Cables forwarded
from Eytan in Jerusalem to Sharett in New York, December 12, 1955
(A)
To the Minister.
Following
consultation with Gideon [Rafael] & Yaacov [Herzog] I sent this morning the
following letter to the PM.
I want to
express my sorrow that neither I, nor any other FM person, was a party to the
considerations brought up regarding last night’s operation on the Syrian
border. Had I been given an opportunity, I would have tabled the following
considerations:
a) Our
main aim at this hour is to obtain defense weaponry. Important actions are
being taken in both the US and France. According to what was said to the FM in
his last conversation with Dulles, it could be expected that the Minister would
be given an answer to our request for weapons before leaving the USA, i.e., today
or tomorrow. On the French front matters are pending decision and only a few
days ago Shimon Peres flew out to take part in a big operation the aim of which
is to overcome difficulties that have arisen regarding clinching the deal on
the jets. It is known that the French are especially sensitive to any blow
against Syria. Our military operation will be exploited by those interested in
preventing a response to our appeals for arms and will weaken our friends, Jews
and non-Jews alike.
b) Today
is the opening of the debate in the British Parliament on the topic of the
Middle East. Following a thorough political preparation, our friends were made
ready for an all-out attack against Eden’s plans for reducing Israel’s
territory and for criticism of the British government’s policy of supplying
arms only to the Arabs.
c) Any
military action needs prior public relations activity – as was successfully
done prior to [the] Khan Yunes [operation of August 31/September 1] – in order
to prepare world opinion and prevent negative political results. Regarding the
present case, the world was not aware of the latest Syrian provocations, the
impact of which had not sufficiently penetrated world awareness.
d) Our
military action cannot but enhance Syrian-Egyptian military partnership when
our main struggle flares up with Egypt.
e) An
Israeli attack against Syria at this juncture would enhance trends which are
active there towards cooperation with the Soviet Union, this leading to various
conclusions in the policies of the Arabs, the west and the Soviet Union itself.
Eytan
(B)
Immediate
To the Minister.
I received a written answer from PM as follows:
Recent
days have been hectic days and Golda’s trip yesterday scrambled my time even
more, and I am indeed sorry that I did not converse and did not consult with
you before the action, especially since I am aware that several of your
considerations carry much weight, even if they do not exhaust them all – and
it’s a pity.
Eytan
(C)
Eytan to Israel Embassies Washington, London, Paris,
Rome, 12.12.55
Personal for the Ambassador.
The action against Syria was executed without prior
consultation with the Foreign Ministry. I expressed my regret to the PM. For
your knowledge.
Eytan
