At Prime Minister’s request I met with him and Foreign
Minister yesterday for an hour. Difficult to assess reason for this high-level
meeting but believe it primarily to make strong and impassioned plea for US
favorable and quick action on arms request and Mystere order as soon as
Security Council debate concluded. Significant elements of Ben-Gurion’s comment
and approach to subject as follows: he obviously deeply concerned over Israel’s
indefensible position especially against Egypt’s jet air power. He spoke with
fire and emotion and with obvious effort to impress with his seriousness and
alarm. Said Egypt has presently tremendous air advantage with MIGs and jet
bombers which could destroy Israel’s cities, settlements and waterworks without
which Israel ruined. He spent some time on performance features of Egyptian
jets and said they could drop their loads and return to Egypt before Israel
could spread alarm. Israel needed something to fight with not same quantity but
same quality. Even if Israel received Mysteres and F-86’s now it would be at
serious disadvantage in pilot training.
I scouted idea Nasser would [not?] start air attack
without being prepared for large-scale balanced military operation unless he
felt forced into such action before prepared. But Ben-Gurion thought Nasser
would strike at any time using foreign pilots if necessary.
He described at some length his feeling about Nasser’s
intention. Visitors from Egypt had told him Nasser spoke of wanting peace but
did not act in that spirit; Nasser’s technique danger to world peace; at
Ben-Gurion’s request General Burns endeavored but unable to obtain Nasser’s
agreement to abide by GAA or at least order ceasefire; Egypt’s action against
Israel stepped up over past two or three years with 192 of total of 259 Israeli
casualties in 1955 being charged to Egypt whereas only 26 of 160 recorded 1953;
Nasser ambitious become great leader of Arab States and African Continent
therefore thinks it better for his objective if he defeats Israel; desires link
across Negev with Jordan as part of leadership drive; Nasser back of trouble in
Jordan and is subversively active in Iraq ail to disadvantage of West.
He said Nasser had two possibilities: either attack
Israel or build up military potential to give him strength to dictate, Israel
would never accept dictation from Nasser; there can only be peace between
equals; some people think Eden’s speech encourages Nasser to believe he can
dictate from strength of arms. Nasser knows Israel will not attack him as it
did not do so or even consider possibilities when he was weak, having his
troubles with British and with other Arab States. But now with Nasser receiving
arms and Israel confronted with arms embargo and even France not meeting its
contract “Israel in mortal danger.” He feels keenly what he called “sanctions”
in form of arms embargo while Egypt receives arms from both Soviets and UK.
He then said “if balance of arms is not restored (in
terms of quality of arms not quantity) then we in desperate danger. Can
citizens of this little country not live in peace and security? I ask you in
ail frankness what would be reaction of governments of US and UK and France to
danger and to attacks on their frontier people? All we want to do is bring in
our people, develop land and live”. United Nations has proven helpless with
Security Council resolutions ignored in particular Suez resolution unenforced,
Red Sea blockade in defiance of international law. “If we don’t get quality
arms in time it may be too late—there may be an explosion consequences of which
cannot be foreseen.
I then asked Ben-Gurion if he did not share our
conviction that answer to problem of war or no war lay in starting peace
negotiations—starting them before deadline is reached or before serious trouble
started. He agreed enthusiastically saying that what he favored all along and
said so publicly many times but Nasser will not agree to do so. He said he
would reply favorably to such proposal if called to do so “in middle of the
night”. He repeated much of what he said to Streibert when I asked if that
meant he would agree to discussions without any preconditions and not
necessarily require face to face talks with Nasser.
I expressed some doubt Nasser would attack although
superior in arms and asked Ben Gurion “if arms imbalance were to continue if in
his opinion war inevitable.” He replied “not necessarily inevitable but very
probable.” He then added ambiguously I thought, “you cannot expect even people
of small country to commit suicide.”
I then asked “how strong is your evidence Nasser will
strike when he prepared to use his few arms?” He said it clearly logical Nasser
would do so in view of his known techniques and intentions as already
described—he not spending all that money for nothing— Cairo Radio has said
Egypt will attack and defeat Israel and so has Syria. In reply to my question
as to when Nasser would be ready to strike Ben Gurion said within 6-8 months.
I replied it seemed to me illogical for Nasser to attack
Israel at early date as time working his favor, be needed more time to acquire
facility of use of his arms, his position in military potential outstripping
Israel [garble] and great monument of Nasser’s life—Aswan Dam—would be
threatened and would require all Egypt’s resources. These seemed to me to be
effective deterrents. He made no comment.
In effort to gain some impression as to whether there bad
been some fairly firm GOI thinking as to future action at Bnat Yaacov I pointed
out Israeli work at that point could start military action by Egypt before 6-8
months. I wondered what would happen if it became evident Nasser unwilling or
unable to bring about Arab States acceptance of Eric Johnston’s Jordan River
Plan—was it likely following sequence of events would occur in spring i.e.,
Israel would start digging. Syria would start shooting and Egypt would come to
support of Syria when fighting started. Neither Ben Gurion nor Sharett would
give any reply probably not wishing to be on record suggesting such possibility
and later being charged with being aggressors. They made no comment despite
fact GOI pretty well committed to start digging in circumstances.
Ben Gurion apparently realizes seriousness of error with
regard Tiberias raid and unfavorable effect on US Government attitude toward
GOI arms request. I felt he desired to create feeling of reassurance he will
not resort to such ill-considered and untimely acts in future. Although be made
no reference to event be took opportunity on at least three occasions to
underscore necessity for Israel to take into consideration “wider political
factors” of Arab-Israel problem and “Israel must not be indifferent to wider
interests of humanity and must not consider her relations with her neighbors
only but broader interests of humanity. He then remarked “we may have made
mistakes but we are all human” and asked when wider political factors
considered that elements of Israel’s position be taken into account. He said
Israel cast her lot with democracies as she is democracy. “Speaking frankly” he
said, “we have no better friends than US and I ask that US understand our
position.”
Comment: I did not at any time gain impression Ben Gurion
threatening action by Israel in event she received no arms and noted bow
carefully be avoided linking Israeli action with failure to receive arms. I
felt he making dramatic plea for understanding in a way regretting his hasty
ill-timed Tiberias raid action and implying in future he would be more cautious
and regardful of effect on US policy bath global and area-wise. I believe it
significant of his reaction to strong and widespread criticism heaped on him
since raid and his indefensible action in placing Sharett in his unfavorable
position by raid that he had Sharett present when he discussed these important
matters with me. However Ben Gurion most careful to keep control of
conversation and Sharett had little opportunity to comment except to discuss
Security Council resolution.
SOURCE: Lawson to State Department, January 10, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 XV: doc.13.
Cf. DFPI 11, doc.15.
