Lawson's report, sent January 2, 1956, includes the following remarks:
[- - -] the Foreign Minister [- - -] dwelt at length and with some emphasis on the serious position in which
Israel finds itself with regard to its inability to in any way meet the strong
air superiority of Egypt. It seemed obvious to me that not only Sharett but the
GOI [Government of Israel] are finding this insoluble problem a highly
disturbing factor in the determination of Israel’s foreign policy. From other
sources we have heard that this problem has created an attitude approaching
panic in some quarters and that Ben Gurion is getting extremely nervous and
upset over it. Although Sharett led up to the subject casually it undoubtedly
was the principal theme of his discussion with me. [- - -] [H]e introduced the
subject of the twelve Mystere IV planes on order with the French and delivery
of which had been temporarily delayed. He spent considerable time emphasizing
the importance of receiving even this small number of planes [- - -]. Sharett
explained to me that Israel could not hope to match Egypt quantitatively in
planes [- - -]. But, Israel must have units of the same quality, making up for
quantitative disparity to some extent by greater courage and technical ability
of the Israeli pilots. Sharett was very hopeful something might be done to
expedite delivery of these planes, and he made ]the[ point ]that[ Israel had
never used planes of any kind in any act of retaliation. [- - -] I believe that
Sharett appreciates that no positive action of this kind can be taken until
after the Security Council resolution on the Kinneret raid of December 11 has
been debated. And he knows that the related subject of US policy with regard to
Israel’s arms request must also be considered. However, I feel that he believes
that the GOI has made a sober reappraisal of the Kinneret action, that it is
unlikely similar action will be taken under similar conditions in the future, and
in the future broader political sources will be consulted as well as the usual
military sources. Although Sharett did not condemn his government for the
Kinneret action it seemed obvious to me that he regarded it as a severe blunder
and one which has brought about among Israeli leaders some serious second
thoughts which should be effective in producing a much more cautious
policy.
SOURCE: FRUS 1955-1957, XV, doc.2.
