Washington, November 21, 1955, 11 a.m.
SUBJECT
Israel-Arab Settlement
PARTICIPANTS
Department
·
The Secretary
·
The Under Secretary
·
Mr. Allen
·
Mr. Russell
Israel Government
·
Foreign
Minister Sharett
·
Ambassador Eban
The Secretary opened the discussion by saying that although
he realized Mr. Sharett had requested an appointment in order to make
a courtesy call, he wished to take advantage of the occasion to speak of a
matter of the greatest importance. The Secretary said he believes there is a
possibility of moving toward a settlement along the lines of his August 26th
speech. Two things are necessary, however, if further progress is to be made.
First, there must be self-control and restraint on both sides so that there
will not be a build up to an explosive border situation. There must not be any
effort to compel a settlement of specific issues by force, in the Gulf of Aqaba
for instance. Secondly, the Israel Government must be prepared to make some
concession in the Negev which would make possible an area of contact between
Egypt and the other Arab states. Such an area would not necessarily be large
nor of great value. And the compensation to Israel from effecting a settlement
would outweigh any loss of territory. The position of rigidly standing on the
present armistice lines is not tenable. If there is to be a settlement, a lot
of people will have to make contributions. The United States has indicated the
contributions that it is prepared to make. The Arabs will have to retreat some
from their position. So will the Israel Government. The Secretary said that he
can understand that the Israel Government would not want the Arabs to know what
concessions it would be prepared to make for a settlement until negotiations
were well underway. But we must know that there is flexibility if we are going
to be in a position to push things along. The Secretary said he could assure
Mr. Sharett that we are presenting our views on the other side as
well although Mr. Sharett, of course, only sees one side of it. There are indications, the Secretary said,
that Egypt is worried about the long-term consequences of its action in making
a deal with the Soviet Bloc and that it is beginning to have second thoughts.
The Secretary handed an aide-mémoire [WebDoc #67] to Mr. Sharett. Mr. Sharett said that with respect to the first
point, the necessity of maintaining calm along the borders, there had recently
been a series of provocations along the Jordan border. Israel had made no
reaction up to the present time and Mr. Sharett said he hoped it could
continue to refrain from taking action, but he had to say there was a
possibility that things would burst out of bounds.
Of graver concern was the Secretary’s second point, Mr. Sharett said.
The Secretary had mentioned several times the need for concessions from both
sides. But the Arabs are only asked to give up things they talk about, not
anything they possess. Israel, however, is expected to give up territory it
already possesses. If Egypt is to be given contiguity with Jordan, it can be
done only in one of two ways: (1) by giving up the port of Elat and shrinking northwards;
or, (2) by cutting a belt of land out of the Negev, in other words by cutting
Israel in two. This is not fair and the Israel Government should not be asked
to do it. The contiguity which Egypt now seeks never existed before. The
present situation existed under the British Mandate. There is nothing vital in
that contiguity. There are no roads that go through that part of the country,
no railroads, and no traffic. There is nothing that would start moving through
it. It is only a national slogan and for that Israel is expected to cut itself
in two.
The Secretary said he wished to emphasize that we are
talking about something of the greatest seriousness, namely, the threat to
Israel and the grave threat of the relation of the Middle East to the free world
as a whole. The West has great stakes in the Middle East. Israel is one of
them. The United States does not intend to allow any of its other extremely
important stakes in the area to threaten the existence of Israel. By the same
token, we do not think that in the present international situation the Israel
Government should allow the contribution which it can make to a settlement and
which would not violate Israel’s vital interests, to stand in the way of a
settlement. The extent and nature of the contribution should and must be a
matter for discussion and development. But the Israel Government should not
take the position of saying that it will not consider a solution that might be
worked out.
Mr. Sharett said that Israel, by its geographic
position, is the hub of the area and this imposes an obligation on it to be a
good neighbor which it intends to be if the Arab states would only be good neighbors. Israel has offered to provide
communication facilities for the Arabs across Israel territory, following a
settlement, but giving up its sovereignty over present Israel territory to meet
a whim of Nasir’s is another matter. Who can tell what Nasir would then go on to
request? It would be the beginning of a slippery slope.
