The
Government of Israel has always upheld the necessity of a settlement with the
neighboring Arab States.
2. It notes that the Secretary of State, in his
Aide-Mémoire of November 21, advocates an "approach which involves
concessions by Arab states as well as Israel". While the Israel Government
believes that the legitimate interests of Israel and the Arab States are
reconcilable as they stand, it holds that if concessions are to be made they must
be based on equality and reciprocity. The Aide-Mémoire of November 21, however,
discusses a territorial concession by Israel, without indicating the need for
any specific territorial concession to be made by any Arab State.
3. If the Arab States prevent violence from
their side of the demarcation line, Israel will maintain complete calm on its
side. Israel's policy is, also, to avoid reaction to provocation, except when
such abstention imperils the security of its population or the integrity of its
territory. The assistance of the United States would be welcomed in securing
the cessation of "commando" raids and other violent actions now being
carried out against Israel on various fronts, principally on Egypt's
responsibility.
4. Israel's only intentions in the Gulf of Aqaba
are those of free passage in conformity with its elementary rights under
international law. If Egypt does not use force to impede passage in the Gulf,
there is no reason to anticipate the use of force by Israel to ensure it.
Moreover, if negotiations with Egypt prove feasible, Israel will abstain from
any action in the Gulf likely to prejudice them.
5. The Government of Israel was interested to
hear the view expressed by the Secretary of State on November 21, that there is
now a chance of a settlement. Unfortunately, this impression is not borne out
by the current acts and statements of Arab Governments. Encroachments continue
into Israel, on the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian fronts. There is still no
certainty of Arab acceptance of Ambassador Johnston's plan, which may well
serve as a test of Arab sincerity. Arms from Soviet sources continue to flow
into Egypt. In these circumstances, it is likely that the Egyptian regime is
merely attempting to give an illusory impression of peaceful intent, in order
to gain time for strengthening its forces in preparation for intimidation or
aggression when the time is ripe. At any rate, the Government of Israel is
unaware of any concrete evidence which would disprove this analysis of Egyptian
intentions.
6. Nevertheless, in order to assist the
Secretary in his exploration, the Government of Israel submits its confidential
views on the contribution which Israel might make in the context of a peace
settlement. The settlement to which Israel aspires is one which would benefit
both parties, by inaugurating an era of development and social progress; by
enabling a reduction of defence expenditures; and by initiating processes of
political, economic and cultural cooperation. Israel does not advance a claim to
any of the territory held by Arab States under the General Armistice
Agreements. On the other hand, Israel sees no reason for ceding any of its
territory to any of the neighboring Arab States, and cannot see its way to
discussing a settlement on such a prejudicial basis.
7. The following is the general outline of a
settlement which Israel would envisage:
(i) The Government
of Israel is ready to authorize a meeting at any appropriate level between its
representatives and those of the Government of Egypt, to discuss progress
towards a settlement, it being clearly understood that the basis for such a
meeting would not include the cession of any part of Israel[‘s] territory to a
neighboring state.
(ii) Israel is
prepared to discuss mutual adjustments of the armistice frontier for the
benefit of both parties, on the understanding that the integrity and continuity
of Israel's territory is not impaired.
(iii) Israel would
be willing, in the context of a peace settlement, to contribute substantially
to the opening of freer communications between all the States of the Near East,
so as to enhance the economic strength and commercial enterprise of the region,
and promote political and cultural understanding. These measures, which would
in each case be effected without change of the existing territorial
jurisdiction. might include on Israel's part:
(a) Provision for communication by air and
railway between Egypt and Lebanon;
(b) Port facilities in Haifa for the Kingdom of
Jordan, including transit rights by road to and from the Port;
(c) A transit arrangement to be agreed to by
Israel for communication between Egypt and the Kingdom of Jordan, it being
clearly understood that Israel will not cede territory, whether populated or
unpopulated, in the Negev.
(iv) The Government
of Israel recalls that it had already conveyed its affirmative attitude,
subject to certain reservations, to the proposal on refugee compensation
contained in Secretary Dulles' speech of August 26, 1955.
(v) The United
States is also aware of Israel's readiness to cooperate in an agreed plan for
the coordinated use of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers, as elaborated by
Ambassador Johnston. The Government of Israel would welcome information on the
attitude of the Arab Governments to this project.
8. The subjects proposed above for discussion
and action represent a significant contribution by Israel to the establishment
of peace with the Arab States. These States would, of course, have to make a
corresponding contribution in order to ensure fair conditions for a peaceful
settlement on the basis of mutuality. Thus, freedom of transit for Arab traffic
between Egypt and Lebanon would entail corresponding freedom for Israeli
traffic northwards over Lebanon and southward over Egypt. Similarly, if the Kingdom
of Jordan is to have free access to and from Haifa and port facilities therein,
it should agree to restore free access to the Wailing Wall, the Mount of Olives
and Mount Scopus. Similarly, there should be a broad element of mutuality in
any territorial adjustments agreed upon in accordance with Paragraph 2. Egypt
should abstain from blockades and practices of maritime interception. Indeed,
this duty is incumbent upon her under the Armistice Agreement, whether or not a
settlement is achieved. In the context of a settlement such as that discussed
here, all Governments should undertake to abstain from pressure and
intimidation against governments or agencies wishing to trade with any state in
the Middle East.
9. In discussing the prospect of a peaceful settlement,
the Government of Israel cannot ignore the prejudicial effects of the
increasing preponderance of the Arab States, and especially of Egypt, in armed
strength. Unless prompt steps are taken to reduce this perilous disparity, by
providing Israel with additional arms for self-defence, such as would be
matched in quality and effectiveness to the arms now obtained in Egypt, there
will be an inevitable aggravation of Arab intransigeance and of Israel's
apprehensions. In such circumstances the Israel Government finds it difficult
to conceive any hopeful discussion of progress towards peace.
Source:
FRUS 1955-1957 XIV, doc.436.
