During the last weeks of
December there was much activity in the State Department regarding the supply
of arms. Not only had hints reached us, but we were told openly that they are
deliberating, creating plans with the intention of supplying us with arms, indeed
not on a large scale, but something concrete. I thought that we should not ask
for a meeting with Dulles. If he had something to tell us, he should summon us.
Then there was a meeting with [Assistant Secretary George] Allen. He said: “When the
Secretary of State returns to Washington I’ll suggest to him that he call you
in. Indeed, when he came back on the 29th, a meeting took place in the
afternoon between Hoover, Allen and Russell and Eban and Shiloah. At a certain
stage Ben-Gurion sent a personal message to the President through the
Ambassador with the aim of bringing matters to a decision. Eban informed the
State Department that he had a message to deliver and asked for a meeting with
President. After that Eban had another meeting with Allen and then with the
Canadian ambassador in Washington.
[- - -] I informed Eban that I wanted to see Lawson.
There is a difference between a meeting between the [Israel] Ambassador and
the Secretary of State [in Washington] and a meeting between me here with the
American Ambassador. When Eban goes to see Dulles he cannot talk from above,
because he is at his home. Not so when we summon Lawson. When he comes to us we
are the government. We can say whatever we want to say and he must write down
our words and relate them to Dulles, who then reads things the tone of which he
cannot hear from Eban. This is not something particular to us. This is
customary everywhere.
There was also a meeting between Comay and Pearson [in
Ottawa]. Pearson told him that he would bring the matter before his Cabinet. We
still do not know what happened at that meeting, but Comay did not believe that
we would receive F-86 jets without a more concrete understanding between Canada
the United States.
Regarding Italy all I can say is that we approached them
and were informed that they had contacted the United States but had not
received an answer, positive or negative. A certain improvement occurred in our
relations with this country. First, they are much interested in the financial
aspect of selling us arms. For them it is much more important than to the
Canadians. Canada has an annual surplus of $800 million and they do not know
what to do with their money; Italy feels that owing to the Czech-Egyptian arms
deal it has lost its Egyptian arms market. The result is that they are angry
with Nasser and our importance in their arms market grows. Second, they are
critical of Nasser’s ties with the communists. They regard him as pro-Soviet.
Third, in the course of time several pro-Israeli [people] were placed in
important governmental positions. One of them is the DG of the foreign
ministry. He and a few of his colleagues have approved the sale to us of
various arms. However, since their jet motors are manufactured in the United
States and mounted at the Torino Fiat plant, these jets are considered NATO
property and cannot be sold.
A word on Pineau. From the beginning I was doubtful
whether he would visit us, given the cancellation of his visits to Damascus and
Beirut. However, at a certain phase it became clear that, in spite of not
visiting Damascus and Beirut, he would visit us. This was decided against the
negative advice of Quai D’Orsay. He was supposed to arrive tomorrow at 23:00.
Last Friday I met with Ambassador Gilbert and discussed with him the plan for
the visit. Yesterday morning I sat with the Foreign Ministry and the Defense
Ministry people to finalize the plan, and then a cable arrived announcing the
cancellation.
As to the Mystères, six are already at our disposal and are to be flown to Israel
on April 11th by our pilots. Thanks to an effort that was not easy we have
guaranteed their landing in Athens. In his meeting with the Greek FM our
representative was given a straight negative answer. He suggested that our PM
approach the Greek PM on this matter. Greece has not recognized us de jure, thus we do not have a
diplomatic mission there. However we have there a very able representative with
diplomatic acumen. Indeed, while waiting for our PM’s message to arrive, the
Foreign Ministry summoned our representative and informed him that they agreed
to the landing in Athens of 12 jets only, without it being a precedent. Now it
is assumed that the Mystères can fly directly to Israel
from Rome.
As for the next twelve Mystères, we have a clear French promise, but their delivery is scheduled
for June-July. Possibly this transfer does not need American approval; these
jets are outside the NATO pool.
[- - -]
I would now like to discuss the latest developments along
the Gaza Strip. [- - -] After the Egyptian shelling of the settlements of Ein
Ha-Shlosha and Kissufim, and then also of Nahal Oz, we returned fire against
the Egyptian positions, but we also shelled the city of Gaza by guns. [- - -] Later on I was informed that 59 or 61 were killed in the shelling of Gaza: four
soldiers and all the rest civilians, among them 15 women and 12 children. The
injured numbered 104. A question could be raised whether our shelling
retaliation was not exaggerated. It is indeed difficult to answer such a
question while the shooting at our settlements continues. [- - -] I now regret
the shelling of Gaza, even though I cannot say that I would not have issued
such an order had I been the authoritative commander, but ex post facto I regret this action because the area shelled was densely
populated.
At this point Ben-Gurion took the floor and following his report a long
debate ensued.
Several ministers were critical of the intensive shelling of Gaza. Not Minister Golda Meir, however, who declared:
Several ministers were critical of the intensive shelling of Gaza. Not Minister Golda Meir, however, who declared:
“I would like the say that I
do not regret the Gaza matter. I know this may sound cruel, because children
were killed; but the Ein Ha-Shlosha children are children too. I truly admit
that when a Chicago Jew tells me that, if fifty Jewish soldiers and only six
Syrian soldiers had been killed [in the Kinneret operation], it would have been
better public-relations-wise, I do not share such a feeling. I am not saying
this because in Gaza it was Arab children who were killed and we are worried
about Jewish children. I am saying this because it was not we who started it
all. They must know that they must pay, and pay dearly. I cannot restrain
Nasser. I don’t know whether the bereaved Gaza mothers can restrain him, but
there should be a general awareness there that any strike against us will cost
them dearly. Generally speaking, sensitivity to human life, even the enemy’s
life, is a commendable quality. That’s very fine. But not where the human life
of our people is endangered. I am saying this in view of all the cruelty
involved. I can’t stop thinking what would have happened if not for the agility
of the responsible settler [in Kissufim, where the children’s house was hit] who ordered everybody to enter the shelters immediately. Blessed be the fellow
who was responsible for the life of the civilians there.
MS: One remark to Golda
regarding regret for the women and children. You may be surprised to hear that
my consideration doesn’t emanate from regret about children and women. This
doesn’t mean that I do not feel such regret, but in the case before us I am
prepared to avoid triggering this regret. My consideration is political. We are
perhaps standing now on the verge of a great battle, perhaps not. But we have a
starting point: we are not seeking a great battle. We are not seeking victory,
because we do not wish for the destruction involved in a great battle.
Then there is the question of how our actions are
perceived. We are, so to speak, constantly being accused of two things: first,
that whenever we find a justified excuse we are eager to strike, and strike
hard. A series of incidents occurred; there were forty, fifty and sixty people
killed. It is perceived as a certain disproportion; that the scale of our
retaliations is always somewhat exaggerated; that this is overdone. The
impression is that our boys, whenever a possibility occurs, strike very hard.
In my opinion this is not desirable. Second, we are suspected of striving for a
war. Nobody would suspect us of provoking Nasser to shoot at our patrols, but
we are suspected of being prepared to utilize every incident for retaliating in
such a manner which is bound to make war inevitable.
These two things are undesirable. I am not saying even
one critical word regarding the order [to shell Gaza] as it was issued. I
myself would have been prepared to issue such an order. But every step,
including this one, depends on certain calculations. And, permit me to say, I
think that these considerations – even if the commander issuing orders is not [legally]
bound to consider political aspects – must, most certainly in a country like
ours, [- - -] be based not only on military aspects, but also be accompanied by
political awareness.