When I saw Mr Sharett this morning I said I was
distressed to find that so many people (including, according to some reports,
the Prime Minister), appeared to believe that our real motive in urging Israel
to make territorial concessions was to obtain a corridor across the Negev, or a
large expanse of territory in the Negev, for our own strategic purposes.
2. Mr Sharett replied that it was an exaggeration
to say that the people seriously believed this though it was undoubtedly true
that many of them suspected it. The suspicion was one of the reasons, though
not by any means the chief one, why the Israeli Government felt that Her
Majesty’s Government were not qualified to act as mediator.
3. I said that suspicion seemed to me singularly
ill founded. If we ever wished to move troops across the Negev it could only be
(a) in circumstances where we
and Israel were equally threatened by a Russian attack, in which case we should
not need a corridor under our own control or
(b) if we were at war with
Israel, in which case the possibility of transit would depend upon our relative
strength and not on anyone’s title to a corridor.
4. As regards bases, I said that to the best of
my knowledge, the question had never been considered.
5. Mr Sharett seemed a good deal relieved by
these explanations, and I do not think any further action is called for.
SOURCE: Nicholls to FO, December 30, 1955,
tgm.557, TNA FO371/115887 VR1076/531G.