The Secretary said we are not talking about a whim. We are
talking about the continued existence of Israel. All we are asking is for the
Israel Government to tell us what it would be prepared to do. That would not be
the beginning of a slippery slope. The Secretary said that he had a rule in
dealing with the Soviet group not to agree to a change in his position in
reliance upon Soviet promises. That is a rather good rule to follow in most
international negotiations. He does not expect to give up something of value in
advance of getting an adequate return. He is not naive and recognizes that
there are many risks in this situation and that there could be some duplicity.
But we do believe that, as a result of a combination of pressures and
inducement, there is a chance for a settlement, whether 50–50 or 1 in 10, no
one could say. It cannot, however, be explored without knowing what Israel’s
position is going to be. If Israel says no then the possibility of a settlement
is off and we shall all have to face the consequences. We believe that there is
an appreciable chance for a settlement. It would give Israel peace. It would
reverse the process of Soviet penetration in the Middle East. The Secretary
said that he did not make this statement lightly. He was not engaging in mere
wishful thinking. But any further attempt towards a settlement has to be based
upon our knowledge that Israel will cooperate. We have not advanced far enough
so that we are asking Israel to state its willingness to make concessions
publicly but we must know whether Israel would be willing to make concessions
or not. If “no” is the last word, then Israel is putting us all in great peril.
If we have to make a choice of sticking to Israel in the face of all that the
Middle East is to the safety and continued existence of the free world, Israel
will be forcing us to make a very grave choice. If the present opportunities
for a settlement are to be seized, it will be necessary for us to have Israel’s
position in the next few days. We can not go any further in developing the
possibilities of a settlement with the Arabs until we know Israel’s position.
Mr. Sharett said that he saw no certainty that
Egypt, if it knew Israel would agree to a settlement, would itself agree. There
was no certainty, if Israel agreed, that such a concession would close the
breach in the wall against Soviet penetration in the area. Israel leaders sat
with Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax at the beginning of World War II and
heard them say that the clouds were gathering, that the Allies must gather the
Arabs to them, and that on those grounds they were forced to repudiate the 1939
White Paper.War broke out but the Arabs did not rally to the Allies.
The only thing that brought the Arabs to the Allied side was the Allied victory.
Mr. Sharett said that he did not dispute the purity of the
Secretary’s intentions but it is results and not intentions that count. He said
he did not see Israel capable of making the concession that the Secretary
asked.
The Secretary said that in Korea and Formosa there were
governments, faced by Communist mass power, that felt the only way out was in
world war, wherever the U.S. would defeat their enemies. He said he assumed
that Israel would not want to get into that situation vis-á-vis the Arabs, that
it would not want to go down a road where there would be no solution short of
general war. The Secretary said he was against peace at any price as much as
anyone but that one cannot be blind to the fact that the scales are more
heavily weighted against war than at any time in history. The sacrifices that
are called for to save peace are greater. No one is suggesting that Israel do
anything that would cripple it. But it is necessary for us to know whether
there is flexibility in Israel’s immediate answer and he hoped that he would
not give him a negative answer. The consequences to everyone concerned would be
most serious.
The Secretary said he wished to say that the views of the
United States and the United Kingdom are very close. He had not
seen Eden’s speech until a few hours before it was given. He would not
have put things in just the way that Eden did but he did not want
Mr. Sharett to think that there is any sharp divergence that could be
exploited to advantage. Mr.Sharett said that it was not a question of
exploiting a difference, it was a question of whether the United States
concurred in Eden’s idea of a compromise. The Secretary said that we are
not engaged in an intellectual dialectic. We are faced with a very practical
situation and that it was a matter of importance for him to know whether, to
make possible a settlement that could be of infinite value to Israel, Israel
would be willing to give up something of comparatively little value.
Mr. Sharett said that if it was a question of give and take, of
exchanging territory on a small scale on the principle of mutuality, it could
be discussed but that Israel could not give up vital points, such as Elat, nor
could it agree to something that would result in cutting Israel in two.
The Secretary said that he would like to have the Israel
Government’s answer in writing. Mr. Sharett said that it would take
two or three days.
SOURCE: FRUS 1955-1957, doc.421.
