(A) Lawson’s account of
meeting with Ben-Gurion and Sharett
Spent over hour with Ben Gurion and Sharett today in
conversation on Israel’s need for yes or no decision on arms question;
Secretary’s testimony and what conclusions Israel must draw from it. I have
never seen Ben Gurion so emphatic, forceful or so emotionally upset and, on
several occasions, so near to tears. Sharett was less dramatic but for first
time in my experience was unsmiling throughout interview, displaying attitude
of undisguised cold bitterness and foreboding criticisms.
Ben Gurion spoke from his own rough notes and what
appeared to be Her[ald] Trib[une] report of Secretary’s testimony. He was obviously most impatient to begin and
dismissed amenities in matter of seconds.
He described Secretary’s testimony as “very bitter
disappointment” he could accept suggestion that peace should not rest on arms
alone if it didn’t exclude arms to Israel at time when its neighbors and Saudi
Arabia and Iraq were supplied with arms.
He was scathing in rejection to suggestions Israel should
rely on UN and tripartite declaration. “None of us would be living” he said,
“if Israel had relied on UN in 1948. As for tripartite declaration, Great
Britain is signatory but its shipment of offensive arms to Egypt and not to
Israel bears no relationship to what I think is spirit of tripartite
declaration. Israel does not rely on it nor does it intend to”.
He professed great worry over Secretary’s suggestion
Israel’s frontiers could not be guaranteed until they were defined by
agreement. In his view modification of frontiers implicit in testimony did not
mean Secretary favored Israel moving into Sinai or expanding into Syria or to
Jordan River. It was obvious he had in mind just the contrary. Pounding on
table for emphasis he said Secretary obviously meant—from Israel’s
standpoint—change for the worse or diminishment of Israeli territory. This
would not happen as long as “we are alive. Our girls and boys will fight to the
death”. He said Secretary had right to opinions on Israel’s requirements but
whatever they were Israel was entitled to “yes or no answer. If the answer is
to be no, please let it be said now. It was question of life or death. We are
in mortal danger. Every week arms are pouring into Egypt. If war is declared there
will be one military commander able to move all the forces of Egypt, Saudi
Arabia and Syria against Israel. Chances of attack are greater than ever
before. I know how Nasser will read the Secretary’s statement. If US letting
Israel down he would regard it as an invitation to attack”. He spoke bitterly
of his conviction that in same circumstances which prevailed for Israel, if
Belgium were to ask for arms it would not have been answered as Israel
was—”Certainly not England nor even West Germany.”
Ben Gurion brushed aside my suggestion he was probably
having to resist tremendous pressure both within his government, his political
party and from the public. He declared only pressures on him were pressures of
events. It was obvious, and confirmed later by Herzog who was present, that Ben
Gurion meant that really effective pressures are those coming from the very
heavy personal and official responsibilities he bears—responsibilities the
weight of which he has been feeling with progressive consciousness during the
past few weeks. This personal responsibility aspect of this attitude is
significant of his dangerous attitude for making quick personal policy
decisions in his capacity of Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. Although
he denied the influence of other pressures it is believed that he is under
heavy and continuous pressures from the IDF, the mobilization of Egyptian and
Syrian armed forces on Israel’s border, the GOI, party members and the
opposition.
He stressed requirement which time placing on him. Israel
could not rely on UN or tripartite declaration. In such grave circumstances
they could only rely on themselves. If Israel were given arms he was sure there
would be no attack. Without them Israel would have to reorganize its life. This
was their land. Their frontiers were as sacred to them as those of America to
the US. They would have to reorganize under the pressure of knowing they had
been let down by the US on their request while arms were pouring into Egypt,
Saudi Arabia and Syria.
Ben Gurion said that he would be obliged to tell Knesset
very soon what dangers were and what measures were necessary for preservation
of Israel. In absence of assistance from US, Israelis must assume enormous
burdens and make great sacrifices.
They were not going to rely on Secretary’s advice when
their very lives were at stake. He said he proposed to tell Selwyn Lloyd the
same on his forthcoming visit.
Sharett reviewed his personal experiences in pressing
Israel’s arms request stating that despite various encouraging indications
contained in statements by Secretary and President many months have passed.
Delay was undignified both to US and Israel. “For you it is undignified to have
to demonstrate inability to make up your mind on this burning issue and there
is no dignity for Israel in continuing to beg for arms. However, it is not only
undignified but dangerous to feed our people for so many months on false
hopes”.
