At the same time, it
has been proven that international bodies are not prepared to forcefully compel
Egypt to abide by her international obligations. These are basic
facts, to which one can add that, at the same time, it is clear that we are not
able to force our way through the Canal
Of course, a proposal
can be advanced – indeed it was advanced – that we react by sabotaging the
Canal. The government totally rejects this idea. It does not think that it
would be wise to enter into an open conflict with a physical clash with the
entire world. It also does not think that Israel is placed in such a desperate
situation to the extent of having no other option but to sink a ship in the
Suez Canal, an act I define as “a noble political suicide.”
We also do not see
any sense in repeating the act of sending a ship through the Canal, as we did
with the “Bat-Galim”, because it would only be a repeat of the same affair.
Second, we do not see any point in continuing our campaign in the Security
Council. This can be done, of course, but it would only be a verbal game. In
order to be consistent, we formally asked the President of the Security Council
to appeal to Egypt and demand its acceptance of the Council’s decision, but
obviously this step would not change Egypt’s position. An additional discussion
at the Security Council would not necessarily end with stronger condemnation,
and I do not believe that we need a demonstration of this impotence of the
Security Council.
Sooner or later we
believe that Egypt should be made to release “Bat-Galim” and to let her sail
southwards only [i.e., not to Haifa through the Canal.] If this happens, the
sailing of the ship to Eilat would be possible. Politically we are in favor of
taking such a step, but militarily this step still involves several unknowns.
At the time when we
were still at the start of the operation, after we decided to purchase a ship,
bring it over to Massawa and put her under an Israeli flag, there were two
options open before us: directing the ship to the Suez Canal or to Eilat. Both
options were discussed and the decision fell on the Suez option. The reasoning
was that the problem of Eilat is hardly known in the outside world, while
everybody knows what the Suez Canal is, that it is an international maritime
passage, guaranteed for all to use. It was also almost certain that the sailing
to Eilat would involve a military conflict. And we were not certain that it
would occur against a favorable international background.
On the other hand, it
stood to reason that if we chose the Suez option then, even if the Egyptians
stopped the ship, we would by no means use force, for this kind of behavior
would have no chance of winning world public opinion and of censuring the
Egyptians; but at the same time, if the Egyptians were censured for blockading
the Canal, this could justify our breaking through to Eilat later , even forcefully.
We also assumed that each operation – the Suez and the Eilat ones – could take
a few months and that in between these two there could be a lull of several
months. Still, because the argument between the proponents of the two options
ended by the Suez supporters having the upper hand, the option of breaking
through to Eilat was not thoroughly explored militarily. This matter is only
now under examination and I still do not have the Army’s final word in this
respect; but I do foresee here a very serious problem, not at all as simple as
it looked time and again in hasty discussions held around this table. As I
said, the Eilat operation is now being examined and when conclusions are
reached I will present them here. Meanwhile, we are planning other possibilities,
untried yet, of moving cargoes through the Suez Canal.
Indeed, I cannot say
that the government has already decided to carry out a breakthrough to Eilat,
but I would say that at present I am favoring this action even if it requires
the use of force. No opposition was heard in the government against the taking
of such a step, but this does not mean that I am prepared to carry it out
tomorrow. Politically I am all for it, but what is the meaning of
"politically"? I am not in favor of a war erupting between us and
Egypt. I am in favor of a certain operation even it involves the use of force,
but if it turns out that this operation may lead to war, I would then
reconsider the matter anew. There is also the question of the efficacy of the
use of force if we aim at achieving a positive result. After all, our aim is
not hitting the Egyptians but getting our ship through to Eilat. The question
is: can this be militarily secured? This is the uppermost consideration.
