Met with Prime Minister 4 pm
today at his office Jerusalem [- - -]. Following few exchange of remarks on
Gaza developments, Secretary's speech, and Syrian removal Israel soldiers from
POW status, I delivered substance of message contained in paragraph 2
Department telegram 155. Prime Minister listened carefully, made a few notes
and when I finished entered at once into a measured reply, the gist of which
follows:
1. Reviewed Gaza border
developments of 'past few months which he characterized as complete quiet until
recently when (a) Egypt suddenly opened fire on IDF patrol in Israel territory; (b) Egypt broke off Gaza talks under UN; (c) Egypt started series of
"dastardly actions on border."
He referred specifically to Egyptian military action of
Thursday night when GOE military forces crossed into Israel territory four
times and GOE publicly admitted actions, and Saturday night Egyptians launched
"regular offensive" with some military units penetrating rather
deeply as illustrated by the action near Askelon [- - -] some 12 kilometers
inside Israel. In reply to my inquiry as to whether there was any doubt as to [garble] Egyptian action, he stated that Israel now held uniform Egyptian who
was wounded in the action and who admitted that he was member of one of several
groups which had been sent into Israel to ambush and sabotage. Sharett laid
considerable stress on the depth of penetration angle and the startling effect
this had on the public security-wise, just as he did when he defended the Gaza
incident of February 28.
He then said, as in effect he has twice said during the
past two weeks [- - -] "surely Nasser realizes that two can play the same
game."
He then launched into his theme that Egypt has no right
to remain in Gaza -- she is there only under terms of the armistice and she has
so abused her position that she should no longer be permitted to remain; the
Egyptians are "invaders." The question arises as to whether this can
be tolerated any longer. He then said, "Please inform the United States
Government that Egypt should be made to clear out of Gaza – she had used it as
a springboard for violent action against Israel – she has violated the
armistice and cannot claim its protection, she cannot have it both ways."
"Why is Nasser doing this?" He said, "I am
no mind reader and I cannot be certain why he has adopted this policy. It must
be because of one or two of the following reasons: (a) his desire to cement the
Arab front around Israel; (b) he may wish to provoke Israel into a major
action; (c) he may wish to bolster up his tottering ; regime."
Sharett was convinced that Nasser broke off the Gaza talks
to clear the decks for this current action and every conceivable effort had
been made to convince Nasser that "he should behave." In considering
why Nasser acted as he has, Sharett reiterated his former statement to me, that
is, "Nasser has the idea that he can carry on these aggressions (implying
that they would be kept below level of major military action) without fear of
drastic reactions on the part of Israel, because the United States will
continue to bring pressure on Israel not to retaliate."
I remarked, that I doubted that Nasser really believed
that, but if Nasser had thought so I certainly hoped that by now, due to our
representations to him, his mind has been completely disabused of the idea.
Sharett said he hoped so, "but it (sic) will depend on what will happen
during the next two or three nights."
I immediately picked up this remark, hoping it indicated
the GOI was holding up action on the Gaza border to await indicative actions by
Egypt. I repeated his remark and asked if it might not be logical to see in the
next two or three nights a direct reflection of our counseling to Nasser to
abandon any aggressive program he might have in mind. He thought that might
well be the case, implying that continued Egyptian military action would show clearly
that US Counsel was having no effect. I could not, however, elicit from him any
statement or indication that the IDF was holding up action until there is proof
that our pressures on Nasser were effective. The great danger of a continuation
of these incidents was, he said, that the people living on the border would
leave the area or they would become "war-minded." He did not say so,
but I assumed that the latter development applied to some sizeable segments of
the general public as well.
He remarked that he considered it a tragedy that the Gaza
talks, which had been proceeding for some time and which held for him so much
hope, should have been renounced by Egypt – first Egypt opens fire on an Israel
patrol in Israel territory; then Egypt breaks off the talks; then Egypt embarks
on a regular offensive.
He again referred to Israel intelligence reports to the
effect that Nasser had inferred [informed] other Arab States of his aggressive active program in Gaza [- - -] as
indicating that the current incidents are part and parcel of a determined
program by Egypt. He thought Nasser should be told firmly by the US to stop. I
reminded him that we had already approached GOE on that score and that we hoped
for effective results. But I fear that he feels our representations are not
strong enough, although he did not say so. I make no reference to our specific
efforts and results thereof [- - -] in view of counter-productiveness due to
subsequent Egyptian actions.
With regard to possibility that retaliatory action by IDF
might be construed by world opinion as GOI reply to Secretary's statement [- -
-] he expressed some doubt. He said the speech was a very important document
and had been considered by the Cabinet meeting earlier in the day; the Cabinet
would give it further study; and that he might wish to discuss it with me in a
few days, possibly asking for "USG to elucidate certain points." In
response to my question as to whether the Cabinet exhibited any definite
reaction to the speech, Herzo[g] replied that there were some strong reactions
on some points but did not identify them.
Comment: The
Prime Minister seemed to be in much better spirits than one might expect in
view of the rather long and important Cabinet meeting a short time prior to our
meeting; the critical situation on the Gaza border with news of new incidents
reaching him frequently; he had not heard of the latest one [- - -] (in which
two Israel soldiers killed when I saw him), the Syrian decision re the Israel
soldiers [- - -] and the very difficult and personally distasteful experiences
suffered by him at the hands of Ben Gurion during recent weeks. He did not
display as much excitement or explosiveness in his comments as I had
anticipated. Whether this reflected relief and resignation to important and
critical Cabinet decisions today I could not assess, but I felt confident that
it did not reflect any great personal victory or success for moderation over
activism in the same meeting. He was firm and decisive in his manner but not
aggressive.
It seemed to me that the outstanding indices to the
current GOI attitude toward retaliation in terms somewhat stronger than usual,
lie in the emphasis with which he treated certain points. For example, he
returned several times to the thesis that Egypt had no right to remain in Gaza,
and pondered whether it could long be tolerated; he requested that the USG oust
Egypt from Gaza; he stressed Egypt's loss of rights to be in Gaza.
I gathered that the discussions in the Cabinet meeting
today followed something of the same pattern followed before final decision in
February to launch the Gaza incident. Therefore, this coincidence of approach
to the present situation seems to support the theory of retaliation on
something larger than the usual talk of retaliation of the past.
The possible loss of benefits deriving from Secretary's
speech proposals seemed to be of far less concern to him than presence of Egypt
in Gaza with the immediate security problem it posed, the deep penetration, the
loss of life and associated current problems.
With regard to possible immediate action or timing of any
phase on a retaliatory action program I sensed, although I had no tangible
evidence, that the present plan – probably confirmed at the Cabinet meeting
today – is a flexible one which can be activated without delay and whenever the
Egyptian aggressions become too frequent, too penetrating, or too intolerable
from Israel's viewpoint and there is no firm policy of awaiting the events of
“the next two or three nights.”
FRUS 1955-1957, XIV, doc.234. On the situation of Israeli soldiers held
in Syria, see also DFPI 10, doc.351.
