*** Herut, “Behind the Curtains of Sharett’s Disposal,” June, 15 1956, (by a Special Correspondent)
[This article related that Ben-Gurion became fed up with Sharett for the following reasons: Sharett struck a deal with the religious parties; he would appoint 15 of their members to Foreign Ministry posts in return for their voting with him in the Cabinet against Ben-Gurion. Another proof of Sharett’s undermining of Ben-Gurion was his speech in Kibbutz Mizra upon the release of Mordechai Oren: this step was likewise carried out in order to gain Mapam’s support of Sharett against Ben-Gurion. In view of all this Ben-Gurion decided that Sharett had to go. The article ends with:] “The day of his departure is near.”
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*** Herut Editorial, June 15, 1956
The onslaught of Ben-Gurion’s group on Sharett’s position has continued this week incessantly. Those who are after Sharett’s head continue to spread news about internal deliberations inside Mapai regarding Sharett’s dismissal. Nobody inside Mapai is coming forward to help Sharett or defend him. Only the Progressives and Mapam have dared to argue in the Cabinet that Sharett’s dismissal is not an internal issue of Mapai but a matter pertaining to the coalition.
[The article contended that, in fact, Sharett’s policy was tantamount to that of Ben-Gurion’s. Thus] a change at the Foreign Ministry will not change anything in the failing policy of the regime. Even if Sharett is thrown out of the Foreign Ministry, his spirit would stay. Not a change of the minister is needed now but a change of the regime.
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*** Davar editorial, June 18, 1956:
If a question is posed in
responsible and serious political circles why it is that Sharett resigned now,
it is possible to answer openly and sincerely with no beating around the bush
that a defense and political situation has been created in which the foreign
minister has realized that his cooperation with the Prime Minister and Defense
Minister would not be beneficial now.
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*** Moshe Zak, “Two
Personalities – Two Attitudes,” Ma'ariv, June 18, 1956:
The difference [between the
two] was not only in that Moshe Sharett was more sensitive to foreign matters
while Ben-Gurion was more sensitive to defense matters. The difference was much
deeper and more basic. Both have striven for a settlement of relations with the
Arab countries, but Moshe Sharett believed that this could not be attained without the
support of the powers and of world public opinion, and therefore Israel’s first
aim should be to attain the sympathy of the powers and of world public opinion,
presenting Israel as a country devoted to peace, hence his opposition to
launching a preventive war and even to large-scale reprisal operations. MS
believes that the way to convince that Arabs and bring them to recognize Israel
is the long road of buttressing the state and establishing relations with close
and far-away states, and attaining international economic aid.
The other school of thought, of which Ben-Gurion seems to be a
supporter, contends that our position in the world and our possibility to
enlist friends among the powers is a result of our relations with that Arabs:
insofar as we can prove to the world that we are able to wrestle with the Arabs
and pacify our borders by our own means, our influence on the world will grow
proportionally. In other words, it is not that our relations with the Arabs
would be influenced by our coming to terms with the powers, but on the
contrary, our relations with the powers are a function of our power vis-à-vis
the Arabs.
[- - -] For instance, in the very days of Sharett’s visit
to Washington, waiting there for Dulles’ reply regarding supply of arms to
Israel, the Kinneret operation was carried out. Sharett believed that that
action could foiled his efforts to obtain weapons, while his opponents did not
believe that by Israeli concessions to the Arabs regarding the Kinneret Israel would
obtain sympathy in the world. Israel’s retreat before the Arabs could increase
their pressure in world capitals against supplying arms to Israel. The same
holds for the Jordan canal issue. Ben-Gurion believed and continues to believe that
only by the renewal of work it is possible to bring the Arabs and the powers to
a settlement of the water problems between Israel and its neighbors, while
Sharett stressed the attainment of a prior agreement by the western powers
about the renewal of work, and thus also to ensure financial aid to the great
project. He believes in the power of our just cause to convince the powers.
Ben-Gurion differs here. He wants world public opinion to
support us, but believes that first of all we must seek it among the Arabs,
which means that it is necessary to convince the Arabs that war with Israel
doesn’t pay – neither guerrila war nor one by economic boycott. And wherever
such a war is on, it should be brought to a showdown, and thus, as a result,
attain the powers’ support.
[- - -] In the course of time, Arab military power and
Arab enmity have been growing, and Ben-Gurion thought that this process was
endangering Israel militarily and also politically. He feared that the
strengthening of the Arabs would cause the powers to press Israel into making
concessions, and therefore he strove to [take] immediate [powerful] decisions.
This is the background of developments occurring since his return from Sde
Boker. [- - -] While Sharett believes that Israel should first of all obtain
the western powers’ support, Ben-Gurion believes that sources of arms supply [i.e.,
France] are open to us not because of restraint towards the Arabs, but
precisely because it was proven that we are a dynamic [military] force in the
Middle East.
