Dear Mr.
Secretary,
Your
prompt and friendly reply to my message was deeply appreciated. The terms of
your letter and of your oral explanations to Ambassador Eban have received our
most careful consideration.
My
Government was profoundly impressed by your statement to Mr. Eban that you
accept the principle of a security treaty with Israel and that the crux of your
program is to create conditions to make that possible. To Israel with its grave
security problem this comes as a most constructive and encouraging departure.
The
difficulties indicated by you as lying in the way of such an association
between the United States of America and Israel are well understood by us. Yet
on closer examination not only do they not appear insuperable but of themselves
would seem to constitute a reason for hastening its achievement.
Israel is
already faced with a series of developments within the region which have
seriously upset the balance to her detriment. I allude, first, to the
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which has resulted in a major access of military and
geo-political strength to Egypt whilst denying to Israel the benefit of its
protection; secondly, to the Military Aid Agreement between the United States
of America and Iraq, a country avowedly and violently hostile to Israel
occupying a pivotal position in the anti-Israel Arab front; and finally to
their Iraqi-Turkish pact sponsored by the United States of America now
impressively strengthened by Britain’s adherence, which again singles out
Israel for exclusion and which otherwise carries within it definite anti-Israel
implications. For all these far-reaching departures, adversely and cumulatively
affecting Israel’s security, no compensatory measure of assistance to Israel
has been offered. Israel was the first state in the Middle East to seek
American military aid. Its application, dated February 1952, has remained
unanswered.
Thus our
discussion proceeds against the background of a security situation thrown
markedly out of balance against Israel and aggravating the state of siege to
which she is anyhow subjected by her neighbours. This disequilibrium, which may
be only the beginning of a process, seems to us a compelling argument for an
immediate measure of redress in Israel’s favour.
The
obstacles you envisage to the conclusion of a security treaty with Israel are
twofold:
(a) The deviation it implies from the USA line of not
involving itself in intra-regional conflicts and concentrating solely on
anti-Communist defense;
(b) The probable reluctance of the USA Senate to sanction a
security commitment so long as the present unsettled situation within the
Middle East continues. Your conclusion is that substantial progress must be
achieved towards the settlement of major issues outstanding between us and the
Arab States before such a security treaty can be submitted for the Senate’s
approval.
On the
first count it seems to me that the handicaps today in the effective
organization of the Middle East for anti-Soviet defense are on the one hand the
inhibitions which prevent certain Arab States from adopting a pro-western
orientation; and on the other the ever smouldering Arab-Israel conflict
threatening to erupt into conflagration if the Arab States should come to
regard Israel as hopelessly isolated and forsaken, while Israel for her part
were forced into a mood of desperation.
A security
treaty with Israel would go a long way towards meeting these issues. By proving
conclusively that the US is determined not to leave Israel in the lurch, but on
the contrary, to make the most of Israel’s association, the treaty would give
Israel a sense of poise and stability. It would at the same time promote a more
realistic spirit within the Arab States and bring them nearer to peace. It
would also make the reluctant. Arab States eager to secure for themselves the
advantage accruing from an association with the US which would have come within
the grasp of Israel. It would thus be a skillful throw, killing two, or even
three birds with one stone. Moreover, for us in Israel, and we think for many
people outside, it is hardly conceivable that the region can be effectively
mobilized for resistance to a possible Soviet aggression or subversive
penetration without the participation of the one state within it to whom
democracy and spiritual liberty are the very breath of existence and whose
military and industrial potential is patent.
The second
consideration, with all its cogency, is liable to produce deadlock. The root of
the trouble is not the insolubility of the problems at issue between us and the
Arab States, but the deliberate refusal of their leaders to tackle them. That
refusal is only likely to harden still further once they realize that by
proposing any compromise they can prevent Israel from getting a security treaty
with the USA. This result will be bad enough, but if the USA goes further and
proceeds to indicate the specific lines along which a settlement is to be sought,
a worse complication is bound to arise.
You said
to Ambassador Eban on the 13 April that when the USA Government comes out with
its proposals for a settlement, Israel will probably not like some of them and
the Arabs will not like some others. I must admit that this prediction has
filled our hearts with an anxiety not less serious than the one you are so
earnestly endeavoring to allay. We are prepared to accept the status quo
whereas the Arabs are out to change it to our undoing. We do not claim their territory.
