – what is it
doing in view of such a situation? What is the purpose of its existence if not
to be on guard and to prevent aggression? Even if we have not put our faith in
the UN but always stressed our power of self-defense, even if we constantly
claim that no action taken by the UN can serve as a substitute for our own
guarantees of our security, we have not released the UN from all
responsibility. True, we cannot always control the reactions and conclusions of
others in face of the steps taken by us. Others have concluded that, while
Israel should certainly be given freedom of action, still the UN should do
something as well. If the UN says something – and even if this is a result of
some machination by this or that power – the fact remains that, as far as the
world is concerned, the UN has woken up. It has taken a highly incongruous,
unusual step; it has sent the SG himself to our region for a whole month. It
has put on the agenda the whole question of the armistice and the most urgent
task of immediately relaxing tension.
If the main
result of this initiative, given wide publicity, is that the SG has clashed
with us and that we responded to his initial proposals clearly in the negative,
this would constitute a very grave failure of Israeli foreign policy and a
drastic weakening of our international position, as well as of our defense
[i.e., arms procurement] prospects. Consequently we should, inasmuch as
possible, [- - -] keep our main interests intact and do the utmost to avoid
bringing matters to such a head-on clash.
I would like to
say to the Committee members that, so far, a frontal clash has been avoided.
First of all, we have no idea of what will happen with the SG’s proposals –
what he is going to bring us back from the Arab countries. That’s the reason
for the special secrecy of all my analyses and reports regarding these
proposals before you. Possibly, we will face proposals from the other side
which would compel us to retreat. Possibly, we will be faced with issues still
unknown to us today. We are not standing on guard on the frontline. Anyway, it
should be assumed that regarding the main issue which we have raised – the
inclusion of the free passage issue within the framework of the commitments
required by the Armistice Agreement – a clash may occur, but then this clash
would arise around a matter that is highly crucial for us.
The same is true,
as he told us, regarding another issue: “Remember that you have an
international front and that you are requesting arms. You are putting forward
claims [for arms], you are conducting negotiations [for arms]. How is your
situation going to be influenced by your taking this or that position?”
We told him: “There is [also]
public opinion about you. What would people think if it turns out that
you have been burdened with such an extraordinary mission, once in seven years,
to investigate the Armistice Agreements, but that you avoided dealing with a
question [i.e., of free passage] which the world at large is aware of as being
crucial? I don’t know whether the world will be impressed by legal niceties
here. It is clear to the world that there is here a case of violation, of
aggression, and you shall have to stand trial before the world.” Here, on this
issue, we have a weapon in our hands [i.e., his sensitivity to public opinion].
In case there is no alternative, then come what come may, we would possibly
have to appear before the Security Council and there do battle with the SG. But
in view of this possibility we should endeavor inasmuch as possible to narrow,
not widen, our front against the SG, and inasmuch as possible concentrate our
arguments with him on issues most crucial for us, issues whose justification of
our position is self-evident.
We have insisted
that this issue [of free passage] be included within the Armistice Agreements,
and he had agreed with us. Suppose he had not agreed and wanted to bring us to
our knees regarding an issue on which he has legal grounds to base his
position. If so, I would have been quite skeptical regarding Eban’s ability to
satisfy those who are sympathetic to us in the Security Council, as well as
sympathetic public opinion in America, including American Jews, who are at the
same time sympathetic to the United Nations. This public opinion still believes
in the United Nations; it has always endeavored to connect its sympathy towards
us with its loyalty to the United Nations, and to resolve disputes between the
two. Then, when it sees a case of something very crucial for us, it thinks
twice. However, in the present case [of free passage], which legally-speaking
is not covered by the Armistice Agreements and over which the United Nations has
authority, it is clear to public opinion that here indeed UN authority is
supreme and, in any case, the Security Council as supreme institution is
trusted by all. It is thus highly important that we avoid clashing with it on
this issue. We must take this aspect into consideration all along our present
battlefront.
[Here the report ends.
A short, unimportant debate ensued, at the end of which Sharett found reason to
add the following:]
I would like to add that, inasmuch as the SG spoke about the fedayeen, I felt that I could fathom his
thinking on this subject. He was of the opinion that we did something very
wrong in our shelling the city of Gaza [on April 5]. According to his
information, received from UN people there whom he fully trusts – perhaps he
shouldn’t trust them, but it is clear to me that he does; and he told me
specifically about one of them whom he considers objective, and this
enlightened me that he is aware that among the UN people there can be some who
are not objective – he, Hammarskjöld, could not accept our explanations given
to the Security Council, i.e., that the shelling of Gaza was a defensive act
aimed at silencing a certain Egyptian gun battery. He said that this man told
him that the shelling was characterized by clear signs of shelling across the
whole city, that it could not have been the shelling of a specific Egyptian
position. There is a disagreement regarding that position. The UN Observers
claim that they have not found [IDF] shells near it, while we claim that we
have seen exactly where our shells had hit. The Observers say that, besides the
Egyptian position, the shelling had hit the city and the majority of casualties
were hit in the city, and thus there was no justification for the shelling.
Hammarskjold probably would argue, for there is a UN report about it, that our
settlements were shelled following our shelling of Deir El-Balagh. Our
contention is that Deir El-Balagh is wholly surrounded by military posts, and
thus that if these posts are shelled it is impossible to avoid shelling the
town itself. Hammarskjöld assumed that the fedayeen attacks came as a response to our killing of women and children in Gaza.
Anyway, it is
clear to me that he is not willing to conclude that fedayeen activity is proof of Nasser’s intention to wage war against
us. He is of the opinion, or perhaps has information, or knows – I have no idea
what is the basis of his saying so – that following the shelling of Gaza he has
come under pressure to use it as a casus
belli, but he refused to do so. He is prepared to accept the possibility
that he refuses [to wage war] not because he aspires for peace, but because he
is not yet ready. He is not prepared to give Nasser a certificate of honesty.
He thinks that just as there is logic in his going to wage war, so is there
logic in his not doing so. He points out these two alternatives with much care and
extreme reservation, for he admits that logically Nasser has reason to wage war
and dominate the region. But at the same time he thinks that he must take into
consideration the possibility of American intervention. And Nasser must have
been impressed by the Soviet communiqué, which he, Hammarskjöld, sees as a
positive step. He is also of the opinion that the economic situation of Egypt –
he is possibly exaggerating in his Marxist outlook, even though he claims he is
not a Marxist - is simply desperate and constantly worsening on account of
Egypt’s population growth so that Nasser must realize that ultimately his
future depends on whether or not he succeeds in achieving something in the [- -
-] realm of Egypt’s economy. He, Hammarskjöld, assumes that Nasser, based on
his own calculations, may reach the conclusion that he should go to war.
Indeed, Hammarskjöld said all this with utmost care and reservation, and he was
careful to take into consideration avoid saying one word about any other member
of the Egyptian ruling military junta. He said he had not seen any of them and
is ignorant of the situation in this respect. I seriously implore you to be
very, very careful with all this information.
I have nothing to
report on our Afro-Asian front beside one top secret item which is that we have
concluded with the King of Ethiopia [an agreement for] the establishment of an
Israeli consulate in Addis Ababa. Our consul is going there this week in the
hope that the King keeps his word to us. We wanted to establish diplomatic
relations but he asked us to be satisfied for the time being with a Consul
General. Reciprocally we shall recognize the Ethiopian Consul in Jerusalem who
has so far not been recognized by us.
