1. At Mr SHARETT’s
suggestion we convened again at his home at 2030 hours. Mr SHARETT opened the
conversation by stating that he and the Prime Minister had met with
HAMMARSKJOLD and discussed a variety of problems, most of which concerned
questions not directly related to my mission.
2. He could report
that HAMMARSKJOLD had not obtained a cease-fire from NASR, SHARETT stated, but rather
an explanation of why NASR could not issue one. He described NASR’s arguments
as well known to the IG and regarded it ]sic[ as being without validity. Mr
SHARETT stated that NASR had attributed certain border conflicts to the
difference which existed in the employment ]sic. for deployment?[ of troops by
the Israeli and Egyptian Armies. [- - -] Mr SHARETT stated that the Egyptian
posts, which he described as “nervous and trigger-happy”, naturally began to
fire whenever the Israeli patrols appeared unexpectedly. According to Mr
SHARETT, NASR had informed HAMMARSKJOLD that he had once ordered a cease-fire
which the peculiarity of Israeli defense tactics had rendered unworkable. NASR
had therefore concluded that, given the existing situation, he could see no
other course but to leave the border problems to General BURNS.
[- - -]
7. Mr BEN-GURION
then proposed that I ask NASR to “make an experiment” by issuing a strict order
for a cease-fire and by observing the results for one week. He argued that this
would resolve the incidents there.
8. In view of
HAMMARSKJOLD’s failure, Mr SHARETT stated, it would be most important if I
could obtain a cease-fire from NASR. [- - -]
15. Referring
again to my impending return to Cairo, I told Mr BEN-GURION that I believed it
important for all of us to approach the problem by thinking of those things
capable of execution and indicative of the climate we wish to create. Since
their views of this basic problem would be helpful to me, I suggested that they
might have proposals of a positive nature which I might adopt as my own. I
reiterated that I fully realized the importance of time and that I also was
aware that one does not desire to lay all the cards on the table at the time in
achieving positions and making serious decisions. I requested BEN-GURION and
SHARETT to give me constructive ideas which would advance the purpose of our
meeting. I acknowledged that they might prefer that I keep certain
recommendations in confidence, which I would do, but that I would prefer to be
able to make use of them with NASR.
16. Mr SHARETT
asked me to describe the nature of the contributions which the IG might make. I
replied that thoughts as submitted on the “mobile troops”, suggestions for
minimizing propaganda and enlarging the policy of readmitting Arabs to their
families were all constructive and important in the progressive development of
a favorable climate.
17. Mr SHARETT did
not commit himself directly, saying instead that should the parties meet and
“get down to brass tacks”, many suggestions would arise spontaneously in order
to convince the other party. He took the occasion to observe that when I saw
NASR I should not state “it is the IG’s desire” but “it is the IG’s firm
belief” that a satisfactory and beneficial solution is possible.
[- - -]
19. Mr SHARETT
proposed that I meet him for one-half hour the next day in order that he might
explain the “past history” of Israel’s limited contacts with the Egyptians. [-
- -]
SOURCE: Meeting with Israeli Officials: 24 January 1956 [Evening], USNA
NEA Lot File 59D582 Box34. Cf.
Ben-Gurion, My Talks with Arab Leaders,
287-90 (incorrectly introduced as a “morning” meeting).