Meanwhile, we are
looking for other possibilities of transporting cargoes through the Suez Canal,
not under Israeli flag. Some of these we have not tried yet, but they are very
vital for us. It is quite possible that the political setback of Egypt in the
Security Council regarding the “Bat-Galim” issue and her declarations that she
would not interfere with other aspects of free passage in the Canal will work
in favor of our possibilities. Here there are two plans. One is operating a
direct line from Israel to the Far East, which does not yet exist. At present,
when we want to transport a cargo to Burma, we move it to Antwerp and, from
there, we use another ship sailing to the Far East, and the same goes for
cargoes transported to us from the Far East. A similar problem exists in our
commerce with East Africa. Here ships are reluctant to transport cargoes
directly to Haifa through the Canal, fearing that they would be added to the
“black list” of the Arab boycott.[n]
NOTE: The Arab economic boycott, coordinated through an Arab
League office created in Damascus in 1951, not only prohibited Arab companies from
trading with the Jewish state but sought to punish “foreign companies and
institutions acting in support of the economy of Israel” by blacklisting them. Examples
of blacklisted companies and entertainers included Coca-Cola, Danny Kaye and
Frank Sinatra.
A plan is now being worked out of sending cargoes directly
from Haifa to Rangoon and Tokyo and back in ships which would not sail under
our flag. These ships would stop at East African ports too. In this way our
interests would be greatly enhanced. So far there has not been even one
instance of a ship sailing under non-Israeli flag directly from Haifa to the
far East through the Canal.
Another plan in this
sphere is transporting oil through the Canal in various camouflaged ways. This
plan especially is secret, and if it succeeds it could be developed further.
The first attempt
would be the sailing of a ship carrying cement produced in Israel, and more
than 100 jeeps, from Haifa to Rangoon. It will carry back to Haifa a cargo of
rice. There are favorable prospects of commerce with Japan and South Korea
which is now receiving huge American aid and is willing to purchase every other
item.
I will now move to a
different subject: We are now facing a new stage of the American plan of
organizing a Middle East defense system. At first it was assumed that it would
be possible to include at once all the Arab states in a defense plan either by
utilizing the mutual defense pact of the [League of] Arab States, which exists
at least on paper, or by conducting negotiations with the Arab states
[individually]. While the Americans favored the second option, the British
opted for the first.
However that plan has
not materialized, in part because of the unforeseen prolongation of the
Anglo-Egyptian negotiations regarding the Canal Zone evacuation. The Americans
agreed with Britain that as long as her dispute with Egypt is not settled,
Egypt would not be included in the defense organization, and would not be
granted American arms. Strong neutralist attitudes which appeared then in the
Arab world and the campaign we conducted mainly in the United States against
the arming of the Arab countries led the Americans reconsider the whole matter.
Thus, at a certain stage after Dulles’ visit to the Middle East [in spring
1953], they decided to give up the wholesale inclusion of the Arab states in
their defense plan, and to act instead in a gradual, piecemeal way, as well as
to work for it not from the center to the circumference but in the opposite
direction. The idea was to advance outside the narrow framework of the Arab
countries which would involve a clash with Israel and with Arab neutralist
tendencies, and build a foundation for a defense organization in an area free
of neutralism and of clashes with Israel, and not get involved at all with
Egypt. This is how the initiative of connecting Turkey and Pakistan in a
defense pact, called The Northern Tier, was born with the aim of its being the
first defense line against a possible Soviet invasion in case of an eruption of
a world war.
It can be assumed that,
right in the beginning, when this defense line was established, its founders
planned that in the next stage Iraq would be co-opted to it as a buttressing
factor. Presumably, had it been possible, Iran, not Iraq, would have been the
preferred third party of the pact, but owing to the complicated internal
situation in Iran Iraq came first, and the initiative towards it had two
prongs: one was the American willingness to arm this state, the other was
Iraq’s entering into a mutual defense treaty with Turkey. This plan is being
implemented step by step. It seems that our public and diplomatic activity in
America has somewhat slowed it down, for there were already two American
consignments of military equipment to Iraq, but these two did not include arms.
However this military aid is not given to Iraq as a member of the defense pact.
