On Monday May 28 I called on the Foreign Minister in
Jerusalem to pay courtesy visit following my return from the United States. The
principal purpose of the visit was to review in general terms my visit to
Washington, to inform him of the persons on whom I called and the general
character of discussions, some impressions I had gained, and especially to
point out that our basic policy with regard to the Middle East area and the
sale of arms to Israel had not changed. I also stressed the fact that Israel’s
problems and position within the area were matters which were fully understood
and appreciated, and were matters of very great interest at ail official
levels. To reinforce that statement I pointed to the very positive and what we
believe effective conversations the Secretary had in Paris with the French and
Canadians and the need for realization of the fundamentals of our problems not
only with relation to Israel and the Arab States but to world in general.
Sharett expressed gratification and appreciation of these
comments. He realized, he said, that United States problems were worldwide and
the United States carried terrific responsibilities; that our problems were not
single ones involving one or two nations only; therefore, it required longer
for us to work out matters than Canada, for example. He said he set great value
and hope an the influence of the United States an France, Italy and Canada and
at the same time was anxious for results without loss of time. He recalled that
8 months had passed since his [November / December 1955] conversations with the
Secretary in Washington but volunteered the information that 18 French Mysteres
were virtually in Israel’s hands and 6 more were expected to arrive soon. For
this he gave large amount of credit to the Secretary for speeding up these deliveries.
This total of 24 jets, however, stood out against Egypt’s total of 250 Russians
MIG’s and bombers; certainly they were “better than nothing” but Israel’s air
defense still remained far from the indispensable minimum of 72 jets. He said
the fact that Syria was now receiving Czech arms including planes, further
increased Israel’s air imbalance. “Where are we to get the additional 48
planes?” He said we must consider that the United States is out as a source of
supply for the moment and that inasmuch as Italy was dependent on the United
States for F-86’s for processing, (and he was not pressing us in this
connection) France and Canada remained the only two sources for jet fighters.
Israel had made no further approach to the French since the return of Pineau
from Moscow but France’s earlier
statement that she would make no further deliveries until there was a change in
United States policy remained for the time being their only guide as to
France’s attitude. (In response to my question Sharett admitted planes from
Canada would help to change Paris attitude.) He mentioned that France was being
hard-pressed in Algeria but that the French Minister Defense [Maurice
Bourgès-Maunoury] had just come out with a strong statement against Nasser.
However, Sharett was not sure “what hands France was playing with Nasser” at
this time.
Regarding the Canadians he referred to Eban’s visit to
Department May 23 to report no action from Canada and requesting some
assistance in that connection. He referred to character of opposition in Canada
to the proposed supply of planes. He said Israel would apply every peaceful
persuasion, with United States direct help— combined Ottawa and Washington
action—and “we will see where we stand in fortnight”. He thought that with
effective help 24 planes could be obtained from Canada, in which event he was
reasonably hopeful that further 24 could be obtained from France. “But if there
are no planes from Canada and no change in United States attitude, Israel will
face a blank wall in France. This will be terribly disappointing, especially
after the encouraging speeches at the NATO meeting.”
In connection with arms supply and Israel’s need for
defensive weapons, Sharett underscored the very high defense budget which it
must meet in some way. Even if there is favorable reaction from Canada and
France, Israel will have to make unusually great efforts and sacrifices in
order to meet the bill. In this same context, he referred to Israel’s hope that
the ICA program this fiscal year might be upped by $5 million. He thought this
was entirely within the discretion of the United States which had in the past
followed a policy of helping friendly governments with free arms (although
these funds would not be applied directly to military budget). He thought if the
United States concludes Israel should be able to defend itself and aid in the
preservation of peace in the Middle East yet could not give arms to Israel, it
seemed reasonable that this additional financial aid could be supplied. He was
confident this could be done in such manner as not to involve any embarrassment
for the United States or Israel and “could be done within the economic
framework”. Obviously he did not consider this as substitute for any other
possible aid which might help Israel buy arms or as a complete substitute for
the inability of Israel to purchase arms in the United States. (I agreed to
transmit his comment on this matter to the Department. He informed me that Abba
Eban had taken up subject with Under Secretary Hoover. Hale, Director USOM, has
transmitted informally to ICA/Washington and informal request received from
Teddy Kollek, Prime Minister’s office, for an additional $5 million but has
received no formal application as yet. I would appreciate Department’s
preliminary thinking on this request which possesses primarily political
justification factor.
I questioned him about his attitude toward the time element
in matter of procurement of arms by Israel. He said there was no doubt that
Nasser at sometime would attack Israel if the arms imbalance continued but made
it clear that he was not predicting any date when Nasser might attack. “That
would border on prophecy.” However he went on to point to the usually cited
factors which in his mind were convincing that Nasser would attack unless
Israel procured more arms especially jets, which would make Nasser think twice
before attacking.
I asked Sharett why in his opinion Nasser should have
recognized Red China, and particularly at [this] moment. He is convinced that
neither the principle involved nor the timing had anything to do with Israelis
receiving arms or planes from any source at this time. He said it was
completely within Nasser’s established pattern of action and merely underscored
his constant assertions of his capacity to defy the West. At this point he said
the Egyptian correspondent Izzat in an attempt to defend Nasser’s arms deal
with the Soviets stated with great positiveness that the deal was made by
Nasser to show the West he is capable of defying it. Sharett was convinced that
Nasser’s recognition of Red China had some of its roots in the Bandung
Conference where he was feted and praised so much. This developed in Nasser’s
mind a concept of three great leaders in north Afro-Asiatic bloc; namely Nehru,
Chou-en-Lai, and Nasser. Furthermore, Nasser had developed very closed
personalities [sic. for “close
personal ties”] with Nehru. Also by recognizing Red China he was able to link
with him two important allies. The suggestion was also made by Shiloah[,]
Counselor-Minister of the Israel Embassy Washington, that the Soviets were
pressing Nasser to recognize Red China in ample time before upcoming UN
assembly meeting; that large Egyptian cotton sales to China were in view.
Sharett, speaking with some animation, then referred to what
he terms “the dangerous situation in Jordan”. He reviewed the deteriorating
features of the situation which Israel was regarding with some concern, such as
the replacement of the Prime Minister [Samir Rifai] by a pro-Egyptian official [Sa’id
al-Mufti] and the elevation of a definitely pro-Nasser military officer [Ali
Abu Nuwwar] to Commander of the Legion and the growing number of undisciplined
elements in Jordan. Sharett’s particular fear seemed to be likelihood of
Jordan-based Fedayeen operations and increased and widespread border incursions
by undisciplined as well as organized groups from Jordan. He suggested that the
United States asked the Jordan Government to see “That nothing happens to open
the question on self-defense for Israel”. In this connection, I asked Sharett
if he felt Nasser could “turn on and off” Fedayeen operations based in Jordan
as he had done in this connection with those in the past based in Egypt. He
answered question by saying “I am confident Fedayeen operations from Jordan would
not occur if Nasser objects”.
Comment: It seemed obvious to me that Sharett was
more relaxed and less concerned about his responsibilities and, with the
exception of Jordan’s situation, attacked the several subjects with less fire
and determination. It was noteworthy that he is apparently convinced that we
have not yet altered our basic policy re arms for Israel; that he is
appreciative of the Secretary’s positive steps taken at Paris recently; and
that he finally admits the great breadth and time-consuming character of our
many world policy problems.
SOURCE: FRUS
1955-1957 XV, doc.380.