Sharett said there was inexplicable inconsistency “in the
US advising Israel to rely for its security on international rule of law and
establishment of peaceful relations with its neighbors whereas for itself and
its favored friends in NATO the essential element had been reliance on armed
strength”. Sharett referred to Secretary’s statement to effect that he did not
exclude possibility of delivering arms to Israel at time when such deliveries
might contribute to peace. He described this as “far-reaching qualification
opening way for indefinite delay in same manner that indefinite delay was
inherent in suggestion that frontiers could not be guaranteed until their
definition was mutually agreed.”
Both Sharett and Ben Gurion repeated again and again that
delayed US decision was same as negative one. At least twice Ben Gurion said if
no decision on arms request was received, “we will have to make the decision
ourselves”.
Comment: I
believe from emotional restraint which Ben Gurion exercised in conversation
which, given its content, might have been very melodramatic had he been staging
show, that he is very near decision that will set Israel’s foreign policy
direction, if not action, for some time.
He—and Sharett—are genuinely astonished at apparent US
intention to ignore for time being Israel’s arms request and provide no
indication of ultimate decision. They are resentful and nursing sense of
personal grievance.
Ben Gurion has too great feeling personal destiny and
responsibility for Israelis to permit events themselves to shape Israel’s
future. To this sense of personal responsibility for providing solution to all
problems confronting country must be added pressures, which he professes to
ignore, but which nevertheless weigh heavily on him such as IDF desires for
solution by action; government’s public declarations that question of war or
peace hinge]s[ upon US decision on arms, and growing strength of Arab forces on
its borders. Taken together I am sure they will impel him to decide soon.
His summons to me is probably a last effort to induce an
affirmative reply. If it fails—and I think he is sincere in saying that was
]if?[ answer much longer delayed will be considered here as negative answer,
decisions he feels obliged to take will follow very shortly.
Furthermore, I think we would have only very short time
in which to meet his request if that were our desire. Indefinite answers by US
will not win additional time.
While I am persuaded that he is perhaps nearer to policy
decision of the scope now confronting him than at any time since establishment
of state, they will not necessarily include determination date which they will
be put into motion. Decision could range from request Knesset for legislation
increasing degree mobilization, for curtailing civilian consumption, etc. to
decision to impose settlement upon Arabs by military action.
If we reject this last-minute appeal for favorable reply
on arms or an undertaking in future, I am convinced we may have no further
opportunity to influence course of events by diplomatic action aimed at Israel
alone.
SOURCE: FRUS 1955-1957 XV, doc.140.
(B) Lawson subsequently
provided the following personal assessment of this and other recent talks with
Ben-Gurion and Sharett:
Secretary’s February 24 testimony coupled with Allen’s
interpretation [- - -] and retardation decision French Mysteres leaves Israel
Government with no foreign policy and no defense program. For four months
orientation here has been on development adequate defense posture, primarily
through procurement minimum number of interceptor jets. Relatively speaking
this was policy of moderation.
Sharett’s untypical sternness and bitterness reflected
his reaction to collapse of his pro-western orientation and of foreign policy
which place reliance on US. He finds in ashes his basic approach to problem of
Soviet arms to Arabs which was one of maintaining workable defense posture
through acquisition of minimal number of high quality defense arms from US and
its allies. Sharett is now defenseless against accusations of his opponents
within and without Cabinet who, since October last, have argued that Sharett’s
moderate approach and trust in US would be betrayed.
Ben Gurion’s demeanor suggests typical behavior pattern
noted by his close associates in periods when he is intensely occupied with
some major problem during which he gives evidence of uncertainty and emotional
strain. Once he has made his decision he reportedly relaxes, puts his
uncertainties behind him and pursues with equanimity the execution of his
formulation. Both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister must be haunted with
thought that had they adopted different policy October last [- - -] the
Egyptian military threat might have been removed with much smaller loss of
Jewish lives than may now prove to be case.