The task of including Iraq in the pact was given over to Turkey, and indeed
Turkey has started negotiating with Iraq and Egypt regarding their joining the
defense treaty. As it turned out, Turkey was not as successful in her
approaches to Egypt as it was with Iraq. Menderes planned visits to both
Baghdad and Cairo, but he went only to Baghdad. Nuri al-Sa’id, the Iraqi
Premier, tried to get Egypt to agree to joining the pact. He failed and then
tried at least to gain her consent to his country’s joining it. According to
Iraqi sources he succeeded in his second attempt. It seems he was told by
Cairo: “OK, we cannot go along with you, we’ll need a year and a half to do
that.” It is said that, at their last meeting, Gamal Abd al-Nasser told Nuri
al-Sa’id that his country’s joining the pact was only a matter of time; it
could not do that before the evacuation of the British Army is completed; the
presence of British soldiers on his soil makes all the difference. As we have
gathered from Iraqi sources, Nasser supposedly added: “If you are in haste,
then go ahead, but I shall not.” He did not oppose the Iraqi step. But later on
the Iraqis said they were deceived by the Egyptians, for now Nasser was
following a contrary line by orchestrating a fierce campaign within the Arab
League against Iraq’s joining the pact.
I would like to say
something regarding Sa’id’s motives. When dealing with Sa’id, the British
praise him, saying he is a statesman holding a Western worldview. In fact it is
difficult to accept this without a grain of salt even though there is some
truth in that. First of all, Sa’id is faced with a Communist threat from within
and he feels a need to be buttressed against it from without. There is indeed
quite a strong Communist movement in Iraq. It was already there, as I remember,
when he escaped to Jerusalem during World War II, at the time of the [April
1941 Rashid Ali] al-Gaylani revolt [i.e., anti-British coup d’état].
He then sent a Kurdish minister to us in order to maintain contact. At the time
he thought that he was lost, that he was abandoned by the British, and hence he
looked for any possible support. I also well remember their ambassador in London
whom I met there in the days of the "Blitz", telling me how deeply
anxious he was because of the Iraqi young generation’s tendency to join the Communists.
He asked me if we too were facing the same phenomenon in Palestine and wanted
to know how we were grappling with it.[n]
NOTE: See, e.g., Moshe Sharett, Yoman Medini, vol. V
(1940-1942) (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1979 – in Hebrew), 235-27.
Sa’id is also worried
about his own position. At present he completely dominates the political arena
– he has shut down newspapers, invalidated the last general elections,
imprisoned several opposition leaders – but he needs support, economic support,
military support, and he just cannot disregard any proposal of a possible
financial help, even minimal one, or disregard possible Turkish help. I will
not deny the possibility of his thinking that it would also benefit Iraq if it
can be safeguarded against Syria by accepting American help. This does not mean
that he decided that Iraq should fight side by side with the Americans; he can
avoid such fighting in the future, but meanwhile he is benefitted. He can also
present Iraq’s integration into the defense pact and its receiving military aid
as an important step in the war against Israel and thereby win Arab public
opinion.
I assume members of
this committee remember that in the joint communiqué of Turkey and Iraq it was
said that the two governments had agreed on the signing of a mutual defense
pact, and that the internal stability of the Middle East should be based on the
principles on the UN Charter and on the decisions of the UN based on these
principles. We, in our talks with the Turks, the Americans and the British,
claimed that this reliance on the UN decisions means the dismantling of Israel
in accordance with the UN 1947 [partition] decision; it means the exploding of
Israel from within by the introducing into it of tens of thousands refugees and
its decapitation by the internationalizing of Jerusalem according to the UN
decision of 1949.
In our talks with the
Turks about the proposed pact with Iraq we claimed that it would lead to a
further arming of [Iraq], thereby endangering Israel's security. We pointed to
potential anti-Israeli elements in the text of the proposed pact and also
warned them that they were entering into an alliance with an untrustworthy
partner. We asked them whether this pact did not undermine
Turkish-Israeli friendship and whether it was not in contradiction with past
Turkish promises to us that no Turkish-Iraqi friendship would be detrimental to
Israel.