They claim ours. We do not ask that Jewish refugees from Arab lands be
repatriated. They insist on the return to Israel of Arabs who fled. In these
circumstances, what they will not like is their failure to get what they do not
possess, whereas what we shall not like is to give up what is ours.
Should
proposals of this nature be presented, the following results will ensue. Israel
will have no alternative but to reject them. The Arab States will regard them
as a premium upon their intransigence in which they will persist hoping to
extract larger concessions.
To sum up
this part of my argument, if the treaty is made contingent upon a prior
settlement, there will be no treaty; and if the settlement is predicated upon
one-sided concessions, there will be no settlement. A double vicious circle may
well be .created. I am certain that our desire is to avoid such a political
impasse and it is to the same end that my present observations are directed
In all
earnestness I would appeal to you to give further urgent thought to the crucial
question of whether the conclusion of a defense treaty should be deferred till
after tangible progress towards a settlement has been achieved or whether it
should not rather be proceeded with at once and itself pave the way for such
progress. I am encouraged to press this view in the light of your own statement
to Ambassador Eban that you envisage a program leading to the conclusion of a
treaty within the current year and that you do not intend to make it dependent
on unattainable conditions.
In this
context I would be failing in my duty of candour towards you if I did not make
it clear beyond any possibility of misunderstanding that there can be no
question for us of cession of territory or the return of Arab refugees. The United
Nations compromise of 1947 was annulled by Arab aggression which deserves no
reward. Any reversion in that direction is now political and physical
impossibility. This does not of course exclude the technical demarcation of the
frontiers at a peace settlement which may entail minor and mutual adjustments
nor the continued application for the benefit of Arab refugees of the reunion
of families scheme.
All this
does not mean either that we envisage a rigid continuation of the present
deadlock till suddenly peace comes about at the waving of a magic wand, or that
we are prepared to contemplate with equanimity a further deterioration of
border security regardless of its ultimate consequences.
Nothing is
farther from our thoughts and on the contrary, we do believe that gradual
progress towards a settlement such as would result in some interim modus
vivendi, is indeed possible. On the question of the Jordan waters I can only
reiterate the hope that an agreed solution may well be within our reach and as
regards border security, given a firm resolve on the Arab side to check
disorders, a great deal can be done to prevent armed attacks and incursions and
reduce the incidence of marauding to a tolerable minimum. For our part, and
without committing ourselves in advance to the endorsement of every and any
proposal, we shall be only too eager to collaborate with the UN and the Arab
States concerned in the implementation of this program. Furthermore, we would
be ready to proceed to the payment of compensation for refugee
lands—necessitating possibly a special loan to us, repayable over a period of
years—provided Egypt lifted the Suez Canal blockade and the Arab States
discontinued their threats and reprisals against foreign firms, aviation
companies, etc., operating in Israel. Finally, we offer cooperation with the
Arab Governments in the mutual checking of hostile propaganda and in the
adoption of other concerted measures aiming at the reduction of tension.
For the
attainment of these objectives we should welcome the assistance of the USA,
just as we have welcomed Ambassador Johnston’s mission. Such assistance, to be
successful, need not be accompanied by the formulation of definite proposals
for a peace settlement, either complete or partial. Indeed, for reasons explained,
the prior enunciation by the USA or by any other third power, of specific terms
is liable to wreck the chances of a settlement. We feel convinced, for
instance, that the attempt to prejudge the outcome of the water negotiations by
the prior formulation of the main report added needlessly to Ambassador
Johnston’s difficulties which he subsequently managed partly to overcome only
by dint of high skill and unlimited patience. In the case of such decisive
problems as territory and population, the setting forth by a third party of
concrete terms in advance may lead to fatal results and should at all costs be
avoided.
If the
approach here outlined commends itself to your judgment, I would suggest that
discussions be initiated without delay concerning the exact scope and terms of
a Security Treaty. At the same time soundings might be undertaken with regard
to the possible discontinuance of Arab economic warfare against Israel’s
readiness to take in hand the payment of compensation in respect of Arab lands abandoned.
I should
be grateful for an early intimation of your reaction to the views expressed in
this letter.
I assume
that these lines will reach you on the eve of your departure for Europe and I
take this opportunity of again wishing you the fullest measure of success in
your efforts for the sake of peace and freedom.
With
best wishes
cordially
yours
Moshe
Sharett
Minister
for Foreign Affairs
SOURCE: FRUS 1955-1957, XIV, doc.87.
