In the opinion of the
United States Government a settlement of the principal issues of the
Israel-Arab dispute is essential if Israel is in the long run to survive. This
has become more urgent in view of the apparent intention of the Soviet
Government now to seek for its own purposes to implement Arab hostility to
Israel.
The United States
Government believes that a settlement may be possible if the Governments
concerned accept the approach outlined by Secretary Dulles in his August 26th speech, an approach which
involves concessions by Arab States as well as by Israel.
It is, however, in our
opinion, of the utmost importance that the Governments concerned do everything
in their power to maintain calm along the armistice lines, even in the face of
provocations. They should cooperate to the fullest with General Burns. Israel,
for example, would not seek to compel the settlement of specific issues by
force, such as the right of transit in the Gulf of Aqaba.
We believe that it should
be recognized that the territorial adjustments referred to in Secretary Dulles’ August
26th speech may have to include concessions in the Negev to provide an Arab
area joining Egypt with the rest of the Arab world. These concessions need not,
as we see it, involve loss of any appreciably populated land or land of any
substantial economic value.
The settlement, outlined by
Secretary Dulles’ August 26th speech, would, as there indicated,
involve very considerable contributions, both political and economic, by the
United States. We believe, however, that it is indispensable that the
Governments directly concerned should also be prepared to make contributions.
The positive value to Israel of such a settlement, in terms of a prosperous and
viable existence, would be incomparably greater than what it is suggested might
be required of Israel to procure that settlement.
If the Government
of Israel is in accord with the foregoing, it would greatly encourage the
United States in its effort to seek a settlement using fully to that end the
peaceful influences of which it disposes, and which we believe are not
inconsiderable.
SOURCE: FRUS 1955-1957, doc.424