In his talk with
Maurice Fischer, our Minister in Ankara, Menderes said: “By guaranteeing to
Iraq, in the proposed pact, that if it is attacked we would come to her aid, we
thereby secure Iraq’s inability to be an aggressor, for if she attacks first,
we would be freed from our obligations towards her.” Fischer retorted that this
was only a deduced interpretation, and Menderes admitted it was so, but said
that this deduction is very clear.
In a public reception
in Rome held for Menderes, he took aside our Minister Eliyahu Sasson and
referred to my speech in the Knesset in which I said that the basing of the
Turkish-Iraqi pact on UN decisions meant, as far as Israel was concerned, its
breakup, imploding and decapitation. Menderes expressed his sorrow at my
interpretation of the pact’s text. The Turks, he said, have never had such
intentions, and then asked Sasson to keep their talk secret.
We have outlined our
policy as follows. Generally, we should not avoid a disagreement with Turkey,
but we do no want to quarrel with her. We shall gain nothing from a quarrel,
but we can gain something from an argument. We shall not be able to prevent the
signing of the pact; true, if there were chances to achieve this, we would have
done everything towards this end.
From the point of
view of our security, the undermining of the Arab League is not of much
importance. First of all, the League is not a solid body; it is quite a flimsy
one. Precisely because it is not a rigid organization, it does not fall apart
in the face of shocks. What we are saying to America and Britain, as well as to
Turkey, is that the root of Arab animosity towards us is not to be found in the
League; it is in Arab consciousness. The League is only expressing it
vehemently, but this animosity would continue even if the League disappears.
Thus the arming of each Arab state separately is no less dangerous than arming
all of them within the League’s or any other framework.
As to the
Turkish-Iraqi pact, we are demanding first that in its preamble its two parties
should state their obligation to refrain from aggression. We do not say what we
are demanding this from Iraq; we say what we are demanding it from Turkey. An
obligation to refrain from aggression is a regular item in such treaties; you
find it the Balkan Security Pact of which Turkey is a member. Second, we are
demanding that the preamble should not state “to avoid internal aggression,”
but rather that the parties oppose aggression whatever its source. Third, we
are demanding the striking out from the pact any reference to UN decisions.
We have some
knowledge of the draft of the pact as proposed by Turkey. We know that there is
no obligation there regarding non-aggression. It is said more superficially
that the two states strive for a state of security and peace in the region. The
Turkish draft mentions the UN Charter; it does not mention any UN decision. On
this subject, Menderes has fulfilled his promises to us quite completely.
Still, what we have is the draft. We have no idea about the Iraqi draft.
At the same time we
are strongly demanding that the Americans intervene in this matter. We say:
“It’s your responsibility; the pact is your baby, it’s a result of your policy,
and it is only increasing Israel’s isolation and aggravating the dangers with
which she is faced both politically and militarily.
American policy aims
at joining Syria and Lebanon first, and Egypt later, to the pact. The Americans
regard Egypt as the strongest concentration of neutralism within the Arab
world. They thus want to isolate Egypt and thereby prove to her that it does
not pay to remain outside. As for Britain, in view of her treaty with Egypt, it
seems that her interest is to have her join the pact first, but she would not
start a fight with America over this issue. America is now trying her hand with
Syria, while obviously one on the aims of Eden’s visit to Egypt is to have her
join the pact.
Egypt is, for the
time being, strongly refusing to join the Western pact, and accordingly she is
enlisting other Arab states to side with her. In Syria there are conflicting
tendencies over this issue. It seems that in Lebanon the faction favoring
joining would have the upper hand, but I wonder if she would take such a step
before Syria does. At the same time, it is possible that Iraq’s becoming the
leading Arab state at the expense of Egypt would whet her appetite to swallow
up Syria, and thus Lebanon could find herself joining the treaty with Turkey as
a bulwark guaranteeing her borders against Syrian designs.
I would like to add
in this context that both we and France are aware of the possibility of Iraq’s
reviving the dream of the “Fertile Crescent,” and consequently we told the
Americans, British and Turks that if such a plan is implemented, we would
consider ourselves free from being bound by the Armistice Agreements. We have
an Armistice Agreement with Syria, as it is; we have no armistice agreement
with Iraq. If Iraq and Syria become united, a totally different situation is
created.