From their conversation with me yesterday it apparent
that Ben Gurion and Sharett making one last effort to obtain affirmative US
reply and failing that they must assume their policy has failed and new
approach developed forthwith. Logic that this is time of decision must appear
inescapable to GOI for following reasons: Increment large Egyptian and Syrian
military units along Israeli borders is preview of progressively greater future
pressures as Arab equipment and ability to utilize expands. With its military
manpower on civilian reservist basis, Israeli could not indefinitely meet this
challenge except at exorbitant price of progressively larger disruption of its
economy and way of life. Furthermore, IDF appears [- - -] to have advised Ben
Gurion that only very short time remains before balance of power shifts to Arab
side and is urging action before too long delay. It is at this point that there
appears to be vital divergence in interpretation of subsequent events as
between Israelis and some US observers. Israelis are convinced that given
capability the Egyptians aided by other Arab States will attack Israel unless
they can achieve same objective through progressive weakening of Israel by
forced negotiations. This conclusion which may be correct or incorrect is based
on Israel’s past experience in dealing with Arabs, statements and actions of
Arab leaders and information reaching IDF through its comprehensive
Intelligence Services in Arab States. While IDF Intelligence may come up with
its full share of false reports on occasion it has proved accurate. [- - -] In
any event Israelis have firm conviction about Arabs intentions and US arms
policy appears to have undermined their ability to meet this threat through
balance of power approach and to have provided no satisfactory substitute.
While Ben Gurion made it clear to me yesterday that he
considers the forthcoming vital decision his personal responsibility, it is
apparent that in arriving at his conclusion he will weigh carefully the advice
of “his boys” in the IDF that the only remaining alternative to assure Israel’s
survival is a military showdown. Their views have the support of Achdut Avoda,
the militant wing of Mapai within the government and of Herut and many General
Zionists in the opposition. While it is known that the progressive and Mapam leadership,
as well as the Mapai moderate (Sharett) wing, are most reluctant adopt a policy
which may lead to general hostilities, they are unable at moment to present
workable alternative. Ben Gurion, while no longer dominant on many questions of
domestic policy, still retains the confidence of Israel public in security
matters. They will follow his leadership at this decisive moment in Israel’s
history.
From information available to it from various sources
including comments made by Ben Gurion and Sharett to me today. coupled with
their grim and determined manner, I believe it is possible to forecast the
minimum and maximum ranges of Israel’s new formulation of policy and program to
replace those which it is now in process of abandoning. At minimum, Israel’s
economy would be placed on an emergency basis with partial mobilization of
reservists. In the Embassy’s judgment, once this basic step is taken it will
set in motion trend of public attitudes which would make it almost impossible
for the GOI to avoid adoption of a militant policy toward specific Arab-Israel
issues. This could be accompanied by determination to assure, by military
measures if necessary, absolute sovereignty and strict observance of armistice
agreements including decision to proceed with Banat Yaacov, to retaliate for
any continuation of Egyptian firing across the border which is now daily
occurrence, enforcement of transit rights Gulf of Aqaba or Suez. One or more of
these measures could be taken with full knowledge that they might lead to wider
hostilities but with willingness to accept such risks. As maximum, the IDF
might be authorized by Ben Gurion to take off on an offensive against the
Egyptian troops in the Sinai with no more pretext than one of the many
recurring incidents on frontier. In view of Tiberias action experience,
however, it is believed that Ben Gurion’s Cabinet colleagues would counsel him
that widespread hostilities should develop only over major issue with which
world opinion is already acquainted.
Embassy concurs in Ben Gurion’s thesis that the Israelis
would fight rather than acquiesce to truncation Israel’s territory. This is not
so much question of loss of so many square miles of territory as it is
reflection of firm belief that it would constitute the first of series of
weakening measures designed culminate in Israel’s eventual extermination.
Embassy does not exclude possibility that at this
juncture GOI may make some approach to the Soviet Government to explore
possibility obtaining arms. It is known, however, that many Israel leaders
believe such an approach would prove abortive and Embassy considers it doubtful
whether, even if such step is taken, Israel Government would delay placement
its country on war footing pending a reply.
While Embassy may not be fully informed all aspects of
the evolution of American policy on arms question, it appears to us that the
imminent shift in Israel security policy which will greatly increase
possibilities general hostilities in area could still be avoided by supply of
minimal number of modern jet fighters. Ben Gurion has been quoted by several
associates as saying that he believed Israel could maintain adequate defense
posture with 25 percent of the new jets in possession Egypt. This appears to us
a legitimate approach in defense terms, and one which, if adopted, might
stabilize the situation here so as to make possible progress with the Israelis
toward settlement along the lines set forth in Secretary’s August 26 address.
SOURCE: FRUS 1955-1957 XV, doc.147.