Our pressure on the
United States is expressed in our warnings that all these possible alignments
are fraught with danger to us. We are being left out of any regional
arrangements. Our security is threatened by the arming of the Arab states, etc.
Secretary of State Dulles keeps telling us that he is aware of this problem. He
told us that the American government would propose some guarantees. Clearly,
the Americans find themselves between the hammer and the anvil. On the one
hand, they are bound by their international interests [to contain the Soviet
Union] and thus fear that any pro-Israeli step they take would undermine their
present Middle East policy. On the other hand, they feel the pressure we
constantly bring to bear through American Jewish and non-Jewish public opinion,
and through the appeals to the Administration by members of the two Houses [of
Congress] in Washington.
Our pressure is
unrelenting. There are those who say that certainly, after the pact is signed,
America would propose something to us. But what? It may be a security guarantee.
This is no small matter, but it can also be dangerous, for it may serve as
cover for unlimited arming of the Arabs. When we say to the Americans: “You are
arming the Arabs one-sidedly, leaving us out, and thereby you are increasing
the danger we are facing,” they tell us that they have already promised us to
come to our help if we are attacked: “If Iraq receives American jets, you don’t
have to worry, because our jets would protect you.” To this we say that we are
first and foremost relying on ourselves, while vigorously demanding that they
fulfill their obligation to the principle of military balance as stated in the
Tripartite Declaration.
Obviously, after the
Turkish-Iraqi pact is signed, we shall mount a new wave of demands and
criticisms vis-à-vis the United States government in view of its abandonment of
Israel. If some of our suggested amendments to the draft of the pact are
accepted, our attack would be lessened but nevertheless, we shall point to the
one-sidedness of the whole process which puts Israel in an indefensible
position.
In Ambassador Elath’s
last meeting with Eden, Eden explained that they had to clinch the
Turkish-Iraqi pact and that an effort had to be made to include Egypt in it. He
said the time would come when negotiations could be conducted with Israel;
meanwhile we could rely on the fact that they are our friends, and as such they
would not abandon us. In their opinion, our position would not be worsened as a
result of Turkey’s and Britain’s involvement in the region’s defense. He also
said that they would maintain a balanced supply of arms. Elath reminded him
that they had already sold Centurion tanks and planes to Egypt while our
proposal to purchase Centurions has not yet been approved. Eden promised him
that they would do that.
There were two
meetings with Nehru. One of the reasons was to thank him for his intervention
on behalf of the [Egyptian Jews] condemned [to death and other sentences for
espionage] in Egypt. In this case he had acted swiftly. On the very day of his
arrival in London I cabled to Elath and instructed him to try enlisting Nehru.
Nehru was not to be found, and so Elath contacted his sister, who called him up
late that night and he then immediately cabled his Ambassador in Cairo. To no
avail. After the hanging[s] Nehru expressed his sorrow and said that Nasser had
probably succumbed to internal pressures. He was asked to talk with Nasser
[with an appeal] to ameliorating the situation of those who were not sentenced
to death. He very much praised Nasser and generally spoke against involving the
Middle East in Western defense schemes.
At this point Prime Minister Sharett was asked for
information regarding the four IDF soldiers detained by the Syrians.
This subject is top
secret and every word I shall say now must remain within the walls of this
room. The Syrians said that although, in their opinion, the soldiers could be
put on trial according to the Geneva Convention, they would not do so. They
inquired how many Syrians were in our hands and proposed a prisoner exchange.
It turned out that among the Syrians who are in our hands there are three
deserters, one of whom converted to Judaism and married a Jewess. We said we
were willing to bring the deserters over to the border and there, in the
presence of UN observers, they would declare whether they wished to cross over
into Syria or remain in Israel. There are also three Syrian civilians in our
hands, two infiltrators and one suspected of spying. We said we were willing to
release these three. Meanwhile, we have detained a few Syrian fishermen whose
boat was captured by us, and the Syrians are demanding their return as well.
Burns is now dealing with the additional fishermen’s problem and while I am not
in a position to declare that the soldiers would be released, it seems that
things are heading in this direction.
At this point a general discussion ensued in which several
members of the committee participated. Sharett replied as follows:
The subject of the
worth of an American security guarantee to Israel was raised in the discussion.
I am not convinced that the idea of such a guarantee is worthless. We have
never given up our demand for arms, but if a security guarantee accompanies our
arming, I would regard it as important. Anyway, we cannot hold the rope by both
ends at once – we cannot claim that any security guarantee given to an Arab
state means a change of the balance of forces to our detriment, and at the same
time claim that a guarantee given to us is insignificant. If a guarantee given
to us is insignificant, so is that given to the other side.
I was somewhat
astonished upon hearing the opinion here that we should endeavor to obtain a
joint Soviet-American security guarantee. The very appealing in this matter to
the Soviets would immediately undermine any serious negotiations between us and
the United States. There can be no other result. I think it is about time that
we see clearly our position in the international arena: on which power are we
more dependent, and on which less dependent? Who is able to extend more help to
Israel, and who less? Who can do us more harm, and who less? Here, as far as we
are concerned, there is a huge difference between the United States and the
Soviet Union on three accounts: (a) The actual ability of each of these two powers
to control events; (b) The ability of each to extend to us economic
aid which we need as we need air to breathe; (c) The position of the largest
Jewish [diaspora] community and our obligation to support it. All these criteria
favor the United States. Had these facts been different, perhaps we would have
reached different conclusions, but they are not. It is not we who created this
reality; it is a result of historical developments, and we cannot avoid taking
it into consideration when dealing with our international relations. Of course,
within this framework there is a certain freedom of maneuvering. We did
establish relations with Soviet bloc states. We sent a mission to communist
China, and perhaps one day we would establish diplomatic relations with her.
While nobody know
what would happen if a world war erupts, I believe, as one member said here,
that then no pact would be of any use. Indeed, this is what we are saying to
the Americans. But a statesman, if he is realist, cannot ignore facts which are
meanwhile being created as a result of this or that pact. The very process of
preparing for a world war – even if it is, in itself, mistaken – has been
creating political and military facts. Consequently, a question arises: Is
America’s friendship important or unimportant to us? Can we be indifferent to
America and to the fact that her friendship with the Arabs is expressed in
pacts? Is it not in our interest to endeavor to obtain something similar with
her? This is a most serious matter for Israel’s foreign policy. Our interest in
joining a security pact is not for its own sake, not for becoming a participant
in a world war which we abhor, but for the purpose of buttressing ourselves
against dangers which can arise within our region. Our interest is to tie the
hands of the Arab states joining a regional security pact so that they commit
themselves to refrain from aggressive acts against us. Our interest is to
oblige America to grant us arms, and we should endeavor to attain these arms,
inasmuch as possible, in conditions favorable to us. This is the very essence
of our foreign policy.
A question was raised
here regarding France’s position towards the Turkish-Iraqi pact. Well, we are
talking with the French openly and straightforwardly. We say: “You are claiming
you are against this pact. What does this mean in concrete terms? Is this just
an academic position uttered for self-satisfaction, or are you envisaging a
real possibility of undermining it? If so, we would join you to the very end.
However, we do not know what your relations with Turkey are, and what your
political line is. We know very well where our relations with Turkey stand. For
us they carry great importance, for they were the first to have extricated us
from absolute isolation in the Middle East. This is not a simple matter. The
Turks are talking with us in Ankara, Rome and Paris. When did they talk like
this with representatives of the Jewish people? This was not attained easily. I
have earlier pointed out that they refrained from including a sentence about
the UN resolutions in the draft of their pact with Iraq. So if we enter into an
adventurous operation with France against the Turkish-Iraqi pact, we can lose
something, we can completely burn our relations with Turkey. France can somehow
overcome such an eventuality, but I do not know if she would compensate us for
our losses in Turkey – would she purchase our exports to Turkey? Can France be
a substitute for Turkey in the Middle East for us?
